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ABSTRACT	  
	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  aiding	  Europe’s	  integrationist	  project	  with	  regards	  to	  law.	  Since	  the	  1960s,	  the	  Union’s	  acknowledgement	  and	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  have	  evolved	  considerably;	  it	  has	  transitioned	  from	  a	  supranational	  polity	  in	  which	  guaranteed	  rights	  were	  shrouded	  in	  normative	  ambiguity	  and	  forming	  only	  “the	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,”	  to	  that	  of	  a	  polity	  in	  which	  fundamental	  rights	  came	  to	  occupy	  their	  own	  sphere	  of	  influence,	  as	  the	  2009	  legal	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  indicates.	  This	  thesis	  is	  specifically	  concerned	  with	  examining	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Court’s	  evolving	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  has	  served	  as	  a	  positive,	  integrative	  force	  in	  the	  ongoing	  construction	  of	  the	  EU.	  It	  leverages	  neo-­‐functionalism	  as	  a	  paradigm	  to	  explain	  not	  only	  how	  the	  Court’s	  rights-­‐based	  adjudication	  enhances	  European	  integration,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  examining	  
to	  what	  degree	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  it	  does	  so.	  As	  such,	  this	  thesis	  analyzes	  various	  rights-­‐oriented	  legal	  case	  studies,	  and	  it	  examines	  their	  outcomes	  from	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  gauging	  their	  integrative	  effects.	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   Since	  its	  establishment	  in	  1957,	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ECJ)	  has	  maintained	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  legal	  integration	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU).	  The	  Court’s	  case	  law	  has	  shaped	  market	  integration,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  among	  the	  EU’s	  organs	  of	  government,	  and	  the	  constitutional	  boundaries	  between	  international,	  supranational,	  and	  national	  authority.	  The	  ECJ	  maintains	  various	  judicial	  doctrines,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  procedural	  guarantees,	  that	  enable	  it	  constitutionalize	  the	  EU.1	  Thus,	  the	  discursive	  narrative	  of	  European	  integration	  recounts	  the	  gradual	  transformation	  of	  a	  treaty	  regime	  through	  law	  and	  courts.	  As	  such,	  the	  EU’s	  various	  treaties	  provide	  the	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  framework	  in	  which	  this	  supranational,	  expansionary	  legal	  system	  has	  developed.	  These	  treaties	  serve	  as	  “the	  basic	  constitutional	  charter”2	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  	   The	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  (1957)	  was	  an	  international	  agreement	  that	  led	  to	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  (EEC),	  now	  the	  EU.	  The	  Treaty’s	  dominant	  philosophy	  was	  market	  driven,	  and	  many	  of	  its	  core	  provisions	  detailed	  the	  means	  by	  which	  neo-­‐protectionist	  barriers	  –	  embodied	  in	  national	  standards,	  public	  procurement	  policies,	  industrial	  subsidies,	  and	  the	  like	  -­‐	  would	  be	  removed	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  services,	  people,	  and	  capital.	  Absent	  from	  the	  Treaty	  were	  specific	  enumerations	  of	  human	  rights.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  context	  that	  the	  EU	  developed	  a	  “human	  rights	  discontinuity.”3	  Without	  the	  Treaty	  explicitly	  stipulating	  human	  rights	  guarantees,	  there	  lacked	  an	  ‘internal’	  judicial	  control	  on	  fundamental	  rights	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  As	  the	  EU’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Chapter	  1.	  	  2	  Parti	  Ecologiste	  “Les	  Verts”	  v.	  European	  Parliament.	  [1986]	  	  3	  Scheeck,	  Laurent.	  The	  Relationship	  Between	  the	  European	  Courts	  and	  Integration	  through	  Human	  Rights.	  Working	  paper.	  Vol.	  15.	  Research	  in	  Question.	  Paris:	  Science	  Po,	  2005.	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economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  competencies	  expanded,	  this	  reality	  became	  unsettling	  for	  the	  Member	  States,	  who	  realized	  that	  potential	  infringements	  on	  human	  rights	  were	  unavoidable.	  Recognizing	  this,	  the	  ECJ	  established	  its	  own	  human	  rights	  jurisdiction,	  and	  developed	  its	  own	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  Since	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  Court	  has	  concerned	  itself	  with	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  due	  process4,	  respect	  for	  private	  life5,	  lawyers’	  business	  secrecy6,	  the	  principle	  of	  review	  by	  courts7,	  the	  right	  not	  to	  incriminate	  oneself8,	  and	  more.	  “Reading	  an	  unwritten	  bill	  of	  rights	  into	  Community	  law	  is	  indeed	  the	  most	  striking	  contribution	  the	  Court	  made	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe,”9	  declared	  ECJ	  Judge	  Mancini	  in	  1989.	  	  	   	  The	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR)	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  of	  crucial	  importance	  in	  the	  ECJ’s	  construction	  of	  its	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  Indeed,	  the	  ECHR	  “is	  widely	  accepted	  as	  the	  ‘most	  advanced	  and	  effective’	  international	  regime	  for	  enforcing	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  world	  today.”10	  Since	  1953,	  it	  has	  sought	  to	  define	  and	  protect	  an	  explicit	  set	  of	  civil	  and	  political	  rights	  for	  all	  persons	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe’s	  (CoE)	  Member	  States.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CoE	  and	  the	  EU	  have	  maintained	  complete	  overlap	  in	  their	  membership	  since	  May	  1974,	  it	  seems	  logical	  that	  the	  ECJ	  instrumentalizes	  the	  ECHR	  in	  its	  human	  rights	  legal	  doctrine.	  The	  ECJ’s	  use	  of	  the	  ECHR	  has	  evolved	  from	  very	  general	  references	  to	  “an	  expanding	  integration	  of	  the	  Conventional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Precastaing	  (1980),	  Van	  Ladewyck	  (1980)	  5	  Panasonic	  (National)	  UK	  Limited	  v.	  Commission	  (1980);	  Stanley	  Adams	  v.	  Commission	  (1985)	  	  6	  	  AM&S	  Europe	  (1982)	  7	  Kirk	  (1984)	  8	  Hoechst	  AG	  (1989)	  	  9	  Horspool,	  Margot.	  European	  Union	  Law.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  	  10	  Moravcsik,	  Andrew.	  "The	  Origins	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Regimes:	  Democratic	  Delegation	  in	  Postwar	  Europe."	  
International	  Organization	  54,	  no.	  2	  (April	  01,	  2000):	  217-­‐52.	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acquis	  into	  its	  own	  case	  law.”11	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  between	  1975	  and	  1998,	  the	  ECJ	  cited	  the	  ECHR	  in	  over	  seventy	  judgments.12	  	  	   The	  Court’s	  efforts	  in	  constructing	  its	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  were	  formally	  recognized	  nearly	  thirty	  years	  later,	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  (1993)	  and	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  (1997).	  The	  Treaties	  declare,	  	  	  “The	  Union	  shall	  respect	  fundamental	  rights,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  signed	  in	  Rome	  on	  4	  November	  1950,	  and	  as	  they	  result	  from	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  
general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law.”13	  	  Thus,	  the	  Treaty	  consolidated	  what	  had	  been	  previously	  articulated	  and	  practiced	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  By	  establishing	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  as	  a	  Treaty	  obligation,	  it	  would	  seem	  as	  though	  the	  Union’s	  ‘human	  rights	  discontinuity,’	  as	  previously	  defined,	  was	  remedied.	  In	  practice,	  though,	  this	  was	  not	  necessarily	  so.	  The	  Union’s	  lack	  of	  a	  legally	  binding,	  enumerated	  bill	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  impeded	  the	  Court’s	  ability	  to	  coherently	  judicialize	  within	  the	  domain.	  The	  ECJ	  extrapolates	  “the	  general	  principles	  of	  this	  instrument	  [ECHR],”14	  and	  applies	  “them	  as	  Community	  principles	  on	  an	  incremental	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.”15	  In	  fact,	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  consistently	  asserts	  that	  fundamental	  rights	  guarantees	  exist	  only,	  “in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law.”16	  Article	  6(2)	  reaffirms	  this.	  Thus,	  the	  Court’s	  formulations	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  are	  shrouded	  in	  ambiguity.	  What,	  exactly,	  do	  “general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law”	  entail	  in	  relation	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Guild,	  Elspeth,	  and	  Guillaume	  Lesieur.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights:	  Who	  Said	  What,	  When?	  London:	  Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  1998.	  12	  Ibid.	  P9	  	  13	  Article	  6(2)	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam,	  Article	  F(2)	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  14	  Balfour,	  Adam.	  "Application	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice."	  Harvard	  Law	  School	  Student	  Scholarship	  Series,	  4th	  ser.	  (March	  1,	  2005):	  1-­‐39.	  15	  Ibid.	  P11.	  	  16	  Stauder	  [1969],	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  	  [1970],	  Hauer	  [1979],	  Cinetheque	  [1985],	  Demirel	  [1987],	  Kadi	  [2008]	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rights?	  Why	  does	  the	  Court	  accept	  certain	  ECHR	  claims	  to	  be	  part	  of	  these	  “general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,”	  while	  rejecting	  others?	  	  	   By	  1999,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  such	  inconsistent	  application	  of	  the	  Convention	  was	  “unsatisfactory	  and	  should	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  formal	  document	  listing	  such	  rights.”17	  It	  was	  reasoned	  that	  a	  bill	  of	  rights,	  drafted	  by	  the	  Union,	  and	  for	  the	  Union,	  would	  result	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  uniform	  concept	  of	  such	  rights,	  both	  in	  scope	  and	  content.	  	  In	  2000,	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  drafted	  and	  proclaimed	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  (CFRF);	  this	  document	  creates	  an	  explicit	  catalogue	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  is	  no	  longer	  bound	  to	  rely	  its	  arbitrary	  “general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law”	  formula	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  rights.	  The	  Charter	  draws	  its	  inspiration	  from	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  Constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  EU	  Member	  States,	  and	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law.	  Essentially,	  its	  content	  codifies	  the	  sources	  of	  influence	  identified	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam’s	  Article	  6(2).	  The	  Charter’s	  introduction	  marks	  a	  convergence	  of	  the	  interpretative	  tools	  the	  Court	  had	  leveraged	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  past.	  With	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  on	  December	  1st,	  2009,	  the	  Charter	  became	  legally	  binding	  within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  and	  it	  acquired	  higher	  legal	  status,	  with	  Article	  6(1)	  declaring:	  “The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 
2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Weiler,	  Joseph	  H.H.	  "Human	  Rights,	  Constitutionalism,	  and	  Integration:	  Iconography	  and	  Fetishism."	  In	  An	  
Identity	  for	  Europe:	  The	  Relevance	  of	  Multiculturalism	  in	  EU	  Construction,	  by	  Riva	  Kastoryano.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009.	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As	  such,	  the	  Charter	  now	  influences	  “the	  process	  of	  interpretation,	  of	  determination	  of	  the	  very	  content	  of	  particular	  norms,	  their	  extent	  and	  legal	  consequences,	  and	  thus	  they	  provide	  for	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  field	  of	  application	  of	  the	  European	  rules	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  order.”18	  	  
The	  Judiciary	  as	  a	  Positive	  Tool	  for	  Regional	  Integration	  	  	  The	  political	  developments	  outlined	  above	  signal	  a	  shift	  in	  not	  only	  in	  behavioral	  attitudes	  of	  the	  Union’s	  political	  actors,	  but	  also	  an	  expansion	  of	  its	  governing	  competencies.	  As	  such,	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  human	  rights	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  European	  integration.	  Since	  the	  1950s,	  scholars	  have	  sought	  to	  provide	  a	  theory	  explaining	  how	  and	  why	  supranational	  governance	  has,	  and	  continues	  to,	  develop.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  as,	  “the	  creation	  of	  a	  multinational,	  multicultural,	  and	  multilingual	  federation	  of	  state	  with	  mature	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  legal	  systems”	  19	  is	  unprecedented.	  	  The	  success	  of	  supranational	  integration	  is	  inherently	  contingent	  on	  the	  construction,	  coordination,	  acceptance,	  and	  diffusion	  of	  Community-­‐oriented	  norms	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  However,	  such	  a	  process	  requires	  inter-­‐governmental	  cooperation,	  to	  which	  “collective	  actions	  problems	  are	  endemic.”20	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU,	  collective	  action	  problems	  are	  unavoidable.	  The	  Union	  is	  “united	  in	  its	  diversity,”21	  by	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  two-­‐layered	  polity,	  an	  entity	  that	  is	  simultaneously	  supranational	  and	  subnational.	  The	  first	  layer	  constitutes	  the	  EU	  itself,	  which	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  polity	  maintaining	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Marek	  Safjan,	  ‘Fields	  of	  application	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundametnal	  Rights	  and	  constitutional	  dialogues	  in	  the	  European	  Union,’	  EUI	  Law;	  Centre	  for	  Judicial	  Cooepration	  DL,	  2014/02.	  P2	  19	  Cini,	  Michelle.	  European	  Union	  Politics.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003.	  P73	  20	  Garrett,	  Geoffrey,	  and	  Barry	  R.	  Weingast.	  "Ideas,	  Interests,	  and	  Institutions:	  Constructing	  the	  European	  Community's	  Internal	  Market."	  In	  Ideas	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Beliefs,	  Institutions,	  and	  Political	  Change,	  by	  Judith	  Goldstein	  and	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1993.	  21	  See	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Draft	  Treaty	  Establishing	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe,	  CONV	  850/03	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own	  distinct	  value-­‐choices	  and	  interests.	  The	  second	  layer	  encompasses	  the	  Member	  States;	  each	  of	  these	  distinct	  societies	  maintains	  autonomous	  social	  identities	  and	  their	  own	  constitutions,	  reflective	  of	  their	  diverse	  socioeconomic	  and	  cultural	  preferences.	  By	  virtue	  of	  joining	  the	  EU,	  Member	  States	  agree	  to	  share	  certain	  core,	  fundamental	  values.	  However,	  these	  national	  actors	  also	  want	  to	  retain	  dimensions	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  certain	  domains,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  enumerated	  constitutional	  rights.	  	  How	  are	  the	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  preferences	  of	  these	  strikingly	  different	  political	  entities	  to	  be	  reconciled?	  Though	  all	  Member	  States	  advocate	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  integration,	  there	  are	  “often	  multiple	  paths	  towards	  capturing	  the	  gains	  from	  cooperation	  and	  no	  obvious	  way	  for	  a	  set	  of	  decentralized	  actors	  to	  converge	  on	  them.”22	  Thus,	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  left	  in	  political	  gridlock,	  providing	  for	  “the	  potentially	  pivotal	  role	  of	  ideas”23	  in	  solving	  this	  dilemma.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  framework	  that	  the	  ECJ	  assumes	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  aiding	  the	  Union’s	  integrationist	  efforts.	  	  Through	  their	  utilization	  of	  various	  procedural	  mechanisms	  and	  certain	  legal	  doctrines,	  the	  ECJ’s	  case-­‐law	  “coincidences	  with	  the	  making	  of	  a	  constitution	  for	  Europe.”24	  Constitutionalization	  refers	  to	  “the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  evolved	  from	  a	  set	  of	  legal	  arrangements	  binding	  upon	  sovereign	  states	  into	  a	  vertical	  integrated	  legal	  regime	  conferring	  judicially	  enforceable	  rights	  and	  obligations	  on	  legal	  persons	  and	  entities,	  public	  and	  private,	  within	  the	  EU	  territory.”25	  To	  put	  it	  simply,	  EU	  integration	  is	  contingent	  upon	  constitutionalization,	  for	  it	  provides	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  EU’s	  inter-­‐governmental	  collective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Garrett,	  Geoffrey,	  and	  Barry	  R.	  Weingast.	  "Ideas,	  Interests,	  and	  Institutions:	  Constructing	  the	  European	  Community's	  Internal	  Market."	  P176.	  	  23	  Ibid.	  	  24	  Mancini,	  Frederico.	  "The	  Making	  of	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  26	  (1989):	  595-­‐614.	  25	  Sweet,	  Alec	  Stone.	  "Chapter	  1:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Integration."	  In	  The	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004.	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action	  problem.	  This	  is	  because	  constitutionalization	  creates	  legal	  doctrine	  that	  “embodies,	  selects,	  and	  publicizes	  particular	  paths	  on	  which	  all	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  coordinate,”26	  in	  certain	  policy	  domains,	  and	  it	  “defines	  for	  the	  community	  what	  actions	  constitute	  cooperation	  and	  defection.”27	  Thus,	  the	  ECJ’s	  jurisprudence	  creates	  a	  shared	  belief	  system,	  in	  which	  “ideals	  become	  ‘focal	  points’	  around	  which	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors	  converges.”28	  Taking	  this	  into	  account,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  EU’s	  judiciary	  is	  well	  positioned	  to	  aid	  the	  efforts	  of	  supranational	  integration.	  	  
Thematic	  Questions	  Considered	  In	  the	  broadest	  sense,	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  ECJ	  has	  aided	  the	  Union’s	  integrationist	  project	  with	  regard	  to	  law.	  How	  do	  Member	  States’	  distinct,	  national	  identities	  and	  normative	  interests	  affect	  the	  Court’s	  jurisprudence,	  and	  conversely,	  how	  does	  the	  Court’s	  jurisprudence	  affect	  Member	  States’	  conceptualization	  of	  these	  norms?	  In	  particular,	  this	  thesis	  asks:	  to	  what	  degree	  has	  the	  Court’s	  evolving	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  served	  as	  a	  positive,	  integrative	  force	  in	  the	  ongoing	  construction	  of	  the	  EU?	  Does	  the	  Court’s	  conceptualization	  of	  rights	  at	  the	  Community	  level	  transcend	  Member	  States’	  sovereign	  and	  nationally	  embedded	  interpretation	  of	  human	  rights	  norms?	  If	  integration	  is	  to	  excel	  and	  develop	  a	  self-­‐sustaining,	  assimilating	  momentum,	  the	  answer	  to	  both	  of	  these	  questions	  should	  be	  in	  the	  affirmative.	  However,	  if	  the	  answers	  to	  the	  above	  question	  are	  in	  the	  negative,	  then	  thesis	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  institutions	  and	  entrenched	  sociopolitical	  preferences	  can	  alter	  and	  constrain	  the	  dynamics	  of	  regional	  integration,	  with	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Garrett,	  Geoffrey,	  and	  Barry	  R.	  Weingast.	  "Ideas,	  Interests,	  and	  Institutions:	  Constructing	  the	  European	  Community's	  Internal	  Market."	  P176	  27	  Ibid.	  	  28	  Ibid.	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rights	  providing	  a	  case-­‐study	  on	  this	  matter.	  	  The	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  finding	  are	  especially	  relevant	  as	  the	  Union’s	  institutional	  capacities	  continue	  to	  evolve	  and	  consolidate,	  and	  “as	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  limit	  to	  Community	  competences	  and	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiary29	  in	  the	  judicial	  field	  continues	  to	  simmer	  or	  boil.”	  30	  This	  thesis	  leverages	  neo-­‐functionalism	  as	  a	  paradigm	  to	  explain	  not	  only	  how	  the	  Court’s	  rights-­‐based	  adjudication	  enhances	  European	  integration,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  examining	  to	  what	  degree	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  it	  does	  so.	  As	  such,	  I	  look	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  ECJ’s	  evolving	  rights	  jurisprudence	  adheres	  to	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism,	  which	  posits	  that	  a	  gradual	  transformation	  in	  Union’s	  jurisdictional	  competencies	  in	  favor	  of	  supranational	  governance	  is	  a	  self-­‐sustaining,	  expansionary	  process.	  “One	  strong	  assumption	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism	  is	  that	  the	  ECJ	  will	  consistently	  work	  to	  produce	  pro-­‐integrative	  policies,	  even	  when	  these	  are	  resisted	  by	  the	  most	  powerful	  states.”31	  Thus,	  if	  neo-­‐functionalism	  operates	  autonomously	  in	  aiding	  integration,	  one	  expects	  that	  the	  Court	  would	  widen	  its	  jurisdiction	  to	  partake	  in	  right-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review,	  as	  well	  as	  strictly	  limit	  the	  degree	  of	  deference	  awarded	  to	  Member	  States	  charged	  with	  remedying	  a	  rights	  violation.	  Neo-­‐functionalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  political	  spillover	  leads	  to	  the	  expectation	  that	  such	  judicial	  behavior	  would	  become	  even	  more	  common	  as	  time	  goes	  on.	  If	  such	  behavior	  is	  observed,	  then	  the	  Court’s	  jurisprudence	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  having	  a	  pro-­‐Community,	  harmonizing	  effect	  on	  human	  rights	  norms	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  Principle	  of	  Subsidiarity	  will	  be	  discussed	  more	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  30	  Weiler,	  Joseph	  H.H.,	  and	  Nicolas	  J.S.	  Lockhart.	  ""Taking	  Rights	  Seriously"	  Seriously:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Its	  Fundamental	  Rights	  Jurisprudence."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  32	  (1995):	  51-­‐94.	  P58	  31	  Stone	  Sweet,	  Alec.	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  and	  Supranational	  Governance.	  Yale	  Law	  School	  Legal	  Scholarship	  Repository.	  January	  1,	  2012.	  http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4628.	  	  P12.	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However,	  if	  the	  Court	  leaves	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  for	  the	  Member	  State	  to	  determine	  the	  scope	  of	  and	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  violation,	  then	  the	  Court	  impedes	  human	  rights’	  integrative	  effects;	  this	  is	  because	  the	  Member	  State	  is	  free	  to	  establish	  its	  own	  distinct	  normative	  standard	  of	  rights	  protection	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  contested	  EU	  law.	  	  	   	   	   Organization	  of	  Content	  	  Chapter	  one	  will	  argue	  that	  neo-­‐functionalism	  provides	  a	  theoretically	  explanation	  for	  how	  and	  why	  constitutionalization	  and	  regional	  integration	  converge.	  It	  will	  discuss	  the	  interplay	  between	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover,	  and	  how	  this	  leads	  to	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  policy	  domains	  the	  Court	  can	  adjudicate	  within,	  as	  well	  as	  create	  demand	  for	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  Community-­‐level	  norms.	  Chapter	  two	  will	  illustrate	  how	  neo-­‐functionalist	  spillover	  requires	  the	  Court	  to	  construct	  and	  to	  coordinate	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  human	  rights.	  It	  strives	  to	  show	  how	  constitutionalization	  and	  normative	  construction	  and	  diffusion	  work	  symbiotically.	  Chapter	  two	  will	  also	  discuss	  the	  various	  factors	  influencing	  the	  normative	  construction	  of	  human	  rights,	  and	  it	  will	  highlight	  the	  inherent	  difficulty	  the	  Court	  faces	  in	  translating	  such	  considerations	  into	  a	  transnational,	  legal	  context.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  discussion	  of	  the	  various	  considerations	  (e.g.	  economic	  competencies)	  and	  substantive	  sources	  (e.g.	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  Charter)	  animating	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning.	  	  Chapters	  three	  and	  four	  attempt	  to	  gauge	  the	  integrative	  effects	  of	  the	  Court’s	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  It	  focuses	  on	  the	  Court’s	  freedom	  of	  expression	  case	  law	  spanning	  the	  course	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  years;	  it	  looks	  at	  judgments	  prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Charter	  (1985	  –	  2000),	  after	  the	  proclamation	  of	  the	  Charter	  (2000	  –	  2009),	  and	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following	  the	  legal	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter	  (2009	  –	  2013).	  These	  chapters	  will	  examine	  the	  juridical	  outcomes	  of	  these	  cases	  within	  the	  analytical	  framework	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  discussed,	  these	  case	  studies	  will	  measure	  the	  presence	  of	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover	  in	  a	  context	  specific	  to	  jurisprudence.	  This	  thesis	  takes	  a	  doctrinal	  methodological	  approach,	  examining	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  court	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  textual	  reading,	  and	  evaluating	  the	  cases	  by	  reference	  to	  formal	  criteria	  such	  as	  consistency,	  clarity,	  and	  quality	  of	  legal	  reasoning,	  as	  well	  as	  broader	  teleological	  considerations.	  	  
Jurisdiction:	  How	  Do	  Cases	  Get	  Where	  They	  Get?	  	   Understanding	  the	  ECJ’s	  jurisdictional	  standing	  is	  necessary	  for	  conceptualizing	  the	  procedural	  boundaries	  under	  which	  human	  rights	  claims	  can	  be	  invoked,	  and	  thus	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Union’s	  legal	  order.	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  stipulates	  three	  circumstances	  under	  which	  a	  claim	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  ECJ.	  	  
• Article	  169	  gives	  a	  power	  to	  the	  Commission	  to	  bring	  an	  action	  before	  the	  Court	  against	  a	  Member	  State	  for	  failure	  to	  fulfill	  a	  treaty	  obligation.	  	  	  
• Article	  173	  permits	  any	  natural	  or	  legal	  person	  to	  bring	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Court	  against	  an	  act	  of	  the	  Commission	  or	  Council.	  Cases	  brought	  by	  means	  of	  Article	  173	  primarily	  relate	  to	  anti-­‐trust	  actions	  taken	  by	  the	  Commission	  under	  Articles	  85	  and	  86	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome.	  	  
• Article	  177	  awards	  the	  ECJ	  power	  to	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  on	  questions	  regarding	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  EC	  treaty	  referred	  to	  it	  for	  that	  purpose	  by	  a	  national	  court	  or	  tribunal.	  The	  legally	  integrative	  consequences	  of	  Article	  177	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  By	  and	  large,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  cases	  on	  the	  ECJ’s	  docket	  are	  brought	  under	  Article	  177,	  and	  the	  claims	  invoked	  often	  involve	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  policy	  questions.	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This	  thesis	  examines	  court	  cases	  brought	  to	  the	  ECJ	  only	  under	  Article	  177	  claims.	  In	  comparison	  to	  Article	  169	  and	  Article	  173,	  Article	  177	  is	  	  “by	  far	  the	  most	  important	  provision	  to	  the	  development	  of	  human	  rights	  discourse	  in	  Community	  law.”32	  The	  majority	  of	  cases	  citing	  ECHR	  and	  the	  Charter	  are	  referred	  to	  the	  Court	  under	  Article	  177,	  and	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  Community	  law	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  By	  examining	  such	  claims,	  this	  thesis	  assesses	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  ECJ	  creates	  substantive	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  By	  extension,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy33	  and	  Doctrine	  of	  Direct	  Effect34,	  this	  thesis	  can	  assess	  the	  diffusion	  of	  Community-­‐defined	  human	  rights	  norms	  within	  Member	  States’	  national,	  legal	  orders.	  Such	  a	  measurement	  provides	  much	  insight	  into	  the	  directional	  dynamics	  of	  regional	  integration.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Guild,	  Elspeth,	  and	  Guillaume	  Lesieur.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights:	  Who	  Said	  What,	  When?	  P23	  33	  See	  Chapter	  1	  	  34	  See	  Chapter	  1	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  CHAPTER	  1:	  The	  ECJ,	  Constitutionalization,	  and	  Europe’s	  Regional	  Integration	  	   Though	  the	  process	  of	  the	  EU’s	  integration	  can	  be	  observed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  executive	  (the	  European	  Commission),	  the	  legislative	  (the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union),	  and	  the	  judiciary	  (the	  ECJ),	  this	  thesis	  examines	  only	  the	  judiciary’s	  role	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  EU.	  Reasons	  for	  this	  are	  self-­‐evident,	  as	  this	  thesis	  explores	  solely	  the	  ECJ’s	  role	  in	  formulating	  the	  EU’s	  coordinated	  approach	  to	  human	  rights.	  	  
1.1	  Background	  Information	  on	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  	  	  	   The	  ECJ	  is	  the	  highest	  court	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  it	  is	  tasked	  with	  interpreting	  EU	  law	  and	  ensuring	  its	  equitable	  application	  across	  all	  Member	  States.	  The	  Court	  was	  established	  in	  1952,	  and	  it	  is	  based	  in	  Luxembourg.	  It	  is	  composed	  of	  on	  one	  judge	  per	  Member	  State,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  twenty-­‐eight	  sitting	  Justices	  as	  of	  the	  present.	  Under	  Article	  166	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome,	  the	  ECJ	  judges	  receive	  assistance	  from	  Advocates	  Generals,	  who	  present	  legal	  opinions	  of	  the	  cases	  assigned	  to	  them;	  their	  opinions	  are	  advisory	  and	  not	  legally	  binding,	  though	  scholarship	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  ECJ	  is	  often	  receptive	  to	  the	  Advocate	  Generals’	  opinions.	  The	  Judges	  and	  Advocates-­‐Generals	  are	  “chosen	  from	  persons	  whose	  independence	  is	  beyond	  doubt	  and	  who	  posses	  the	  qualifications	  required	  for	  appointment	  to	  the	  highest	  judicial	  offices	  in	  their	  respective	  countries.”35	  Both	  legal	  actors	  are	  appointed	  “by	  common	  accord	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  for	  a	  term	  of	  six	  years.”36	  	   The	  Court’s	  judicial	  authority	  is	  rooted	  in	  Article	  164	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome,	  which	  states,	  “The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  shall	  ensure	  that	  in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Article	  167,	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  	  36	  Ibid.	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Treaty	  the	  law	  is	  observed.”37	  Scholars	  have	  often	  noted	  that	  Article	  164	  “is	  believed	  to	  contain	  an	  exceptionally	  broad	  mandate	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  lay	  down	  rules	  of	  law	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  own	  preference.”38	  However,	  such	  a	  mandate	  is	  necessary	  given	  the	  shortcomings	  inherent	  in	  Treaties.	  	  
1.2	  The	  Differences	  between	  a	  Treaty	  and	  a	  Constitution	  	   The	  legal	  document	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  EU	  was	  a	  traditional,	  multilateral	  treaty.	  By	  definition,	  treaties	  are	  strikingly	  different	  from	  constitutions.	  “As	  a	  rule,	  treaties	  devise	  systems	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  whose	  main	  function	  is	  to	  keep	  under	  control	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  organization	  which	  they	  set	  up.”39	  However,	  because	  treaties	  are	  “products	  of	  protracted	  and	  laborious	  negotiations,”40	  they	  are	  often	  “vague	  and	  open-­‐ended,”41	  regulating	  few	  topics,	  such	  as	  the	  delineation	  of	  powers,	  in	  exhaustive	  detail.	  Additionally,	  treaties	  do	  not	  enjoy	  the	  status	  of	  higher	  law.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  viewed	  as	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  that	  is	  “subject	  to	  canons	  unlike	  all	  others.	  Such	  as,	  for	  example,	  the	  presumption	  that	  States	  do	  not	  lose	  their	  sovereignty.”42	  	  	   The	  Treaty	  of	  Rome’s	  organization	  and	  content	  are	  illustrative	  of	  the	  political	  shortcomings	  inherent	  in	  such	  documents.	  Following	  its	  legal	  ratification,	  there	  remained	  “meaningful	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  commitments	  made.”43	  Though	  the	  document	  outlined	  the	  basic	  ‘rules	  of	  the	  game,’	  “the	  wording	  of	  many	  provisions	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Article	  164,	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  	  38	  De	  Waele,	  Henri.	  "The	  Role	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  Integration	  Process:	  A	  Contemporary	  and	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  Assessment."	  European	  Law	  Review,	  2010th	  ser.:	  3-­‐26.	  	  39	  Mancini,	  Frederico.	  "The	  Making	  of	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe."	  P596	  	  40	  De	  Waele,	  Henri.	  "The	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  Court	  of	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  in	  the	  Integration	  Process:	  A	  Contemporary	  and	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  P10	  41	  Ibid.	  P9	  42	  Mancini,	  Frederico.	  "The	  Making	  of	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe."	  P596	  43	  Sweet,	  Alec	  Stone.	  "Chapter	  1:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Integration."	  In	  The	  Judicial	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  of	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indeed	  terse	  and	  laconic.”44	  This	  was	  problematic,	  as	  it	  allowed	  Member	  States	  to	  distill	  and	  to	  apply	  their	  own	  policy	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Treaty’s	  provisional	  requirements.	  Furthermore,	  because	  the	  Treaty	  did	  not	  enjoy	  “higher	  law	  status	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  contracting	  party,”45	  the	  already	  ambiguous	  relationship	  between	  Treaty	  obligations,	  Community	  law,	  and	  national	  law	  was	  further	  exacerbated.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  Union’s	  integrationist	  efforts	  were	  threatened	  to	  come	  to	  a	  standstill,	  for	  those	  at	  the	  Community	  level	  struggled	  to	  harmonize	  the	  diverse	  policy	  actions	  of	  those	  at	  the	  Member	  State	  level.	  	  The	  ECJ	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome’s	  deficits,	  and	  of	  the	  necessity	  in	  providing	  “normative	  clarity”46	  to	  the	  document;	  “the	  main	  endeavor	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  precisely	  been	  to	  remove	  or	  reduce	  the	  differences”47	  between	  treaties	  and	  constitutions.	  Constitutionalization	  was	  the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  Court	  engaged	  in	  such	  an	  endeavor.	  Through	  its	  doctrinal	  case	  law,	  the	  Court	  transformed	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  and	  	  “fashioned	  a	  constitutional	  framework	  for	  a	  federal-­‐type	  structure	  in	  Europe.”48	  	  
1.3	  Procedural	  and	  Normative	  Mechanisms	  for	  Legal	  Integration	  	  	   Given	  that	  the	  ECJ	  maintains	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  EU,	  questions	  arise	  over	  how	  the	  Court	  pursues	  constitutionalization.	  As	  such,	  this	  section	  explains	  the	  various	  procedural	  mechanisms	  and	  doctrinal	  tools	  the	  Court	  utilizes	  to	  adjudicate.	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   The	  Court’s	  efforts	  to	  “endow	  the	  Community	  with	  a	  constitutional	  framework	  for	  a	  federal-­‐type	  structure”	  49	  would	  be	  null	  if	  not	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  preliminary	  ruling	  mechanism	  enumerated	  in	  Article	  234	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome.	  Whereas	  Article	  177	  (see	  
introduction)	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  partake	  in	  judicial	  review,	  Article	  234	  provides	  the	  procedural	  means	  by	  which	  the	  Court	  does	  so.	  Article	  234	  stipulates	  that	  when	  EU	  law	  is	  material	  to	  the	  settlement	  of	  a	  legal	  dispute	  being	  heard	  in	  a	  national	  court,	  the	  presiding	  judge	  can	  (and	  some	  judges	  must	  depending	  on	  their	  constitutional	  traditions)	  refer	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  ECJ.	  This	  referral,	  called	  a	  preliminary	  question,	  asks	  the	  ECJ	  for	  an	  authoritative	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law.	  The	  ECJ	  responds	  with	  an	  interpretation	  of	  that	  law,	  an	  act	  called	  the	  preliminary	  ruling.	  The	  national	  judge	  of	  referral	  must	  apply	  the	  ECJ	  ruling	  at	  the	  national	  level	  to	  resolve	  the	  case.	  Thus,	  Article	  234	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  “linchpin	  of	  legal	  integration,”50	  because	  it	  delegated	  the	  ECJ	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review,	  which	  “is	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  all	  federal	  systems.	  ”51	  	  	   Though	  Article	  234	  provides	  the	  procedural	  mechanism	  through	  which	  the	  EU’s	  independent	  legal	  system	  could	  develop,	  the	  success	  with	  which	  it	  does	  so	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  Court’s	  establishment	  of	  three,	  distinct	  legal	  doctrines.	  	  	   With	  Costa	  v.	  ENEL	  (1964),	  the	  Court	  established	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy.	  The	  ECJ	  asserted	  that	  when	  a	  conflict	  emerges	  between	  EU	  law	  and	  national	  law,	  the	  former	  must	  be	  given	  primacy.	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  “every	  EC	  norm,	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  entry	  into	  force,	  renders	  automatically	  inapplicable	  any	  conflict	  provision	  of	  national	  law,	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including	  national	  constitutional	  rules.”52	  In	  practice,	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy	  requires	  the	  EU	  to	  abandon	  its	  constitutional	  dualism	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  Community	  law.	  Thus,	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy	  was	  “not	  only	  an	  indispensable	  development,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  logical	  development,	  ”53	  given	  Europe’s	  integrationist	  efforts.	  The	  doctrine	  enabled	  Community	  level	  norms	  to	  “apply	  directly,	  that	  is	  bear	  upon	  the	  federations’	  citizens	  without	  any	  need	  of	  intervention	  by	  the	  Member	  States.”54	  	   As	  a	  consequence	  of	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  v.	  Nederlandse	  Administratie	  der	  Belastingen	  (1963),	  the	  ECJ	  instituted	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Direct	  Effect.	  The	  doctrine	  states	  that	  EU	  treaties	  are	  not	  mere	  intergovernmental	  agreements	  creating	  rights	  and	  obligation	  for	  Member	  States	  and	  EU	  institutions.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  are	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  separate	  legal	  order	  conferring	  rights	  and	  imposing	  obligations	  upon	  individuals.	  As	  such,	  the	  ECJ	  holds	  that	  “provisions	  of	  the	  Rome	  Treaty	  and	  a	  class	  of	  secondary	  legislation,	  called	  directives,	  were,	  directly	  effective.”55	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  Direct	  Effect	  also	  enables	  private	  actors	  to	  plead	  rights	  found	  in	  EU	  law	  before	  national	  courts.	  In	  effect,	  the	  Doctrine	  contributes	  to	  the	  integration	  process	  by	  bridging	  the	  gaps	  between	  the	  national	  and	  supranational	  legal	  systems.	  	  	   Taken	  together,	  these	  two	  legal	  doctrines,	  when	  combined	  procedurally	  with	  Article	  234,	  “would	  integrate	  national	  and	  supranational	  legal	  systems,	  and	  establish	  a	  decentralized	  enforcement	  mechanism	  for	  EU	  law.”56	  Through	  its	  judge-­‐made	  law,	  the	  ECJ	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   21	  
created	  “a	  legally	  driven	  constitutional	  revolution,”57	  that	  enabled	  it	  to	  become,	  arguably,	  “the	  most	  effective	  supranational	  judicial	  body	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  world,	  comparing	  favorably	  with	  the	  most	  powerful	  constitutional	  courts	  anywhere.”58	  	  
1.4	  Theoretical	  Overview:	  Europe’s	  Regional	  Integration	  	  
	   Social	  scientists,	  economists,	  legal	  scholars,	  and	  the	  like	  have	  documented	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  EU’s	  supranational	  governance	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  regional	  integration.	  The	  Community	  has	  expanded,	  its	  “rule	  systems	  have	  become	  denser	  and	  more	  articulated	  within	  particular	  policy	  areas.”59	  Simultaneously,	  these	  competences	  have	  “broadened,	  covering	  an	  expanding	  range	  of	  substantive	  domains	  over	  time.”60	  Additionally,	  the	  capacities	  of	  the	  EU’s	  organs	  of	  government	  to	  monitor	  and	  enforce	  EU	  Law	  have	  “been	  steadily	  upgraded	  since	  the	  1960s.”61	  	  Over	  the	  decades,	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  theories	  accounting	  for	  the	  EU’s	  process	  and	  outcome	  of	  regional	  integration	  has	  been	  posited.	  They	  do	  not	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  judiciary’s	  role	  in	  integration,	  but	  rather	  the	  interplay	  amongst	  all	  three	  branches	  of	  government.	  These	  theories	  are	  united	  by	  their	  attempt	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  following	  question:	  “how	  –	  and	  through	  what	  processes	  –	  did	  an	  intergovernmental	  organization	  with	  limited	  authority	  develop	  into	  a	  quasi-­‐federal	  polity	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  establish	  binding	  rules	  in	  an	  expanding	  array	  of	  policy	  domains?”62	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  providing	  the	  reader	  with	  the	  necessary	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foundation	  for	  understanding	  the	  Court’s	  juridical	  contributions	  to	  EU	  Integration,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  section.	  	  	  Political	  scientists	  cite	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  as	  one	  explanation	  of	  regional	  integration.	  This	  approach	  emphasizes	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  a	  nation	  state	  in	  furthering	  the	  supranational	  construction	  of	  the	  EU.	  While	  some	  scholars	  contend	  that	  European	  integration	  renders	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  obsolete,	  inter-­‐govermentalists	  reject	  this	  notion.	  	  “The	  executives	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  or	  a	  consortium	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  ones,	  effectively	  regulate	  the	  pace	  and	  scope	  of	  integration,	  through	  their	  control	  of	  treaty-­‐revision	  and	  the	  legislative	  process.”63	  Consequently,	  European	  integration	  did	  not	  weaken	  Member	  States’	  sovereignty,	  but	  rather	  strengthened	  it.	  In	  certain	  policy	  domains,	  Member	  States	  realize	  it	  is	  in	  their	  national	  interest	  to	  pool	  together	  their	  sovereignty	  within	  a	  regional	  framework,	  and	  so	  they	  converge	  on	  policy	  matters	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  their	  desired	  outcome.	  According	  to	  Andrew	  Moravcsik,	  the	  continuation	  of	  Europe’s	  integrative	  process	  is	  due	  to	  Member	  States	  desire	  “to	  coordinate	  policy	  responses	  to	  rising	  opportunities	  for	  profitable	  economic	  exchange,	  in	  particular	  growing	  intra-­‐industry	  trade	  and	  capital	  movements.”64	  As	  such,	  “the	  primary	  source	  of	  integration	  lays	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  states	  themselves	  and	  the	  relative	  power	  each	  brings.”65	  This	  argument	  situates	  private	  actors	  as	  providing	  only	  a	  “secondary	  role,”66	  and	  supranational	  institutions	  as	  existing	  solely	  to	  facilitate	  agreements	  among	  the	  Member	  States.	  Inter-­‐governmentalists	  cite	  the	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EU’s	  history	  of	  employing	  the	  Principle	  of	  Unanimity67	  on	  Treaty	  revision	  as	  one	  of	  several	  justifications	  for	  their	  claims,	  for	  they	  contend	  this	  doctrine	  produces	  integrative	  policy	  outcomes	  reflecting	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  provides	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  and	  one	  that	  contrasts	  sharply	  to	  inter-­‐governmentalism.	  It	  seeks	  to	  explain,	  “How	  and	  why	  nation-­‐states	  cease	  to	  be	  wholly	  sovereign,	  how	  and	  why	  they	  voluntarily	  mingle,	  merge,	  and	  mix	  with	  their	  neighbors	  so	  as	  to	  lose	  the	  factual	  attributes	  of	  sovereignty	  while	  acquiring	  new	  techniques	  for	  resolving	  conflicts	  between	  themselves.”68	  Ernst	  Haas,	  the	  pioneer	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism,	  defined	  integration	  as	  the	  process	  where	  “political	  actors	  in	  several	  distinct	  national	  settings	  are	  persuaded	  to	  shift	  their	  loyalties,	  expectations,	  and	  political	  activities	  towards	  a	  new	  and	  larger	  center,	  whose	  institutions	  possess	  or	  demand	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  national	  states.”69	  	  Unlike	  inter-­‐governmentalism,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  acknowledges	  the	  role	  of	  a	  myriad	  of	  political	  actors	  in	  sustaining	  regional	  integration.	  “The	  primary	  players	  in	  the	  integration	  process	  are	  above	  and	  below	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  Actors	  below	  the	  state	  included	  interest	  groups	  and	  political	  parties.	  Actors	  above	  the	  state	  are	  supranational,	  regional	  institutions.”70	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  contends	  that	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  exists	  between	  supranational	  institutions	  and	  more	  minute	  political	  actors;	  as	  EU	  institution’s	  role	  in	  policymaking	  grows,	  those	  “below	  the	  state”	  will	  “coalesce	  across	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national	  boundaries	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  community	  wide	  interests.”71	  This	  creates	  an	  “integrative	  momentum.”72	  	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  contends	  that	  this	  coalescing	  is	  motivated	  by	  instrumental	  self-­‐interest.	  “Assumptions	  of	  good	  will,	  harmony	  of	  interests,	  or	  dedication	  to	  the	  common	  good	  need	  not	  be	  postulated	  to	  account	  for	  integration.”73	  Rather,	  the	  sub-­‐national	  political	  actors	  adjust	  their	  distinct	  interests	  and	  goals	  by	  leveraging	  supranational	  means	  of	  governance	  “only	  when	  this	  course	  appears	  profitable	  to	  them.”74	  Similarly,	  “the	  supranational	  actors	  are	  likewise	  not	  immune	  to	  utilitarian	  thinking.	  They	  seek	  unremittingly	  to	  expand	  the	  mandate	  of	  their	  own	  institutions	  to	  have	  a	  more	  influential	  say	  in	  community	  affairs.”75	  	  Once	  political	  actors	  realize	  that	  supranational	  governance	  provides	  them	  a	  platform	  in	  which	  they	  can	  pursue	  their	  entrenched	  interests,	  the	  process	  of	  integration	  is	  triggered.	  	  Three,	  interrelated	  concepts	  explain	  the	  means	  by	  which	  integration	  occurs.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  different	  sectors	  of	  a	  modern	  economy	  are	  highly	  interdependent	  on	  one	  another;	  this	  results	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  an	  integrative	  action	  in	  one	  sector	  undeniably	  affects	  other	  sectors.	  “Sector	  integration…begets	  its	  own	  impetus	  toward	  extension	  to	  the	  entire	  economy	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  specific	  group	  demands.”76	  Consequently,	  an	  increase	  in	  cross-­‐border	  transactions	  and	  communications	  among	  private	  actors	  occurs,	  triggering	  a	  “functional	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demand”77	  for	  supranational	  rules	  and	  policies	  governing	  such	  transactions.	  Whereas	  functional	  spillover	  focuses	  on	  economic	  integration,	  political	  spillover	  describes	  “the	  process	  of	  adaptive	  behavior,	  that	  is,	  the	  incremental	  shifting	  of	  expectations,	  the	  changing	  of	  values.”78	  Political	  spillover	  develops	  as	  a	  result	  of	  functional	  spillover	  because,	  “the	  ‘purely’	  economic	  decisions	  always	  acquire	  political	  significance	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  participants.”79	  	  Upgrading	  common	  interest	  provides	  the	  third	  and	  final	  element	  sustaining	  integration.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  occurs	  when	  Member	  States	  cannot	  converge	  on	  common	  policy,	  but	  they	  acknowledge	  that	  doing	  so	  is	  necessary	  for	  safeguarding	  the	  other	  aspects	  of	  sectoral	  and	  political	  interdependence	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  Realizing	  that	  intergovernmental	  inaction	  is	  politically	  costly,	  Member	  States	  compromise	  amongst	  themselves,	  and	  “construct	  patterns	  of	  mutual	  concessions	  from	  various	  policy	  contexts.”80	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  that	  neo-­‐functionalism	  contends,	  “The	  context	  in	  which	  successful	  integration	  operates	  is	  economic,	  social	  and	  technical.”81	  Haas	  posits	  that	  in	  ‘noncontroversial’	  areas	  of	  cooperation,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  “might	  be	  so	  trivial	  as	  to	  remain	  outside	  the	  human	  expectations	  and	  actions	  vital	  for	  integration.”82	  	  The	  interplay	  between	  functional	  spillover,	  political	  spillover,	  and	  the	  upgrading	  of	  a	  common	  interest	  illustrate	  how	  transnational	  integration	  develops	  an	  expansive	  logic.	  A	  positive	  feedback	  loop	  develops	  because	  the	  activities	  of	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  number	  of	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political	  actors,	  who	  occasionally	  operate	  in	  separate	  spheres	  of	  influence,	  become	  contingent	  upon	  one	  another.	  As	  supranational	  governance	  expands	  to	  meet	  the	  objectives	  of	  such	  transactions,	  “the	  body	  of	  supranational	  rules	  expands	  in	  scope	  and	  becomes	  more	  formal	  and	  specific	  over	  time.”83	  In	  other	  words,	  deeper	  integration	  is	  facilitated.	  As	  such,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  posits	  integration	  to	  be	  a	  dynamic,	  self-­‐sustaining	  process.	  Theoretically,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  explains	  why	  contested	  values	  become	  assimilated,	  and	  how	  Member	  States’	  accommodate	  this	  in	  a	  way	  that	  cedes	  power	  to	  supranational	  institutions.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  inter-­‐governmentalism.	  The	  latter	  interprets	  isolated	  events	  (e.g.	  treaty	  negotiations)	  and	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  a	  concentrated	  group	  of	  elites	  (e.g.	  Member	  States	  that	  maintain	  the	  most	  economic	  weight,	  such	  as	  Germany)	  as	  triggering	  regional	  integration.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  theory	  refuses	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  other,	  relevant	  political	  undercurrents,	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  private	  interest	  groups	  and	  the	  ECJ.	  
1.5	  Theoretical	  Overview:	  Juridical	  Contributions	  to	  European	  Integration	  	  	   Whereas	  Section	  1.4	  discusses	  the	  general	  dynamics	  of	  regional	  integration,	  this	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  distinct	  role	  that	  supranational	  legal	  institutions	  play	  in	  aiding	  regional	  integration.	  Specifically,	  it	  will	  apply	  the	  neo-­‐functionalist	  paradigm	  to	  that	  of	  legal	  integration.	  This	  section	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  understanding	  how	  the	  ECJ	  has	  managed	  to	  expand	  its	  influence	  into	  various	  policy	  domains.	  	  	   An	  inter-­‐governmentalists	  theory	  of	  regional	  integration,	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  preceding	  section,	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  that	  of	  legal	  integration.	  Though	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  proves	  to	  be	  a	  plausible	  theory,	  it	  maintains	  a	  significant	  drawback.	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Specifically,	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  “other	  EU	  institutions’	  bases	  of	  power.”84	  Inter-­‐governmentalists	  conceptualize	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  as	  an	  “inter-­‐state	  bargain,”85	  and	  nothing	  more.	  This	  claim	  is	  accurate,	  but	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  ECJ	  maintains	  supreme	  authority	  in	  interpreting	  the	  Treaty	  itself;	  note	  again	  that	  this	  delineation	  of	  power	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  own	  construction	  of	  certain	  procedural	  (Article	  234)	  and	  normative	  (Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy	  and	  Direct	  Effect)	  judicial	  mechanisms.	  “The	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  effectively	  insulated	  the	  ECJ	  from	  Member	  States	  controls:	  when	  it	  interprets	  the	  Treaty,	  the	  ECJ	  exercises	  the	  fiduciary	  power	  of	  a	  powerful	  court.”86	  Essentially,	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  does	  not	  consider	  inter-­‐governmental	  decision	  making	  as	  “embedded	  in,	  and	  provoked	  by,	  larger	  processes	  going	  on	  around	  and	  between	  what	  governments	  do.”87	  Applying	  an	  inter-­‐govermentalist	  theory	  to	  legal	  integration	  proves	  inadequate,	  as	  it	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  independent	  role	  of	  the	  ECJ	  in	  advancing	  integration.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  applying	  a	  neo-­‐functionalist	  theory	  to	  legal	  integration	  provides	  more	  promise.	  This	  theory	  contends,	  “legal	  integration	  of	  the	  Community	  corresponds	  remarkably	  closely	  to	  the	  original	  neo-­‐functionalist	  model	  developed	  by	  Ernst	  Haas	  in	  the	  late	  1950s.”88	  Specifically,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  transnational	  and	  private	  actors	  in	  activating	  and	  sustaining	  European	  legal	  integration.	  At	  the	  supranational	  level,	  the	  principal	  actors	  are	  the	  thirteen	  ECJ	  judges;	  at	  the	  subnational	  level,	  the	  principal	  actors	  are	  private	  litigants,	  their	  lawyers,	  and	  lower	  national	  courts.	  Article	  177	  (see	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Introduction)	  provides	  the	  procedural	  framework	  that	  links	  the	  Court	  and	  subnational	  actors	  to	  one	  another.	  	  “The	  glue	  that	  binds	  this	  community	  of	  supra-­‐	  and	  subnational	  actors	  is	  self-­‐interest”89	  On	  the	  part	  of	  national	  judiciaries,	  constitutionalization	  enables	  them	  to	  acquire	  power	  previously	  unavailable	  to	  them;	  “the	  E.C.	  system	  gave	  judges	  at	  the	  lowest	  level	  powers	  that	  had	  been	  reserved	  to	  the	  highest	  court	  in	  the	  land,”90	  and	  for	  many,	  “to	  have	  de	  facto	  judicial	  review	  of	  legislation…would	  be	  heady	  stuff.”91	  In	  the	  context	  of	  private	  litigants,	  the	  ECJ’s	  establishment	  of	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Direct	  Effect,	  in	  neo-­‐functionalist	  terms,	  enabled	  the	  Court	  to	  “create	  a	  pro-­‐community	  constituency	  of	  private	  individuals	  by	  giving	  them	  a	  direct	  stake	  in	  promulgation	  and	  implementation	  of	  Community	  law.”92	  Taken	  together,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  ECJ	  has	  created	  opportunities	  in	  which	  individual	  litigants,	  their	  lawyers,	  and	  lower	  national	  courts	  are	  incentivized	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Community	  legal	  system.	  	  	   Once	  subnational	  and	  supranational	  parties	  realize	  and	  accept	  the	  benefits	  associated	  with	  legal	  integration,	  functional	  spillover	  becomes	  inevitable.	  “Functional	  spillover	  presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  agreed	  objective	  and	  simply	  posits	  that	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  authorities	  charged	  with	  implementing	  that	  objective	  will	  expand	  as	  necessary	  to	  address	  whatever	  obstacles	  stand	  in	  the	  way.”93	  In	  announcing	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy	  and	  Doctrine	  of	  Direct	  Effect,	  the	  ECJ	  enhanced	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  law,	  which	  attracted	  litigation	  brought	  by	  private	  actors;	  more	  litigation	  expanded	  the	  ECJ’s	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jurisprudence	  and	  the	  domain	  of	  EC	  law,	  which	  continued	  to	  socialize	  private	  litigants	  into	  the	  legal	  system.	  	  	   Functional	  spillover	  triggers	  political	  spillover.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  legal	  integration,	  political	  spillover	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  development	  of	  “legal	  transnational	  incrementalism.”94	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	  some	  Member	  States’	  national	  courts	  endorsing	  the	  utilization	  of	  Article	  234,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  influences	  their	  Member	  States	  counterparts	  elsewhere	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  for	  they	  realize	  they	  cannot	  “resist	  the	  trend	  with	  any	  modicum	  of	  credibility.”95	  Once	  this	  complicit	  relationship	  is	  recognized,	  both	  judicial	  bodies	  play	  a	  role	  in	  creating	  a	  uniform	  and	  comprehensive	  law.	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  also	  expects	  that	  political	  spillover	  will	  result	  in	  the	  “ECJ	  routinely	  producing	  supranational	  outcomes	  that	  the	  Member	  States	  would	  not	  have	  produced	  on	  their	  own.”96	  	  If	  neo-­‐functionalism	  defines	  “shifting	  expectations,	  changing	  loyalties,	  and	  evolving	  values”97	  as	  pre-­‐requisites	  to	  regional	  integration,	  then	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  coordinated	  body	  of	  law	  fits	  into	  this	  theoretical	  framework.	  “Law	  operates	  as	  law	  by	  shifting	  expectations.	  The	  minute	  a	  rule	  is	  established	  as	  ‘law,’	  individuals	  are	  entitled	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  assumption	  that	  social,	  economic,	  or	  political	  behavior	  will	  be	  conducted	  in	  accordance	  with	  that	  rule.	  The	  creation	  and	  application	  of	  law	  is	  inherently	  a	  process	  a	  shift	  expectations.”98	  	  	   As	  a	  whole,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  provides	  a	  theoretical	  explanation	  for	  how	  and	  why	  constitutionalization	  and	  regional	  integration	  converge.	  It	  demonstrates	  that	  “the	  internal	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dynamics	  of	  EU	  law	  –	  of	  litigation,	  jurisprudence,	  and	  doctrinal	  discourse	  –	  were	  also	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  European	  integration,	  right	  from	  the	  beginning.”99	  Understanding	  this	  is	  critical,	  because	  the	  process	  of	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover	  provide	  insight	  into	  how	  the	  increasing	  competencies	  of	  Community	  law	  pressures	  the	  Court	  to	  extend	  its	  influence	  into	  various	  policy	  domains,	  such	  as	  human	  rights,	  among	  others.	  	  
	  
1.6:	  Legal	  Integration	  and	  the	  ECJ’s	  Zone	  of	  Discretion	  	  	   Section	  1.5	  discusses	  how	  legal	  integration	  creates	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  process	  in	  which	  the	  construction	  of	  supranational	  norms	  become	  accepted	  and	  coordinated	  within	  a	  body	  of	  law.	  It	  discusses	  how	  this	  process,	  within	  and	  of	  itself,	  augments	  and	  strengthens	  Europe’s	  regional	  integration.	  However,	  Section	  1.5	  does	  not	  discuss	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  ECJ	  exercises	  judicial	  discretion	  in	  constructing	  the	  very	  jurisprudence	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  legal	  integration.	  Judicial	  discretion	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  authority	  of	  judges	  to	  interpret	  and	  apply	  legal	  rules	  to	  situations	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  disputes.100	  	  How	  has	  the	  ECJ’s	  judicial	  discretion,	  separate	  from	  the	  other	  subnational	  actors,	  impacted	  the	  directional	  discourse	  of	  legal	  integration?	  This	  question	  is	  of	  interest	  when	  one	  considers	  that	  the	  ECJ	  maintains	  judicial	  supremacy	  within	  the	  EU’s	  vertically	  arranged	  hierarchy	  of	  judicial	  power,	  and	  that	  their	  legal	  decisions	  are	  directly	  effective	  to	  Member	  States’	  national	  judiciaries.	  	  	   Several	  scholars	  apply	  a	  “Trustee-­‐Principal”	  theory	  to	  understand	  how	  judicial	  discretion	  develops.	  Within	  this	  framework,	  the	  ECJ	  acts	  as	  the	  Trustee,	  and	  the	  Member	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States’	  act	  as	  the	  Principal.	  In	  such	  a	  relationship,	  the	  Trustee	  is	  designed	  to	  govern	  both	  third	  parties	  and	  the	  Principals	  themselves.	  Additionally,	  a	  Trustee	  maintains	  an	  unlimited	  zone	  of	  judicial	  discretion.	  “This	  zone	  of	  discretion	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  (a)	  the	  sum	  of	  powers	  explicitly	  delegated	  to	  a	  court,	  and	  possessed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  court’s	  own	  accreted	  rulemaking,	  minus	  (b)	  the	  sum	  of	  control	  instruments	  available	  for	  us	  by	  non-­‐judicial	  authorities	  to	  shape	  (constrain)	  or	  annul	  (reverse)	  outcomes	  that	  emerge	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  court’s	  performance	  of	  its	  delegated	  task.”101	  Taking	  these	  two	  criteria’s	  into	  account,	  a	  “Trusteeship	  situation	  can	  thus	  be	  characterized	  as	  one	  of	  structural	  judicial	  supremacy.”102	  	  A	  Trustee-­‐Principal	  relationship	  is	  distinct	  from	  a	  Principal-­‐Agent	  relationship	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Trustee	  maintains	  a	  complete	  insulation	  from	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  Principal.	  	  	   In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ECJ,	  the	  concept	  of	  Trusteeship	  becomes	  appropriate.	  	  Judicial	  scholar	  Alec	  Stone	  Suite103	  articulates	  three	  conditions	  that	  are	  met	  for	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  First,	  the	  ECJ	  possesses	  the	  authority	  to	  review	  the	  legality	  of,	  and	  to	  annul,	  acts	  taken	  by	  the	  EU’s	  organs	  of	  governance	  and	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  domains	  governed	  by	  EU	  law.	  Additionally,	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  is	  compulsory.	  Finally,	  the	  Member-­‐States,	  acting	  as	  principals,	  find	  it	  impossible	  to	  “punish”	  the	  Court	  by	  restricting	  its	  jurisdiction,	  or	  reversing	  its	  rulings.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  ECJ,	  as	  a	  Trustee,	  “possesses	  the	  capacity	  to	  expand	  or	  contract	  its	  own	  zone	  of	  judicial	  discretion,	  through	  interpreting	  the	  law,	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  own	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powers.”104	  Thus,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  full	  authority	  to	  define	  the	  direction	  of	  legal	  integration	  substantively;	  the	  Court’s	  establishment	  of	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Supremacy	  and	  Direct	  affect	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  express	  authorization	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  and	  despite	  the	  declared	  opposition	  of	  Member	  States	  governments,”105	  is	  case	  and	  point.	  What	  is	  key	  here	  is	  recognizing	  that,	  in	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  has	  enhanced	  its	  own	  capacities	  to	  govern	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policy	  domains.	  As	  such,	  “trusteeship	  constitutes	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  feedback	  and	  spillover	  to	  emerge	  and	  become	  entrenched,”106	  as	  posited	  by	  neo-­‐functionalism.	  Examining	  when	  the	  Court	  widens	  or	  restrains	  its	  zone	  of	  discretion	  on	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  basis	  reveals	  much	  about	  the	  values	  judges	  maximize	  when	  creating	  legal	  doctrine.	  Taking	  this	  reality	  into	  account	  becomes	  necessary	  when	  attempting	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  ECJ	  approaches	  constitutionalization	  within	  the	  human	  rights	  domain.	  	  
1.7:	  Legal	  Integration	  and	  its	  Relationship	  to	  Jurisdiction	  When	  the	  ECJ	  extends	  the	  process	  of	  legal	  integration	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  human	  rights,	  it	  is	  tasked	  with	  creating	  a	  transnational,	  normative	  interpretation	  of	  such	  rights.	  However,	  expanding	  legal	  competence	  into	  the	  human	  rights	  domain	  depends	  on	  the	  Court’s	  willingness	  to	  either	  constrain	  or	  broaden	  its	  jurisdiction.	  	  The	  Court	  consistently	  holds	  that	  it	  maintains	  judicial	  review	  “from	  the	  moment	  when	  national	  regulations	  enter	  the	  field	  of	  application	  of	  Community	  law.”107	  	  However,	  such	  a	  formulation	  is	  open-­‐textured,	  and	  begs	  the	  question:	  when	  does	  a	  national	  regulation	  enter	  the	  field	  of	  application	  of	  Community	  law?	  The	  answer	  to	  such	  a	  question	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Ibid.	  P13.	  105	  Stone	  Sweet,	  Alec.	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  and	  Supranational	  Governance.	  Yale	  Law	  School	  Legal	  Scholarship	  Repository.	  P13.	  	  106	  Sweet,	  Alec	  Stone.	  "Chapter	  1:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Integration."	  In	  The	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe.	  P22	  	  107	  Wachauf	  [1989],	  ERT	  [1991],	  Article	  51(1)	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  	  
	   33	  
is	  complicated,	  and	  far	  from	  static.	  Because	  the	  EU’s	  competences	  continue	  to	  grow,	  few	  sovereign	  policy	  domains	  remain	  untouched	  by	  the	  Community	  obligations	  the	  Treaty	  confers	  upon	  them.	  In	  fact,	  “the	  potential	  for	  Community	  legislative	  reach	  into	  Member	  State	  domains	  is	  not	  only	  dynamic,	  but	  may	  perhaps,	  be	  limitless….	  there	  simply	  is,	  no	  nucleus	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  the	  Member	  States	  can	  invoke,	  as	  such,	  against	  the	  Community.”108	  Consequently,	  defining	  the	  threshold	  for	  when	  a	  national	  regulation	  interferes	  with	  Community	  law	  becomes	  a	  point	  of	  contention.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  “greatest	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ECHR”109	  and	  the	  Charter	  “in	  community	  law	  arises.”110	  	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  Court’s	  unlimited	  zone	  of	  discretion,	  jurisdiction,	  and	  integration	  become	  apparent.	  Because	  the	  Court	  maintains	  insulated	  hegemony	  in	  delineating	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  national	  law,	  it	  can	  initiate	  judicial	  review.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  constitutionalize	  the	  policy	  domain	  at	  hand,	  thereby	  triggering	  normative	  harmonization,	  a	  component	  critical	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  integration.	  This	  raises	  the	  question:	  normatively,	  how	  far	  should	  the	  Court	  go	  in	  extending	  its	  jurisdiction	  within	  the	  area	  of	  Community	  law?	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Weiler,	  Joseph	  H.H.,	  and	  Nicolas	  J.S.	  Lockhart.	  ""Taking	  Rights	  Seriously"	  Seriously:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Its	  Fundamental	  Rights	  Jurisprudence."	  P64	  109	  Guild,	  Elspeth,	  and	  Guillaume	  Lesieur.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights:	  Who	  Said	  What,	  When?	  P23	  110	  Ibid.	  	  
	   34	  
CHAPTER	  2:	  NORMATIVE	  CONSIDERATIONS	  FOR	  JUDICIAL	  PROTECTION	  OF	  
HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  Chapter	  1	  discusses	  the	  ECJ’s	  distinct	  role	  in	  legal	  integration,	  and	  how	  spillover	  has	  expanded	  the	  Community’s	  jurisdictional	  competencies.	  Chapter	  2	  focuses	  on	  how	  these	  developments	  require	  the	  ECJ	  to	  create	  and	  to	  coordinate	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  human	  rights.	  Normative	  conceptions	  of	  certain	  principles	  –	  whether	  they	  are	  economic,	  social,	  or	  political	  -­‐	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  subsequent	  law	  and	  policy.	  Consequently,	  understanding	  how	  political	  actors	  construct	  and	  understand	  norms	  provides	  insight	  into	  why	  certain	  policy	  domains,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  human	  rights,	  develop	  as	  they	  do.	  In	  the	  broadest	  sense,	  this	  chapter’s	  motivating	  question	  is:	  How	  has	  the	  ECJ	  created	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  human	  rights?	  What	  normative	  considerations	  does	  the	  ECJ	  award	  to	  the	  judicial	  protection	  of	  human	  rights?	  	  
2.1:	  The	  EU	  as	  a	  Normative	  Power	  Scholars	  have	  long	  established	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  normative	  power.	  As	  such,	  the	  EU	  maintains	  the	  distinct	  ability	  to	  shape	  supranational	  conceptions	  of	  norms.	  Norms	  can	  be	  defined	  as,	  “standards	  aimed	  at	  codifying	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors	  sharing	  common	  principles	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  collective	  disciplines	  and	  to	  forbid	  certain	  conducts	  in	  the	  different	  field	  of	  public	  policies.”111	  In	  practice,	  norms	  reflect	  a	  community’s	  shared	  understandings	  and	  intentions	  of	  certain	  principles,	  “they	  are	  ‘social	  facts’	  and	  reflect	  ‘legitimate	  social	  purpose.’”112	  Thus,	  the	  process	  of	  normative	  construction	  is	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  process	  of	  constitutionalization.	  When	  a	  Member	  State’s	  national	  judiciary	  initiates	  a	  preliminary	  question	  (Art.	  177),	  “it	  is	  acknowledging,	  at	  least	  at	  face	  value,	  Community	  norms	  are	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necessary	  and	  govern	  the	  dispute.”113	  Thus,	  normative	  diffusion	  and	  constitutionalization	  are	  united	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  a	  shared	  social	  purpose	  and	  understanding	  among	  Europe’s	  political	  actors	  and	  peoples	  alike.	  	  
2.2:	  The	  Origins	  and	  Emergence	  of	  Norms	  Scholars	  across	  disciplines	  have	  recognized	  different	  categories	  of	  norms.	  The	  most	  common	  distinction	  is	  between	  regulative	  norms,	  which	  order	  and	  constrain	  behavior,	  and	  
constitutive	  norms,	  which	  create	  new	  actors,	  interests,	  or	  categories	  of	  actions.114	  These	  distinctions	  aside,	  normative	  construction	  is	  critical	  within	  any	  political	  landscape.	  Norms	  facilitate	  cooperation	  among	  self-­‐interested	  actors,	  they	  constrain	  the	  behavior	  of	  States	  and	  individuals	  alike,	  and	  they	  reflect	  underlying	  power	  distributions.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  norms	  originate,	  develop,	  and	  become	  institutionalized.	  Normative	  development	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  process	  in	  which	  principled	  ideas	  (beliefs	  about	  right	  and	  wrong	  held	  by	  individuals)	  become	  norms	  (collective	  expectations	  about	  proper	  behavior	  for	  a	  given	  identity).115	  	  At	  its	  foundational	  level,	  the	  emergence	  of	  norms	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  various	  political	  actors.	  These	  individuals	  maintain	  strong	  notions	  about	  appropriate	  or	  desirable	  behavior	  within	  their	  community,	  and	  they	  strive	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  “by	  using	  language	  that	  names,	  interprets,	  and	  dramatizes”116	  the	  norm	  they	  wish	  to	  establish.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  norm	  ‘agent’	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  and	  “all	  norm	  promoters	  need	  some	  kind	  of	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organizational	  platform	  from	  and	  through	  which	  they	  promote	  their	  norms.”117	  These	  organizational	  platforms	  have	  distinctive	  structural	  features	  that	  influence	  the	  kinds	  of	  norms	  it	  promotes.118	  Additionally,	  organizational	  platforms	  have	  the	  “expertise	  and	  information”119	  necessary	  to	  change	  the	  behavior	  of	  other	  actors.	  However,	  because	  “new	  norms	  never	  enter	  a	  normative	  vacuum	  but	  instead	  emerge	  in	  a	  highly	  contest	  normative	  space,”120	  maintaining	  an	  organizational	  platform	  cannot	  guarantee	  norm	  diffusion	  within	  itself.	  Normative	  contestation	  requires	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  to	  promote	  their	  norm	  “within	  the	  standards	  of	  appropriateness”121	  defined	  by	  prior	  norms.	  Thus,	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  must	  frame	  norms	  in	  a	  way	  that	  resonates	  with	  relevant	  audiences,	  and	  they	  “devote	  significant	  attention	  to	  constructing	  a	  suitable	  cognitive	  frame	  in	  order	  to	  persuade	  targeted	  states	  to	  embrace	  the	  normative	  idea	  they	  support.”122	  Taken	  together,	  these	  three	  factors	  (the	  presence	  of	  a	  various	  political	  actors	  with	  similar	  interests,	  an	  organizational	  platform,	  and	  the	  framing	  of	  norms)	  compel	  state	  actors	  to	  endorse	  the	  given	  norms,	  and	  to	  make	  norm	  socialization	  part	  of	  their	  agenda.	  However,	  these	  State	  actors	  realize	  that,	  for	  an	  emergent	  norm	  to	  reach	  the	  threshold	  of	  norm	  diffusion,	  an	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  norm	  must	  occur.	  “Since	  1948,	  emergent	  norms	  have	  increasingly	  become	  institutionalized	  in	  international	  law,	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  multilateral	  organization,	  and	  in	  bilateral	  foreign	  policies.”123	  Institutionalization	  of	  norms	  is	  key	  to	  norm	  harmonization;	  it	  clarifies	  “what,	  exactly,	  the	  norm	  is,	  and	  what	  constitutes	  violation	  (often	  a	  matter	  of	  some	  disagreement	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among	  actors)	  by	  spelling	  out	  specific	  procedures	  by	  which	  norm	  leaders	  coordinate	  disapproval	  for	  norm	  breaking.”124	  	  	   2.3	  The	  ECJ	  and	  Normative	  Construction:	  A	  Neo-­‐Functionalist	  Perspective	  	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  discussion	  above,	  the	  ECJ	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  preeminent	  political	  actors	  seeking	  to	  expand	  supranational	  norms.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  EU’s	  key	  institutions,	  the	  ECJ	  is	  charged	  with	  legally	  integrating	  Europe	  and	  ensuring	  the	  internal	  market.	  As	  such,	  it	  has	  clear	  notions	  about	  what	  behavior	  is	  necessary	  and	  desirable	  within	  their	  supranational	  community.	  It	  uses	  the	  various	  Treaties125	  as	  framing	  devices	  for	  its	  creation	  of	  legal	  norms.	  Within	  the	  domain	  of	  human	  rights,	  it	  leverages	  its	  “fundamental	  rights	  form	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law”126	  formula,	  the	  Charter,	  and	  its	  past	  case	  law.	  By	  virtue	  of	  its	  status	  as	  Europe’s	  preeminent	  court,	  the	  ECJ	  maintains	  the	  
organizational	  platform	  necessary	  to	  legitimize	  its	  ideas.	  Its	  structural	  organization	  of	  a	  vertical	  hierarchy	  of	  judicial	  authority,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  judges’	  legal	  expertise,	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  compel	  other	  State	  actors	  to	  endorse	  their	  articulated	  norms.	  	  However,	  because	  the	  ECJ	  is	  also	  an	  institution,	  its	  transaction	  costs	  in	  creating	  and	  institutionalizing	  norms	  are	  significantly	  lower	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  political	  actors.	  The	  Doctrines	  of	  Supremacy	  and	  Direct	  Effect	  enable	  the	  ECJ	  to	  circumvent	  the	  process	  of	  compelling	  state	  actors	  to	  endorse	  their	  proposed	  norms.	  Instead,	  the	  ECJ	  can	  issue	  binding	  legal	  decisions	  that	  articulate	  these	  norms,	  and	  make	  them	  ‘supreme’	  and	  ‘directly	  effective,’	  on	  national	  orders	  in	  matters	  of	  Community	  law.	  With	  every	  ECJ	  decision,	  the	  Court	  clarifies	  what	  the	  norm	  is	  and	  what	  constitutes	  a	  violation	  of	  that	  norm.	  Thus,	  the	  ECJ	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simultaneously	  ensures	  norm	  diffusion	  and	  norm	  institutionalization	  on	  the	  supranational	  level.	  This	  makes	  its	  efforts	  in	  constructing	  and	  harmonizing	  legal	  norms	  throughout	  the	  Community	  contingent	  on	  its	  adjudication.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  normative	  change	  are	  contingent	  on	  the	  operational	  presence	  of	  neo-­‐functionalist	  spillover.	  The	  Court’s	  evolution	  in	  how	  it	  leverages	  its	  various	  rights-­‐oriented,	  normative	  ‘framing	  devices’	  are	  indicative	  of	  this.	  What	  were	  once	  regulative	  norms-­‐	  “those	  that	  order	  and	  constrain	  behavior”	  127	  	  –	  gave	  way	  to	  constituent	  norms,	  “which	  create	  new	  actors,	  interests,	  and	  categories	  of	  actors.”	  128	  In	  the	  context	  of	  human	  rights,	  the	  Court	  transitioned	  away	  relying	  on	  its	  “general	  principles”	  formula	  as	  a	  means	  of	  framing	  human	  rights	  norms,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  Charter	  following	  its	  ratification.	  What	  is	  to	  be	  underscored	  here	  is	  that	  neo-­‐functionalist	  spillover	  creates	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  past	  norms	  (i.e.	  the	  general	  principles	  formula),	  and	  over	  time,	  this	  provides	  an	  impulse	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  new,	  complimentary	  norms	  (i.e.	  the	  Charter).	  Thus,	  the	  Court’s	  role	  in	  normative	  construction	  works	  symbiotically	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  integration.	  	  
2.4:	  	  Neo-­‐Functionalism	  and	  its	  Correlation	  to	  the	  Narrative	  of	  the	  Legal	  Incorporation	  and	  
Normative	  Construction	  of	  Human	  Rights	  at	  the	  Community	  Level	  	  	   As	  discussed,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  offers	  a	  causal	  explanation	  of	  the	  development	  and	  expansion	  of	  supranational	  governance.	  Unlike	  inter-­‐governmentalism,	  neo-­‐functionalism	  acknowledges	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  law	  in	  advancing	  Europe’s	  regional	  integration.	  This	  section	  utilizes	  the	  previously	  discussed	  tenants	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  explaining	  how	  and	  why	  the	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  human	  rights	  occurred	  at	  the	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Community	  level.	  By	  discussing	  and	  evaluating	  the	  casual	  mechanisms	  of	  such	  a	  narrative,	  this	  section	  illustrates	  the	  gradual,	  integrative	  effects	  that	  Community-­‐level	  human	  rights	  norms	  have	  had,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  various	  entrenched	  interests	  animating	  the	  dynamics	  of	  such	  legal,	  normative	  incorporation.	  	  	  When	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  was	  drafted,	  the	  framers	  failed	  to	  provide	  any	  enumerated	  fundamental	  rights	  protections.	  “Presumably	  they	  knew	  that	  a	  bill	  of	  rights	  are	  in	  the	  long	  run	  a	  powerful	  vehicle	  of	  integration	  and	  in	  1957,	  when	  the	  European	  climate	  was	  already	  tinged	  with	  skepticism…they	  were	  not	  eager	  to	  see	  the	  integration	  process	  speeded	  up	  by	  a	  central	  authority.”129	  Such	  a	  sentiment	  was	  also	  off-­‐set	  by	  their	  belief	  that,	  “the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law	  was	  essentially	  limited	  to	  economic	  issues	  and,	  as	  such,	  did	  not	  involved	  human	  rights	  problems.”130	  Member	  States	  echoed	  such	  sentiments,	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  bill	  of	  rights	  ensured	  their	  sovereign	  hegemony	  over	  their	  distinct,	  constitutional	  traditions	  and	  fundamental	  right	  guarantees.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  Union’s	  internal	  market	  evolved,	  economic	  (functional)	  spillover	  led	  to	  the	  inevitable	  expansion	  of	  supranational	  competencies	  into	  novel	  policy	  domains;	  Community	  law	  “came	  to	  govern	  diverse	  and	  sometimes	  unforeseen	  facets	  of	  human	  activity.”131	  This	  reality,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  Court’s	  declaration	  of	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Direct	  Effect	  and	  Supremacy,	  alarmed	  Member	  States.	  On	  what	  lawful,	  democratic	  basis	  could	  Union	  law	  supersede	  national	  law,	  and	  thus	  rob	  Member	  States’	  citizens	  of	  their	  human	  rights	  guarantees	  when	  operating	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  law?	  Member	  States	  with	  strong	  constitutional	  traditions,	  such	  as	  Germany	  and	  Italy,	  threatened	  to	  defect.	  “It	  was	  a	  brutal	  blow,	  a	  blow	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jeopardizing	  not	  only	  the	  supremacy,	  but	  the	  very	  independence	  of	  Community	  law.”132	  Though	  Member	  States’	  desired	  to	  maintain	  the	  economic	  benefits	  associated	  with	  the	  internal	  market,	  they	  realized	  that	  the	  regulatory	  laws	  governing	  such	  an	  objective	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  infringe	  on	  their	  constitutional	  guarantees	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Such	  concerns	  were	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  their	  awareness	  of	  the	  potentially	  eroding	  effects	  a	  supranational	  enumeration	  of	  rights	  would	  have	  on	  their	  constitutional	  traditions,	  and	  by	  extension,	  their	  national	  sovereignty.	  Thus,	  the	  Member	  States	  found	  themselves	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture:	  they	  could	  either	  effectively	  threaten	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  by	  refusing	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  supremacy	  of	  Community	  law,	  or	  they	  could	  coalesce	  around	  the	  establishment	  of	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  Realizing	  that	  defection	  was	  more	  costly,	  the	  Member	  States	  ‘upgraded	  their	  common	  interest,’	  and	  became	  willing	  “to	  extend	  supranational	  policy-­‐making	  to	  additional	  domains,”133	  such	  as	  those	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  By	  articulating	  such	  sentiments,	  Member	  States	  elites	  made	  clear	  their	  transnational,	  self-­‐interest	  in	  having	  a	  general,	  legal	  framework	  for	  guaranteed	  rights;	  such	  a	  request	  was	  “forced	  on	  the	  Court	  from	  the	  outside,	  by	  the	  German,	  and	  later,	  the	  Italian	  Constitutional	  Courts.”134The	  Court	  obliged,	  due	  to	  its	  own	  self-­‐interest	  in	  preserving	  its	  institutionalized	  judicial	  supremacy,	  and	  “because	  of	  its	  growing	  awareness	  that	  a	  ‘democratic	  deficit’	  had	  become	  apparent	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Community.”135	  Additionally,	  “a	  changing	  historical	  climate	  and	  international	  consciousness	  towards	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human	  rights	  was	  unfolding”136	  at	  the	  time,	  providing	  the	  Court	  with	  the	  perfect	  environment	  in	  which	  it	  could	  advance	  rights	  protections.	  In	  Stauder	  [1969],	  the	  Court	  proclaimed:	  “Fundamental	  rights	  are	  enshrined	  in	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law	  and	  protected	  by	  the	  Court.”	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  declared	  fundamental	  rights	  to	  be	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  Community	  law,	  and	  a	  means	  by	  which	  “to	  check	  the	  legality	  of	  Community	  measures.”137	  These	  pivotal	  political	  and	  legal	  developments	  –	  of	  which	  Stauder	  is	  a	  product	  off	  –	  illustrate	  the	  dynamics	  of	  neo-­‐functionalist	  spillover.	  On	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Court,	  Stauder	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  functional	  spillover,	  for	  the	  Court	  carved	  out	  for	  itself	  a	  novel	  policy	  domain	  within	  which	  it	  could	  adjudicate.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  Union’s	  national	  actors,	  Stauder	  initiated	  another	  policy	  realm	  in	  which	  Community	  law	  became	  effective.	  The	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  became	  apparent	  soon	  after.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  Court,	  political	  spillover	  manifested	  itself	  through	  the	  Court’s	  active	  construction	  of	  rights-­‐oriented	  jurisprudence	  and	  adherence	  to	  stare	  decisis	  (precedent).	  The	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  also	  trickled	  down	  to	  affect	  the	  normative	  behavior	  of	  national	  judiciaries	  and	  private	  litigants	  alike;	  “those	  actors	  to	  which	  the	  Court’s	  decisions	  are	  directed	  –	  Member	  State	  governments,	  national	  courts,	  and	  individuals	  –	  accept	  one	  decisions	  as	  a	  statement	  of	  existing	  law	  and	  proceed	  to	  make	  arguments	  in	  the	  next	  case	  from	  that	  benchmark.”138	  By	  leveraging	  supranational	  human	  rights	  norms	  (vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  legal	  precedent)	  as	  a	  means	  of	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achieving	  certain,	  desired	  policy	  outcomes,	  these	  political	  actors	  attitudes	  shifted	  in	  favor	  of	  supranational	  governance,	  thereby	  propelling	  political	  integration	  forward.	  	  The	  expansive	  logic	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism	  in	  relation	  to	  human	  rights	  became	  apparent	  once	  again	  with	  the	  subsequent	  ratification	  of	  Treaty	  of	  	  Maasticht	  in	  1993.	  Article	  6(2)	  declares:	  	  ““The	  Union	  shall	  respect	  fundamental	  rights,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  signed	  in	  Rome	  on	  4	  November	  1950,	  and	  as	  they	  result	  from	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law.”	  	  By	  introducing	  human	  rights	  as	  a	  Treaty	  obligation	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  Union	  made	  clear	  its	  enduring	  commitment	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights.	  Clearly,	  the	  Court’s	  rights	  jurisprudence	  created	  and	  consolidated	  political	  interests	  for	  both	  supranational	  and	  subnational	  actors	  alike	  within	  the	  human	  rights	  domain.	  If	  this	  had	  not	  been	  the	  case,	  such	  explicit	  acknowledgment	  of	  respect	  for	  fundamental	  rights	  would	  have	  remained	  absent,	  as	  it	  had	  in	  the	  past.	  This	  is	  because	  such	  an	  amendment	  could	  not	  have	  been	  legally	  incorporated	  given	  the	  Principle	  of	  Unanimity	  for	  Treaty	  revisions	  at	  this	  time.	  Under	  Article	  48	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht,	  Treaties	  can	  only	  be	  amended	  when	  all	  Member	  States	  have	  agreed	  to	  the	  provisions,	  and	  amendments	  can	  only	  take	  effect	  when	  all	  Member	  States	  have	  ratified	  them	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  national	  constitutional	  provisions.	  Thus,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  highlights	  the	  salient	  role	  that	  entrenched	  political	  interests	  play	  in	  “producing	  incremental	  but	  steady”139	  integrative	  change.	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   Neo-­‐functionalism	  also	  contends	  that	  as	  “hindrances	  to	  cross-­‐national	  exchange	  and	  interactions”140	  are	  removed,	  “new	  obstacles	  to	  such	  transactions	  are	  revealed	  and	  become	  salient	  to	  national	  and	  supranational	  transactors.”141	  These	  political	  actors	  are	  then	  motivated	  to	  “target	  these	  obstacles,	  through	  ligation	  and	  through	  pressure	  on	  EU	  institutions	  to	  expand	  the	  reach	  of	  EU	  rules	  into	  new	  domains.”142	  What	  is	  to	  be	  underscored	  here	  is	  the	  transformation	  of	  preferences	  with	  time;	  political	  interests	  that	  were	  once	  viewed	  as	  inconsequential	  acquire	  significant	  weight	  to	  them,	  and	  as	  such,	  prompt	  novel,	  reactionary	  processes	  favoring	  integration.	  	  Taking	  this	  neo-­‐functionalist	  component	  into	  account,	  the	  logic	  motivating	  the	  adoption	  of	  The	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  crystallizes.	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  Court’s	  formulation	  of	  “fundamental	  rights	  form	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,”	  proved	  to	  be	  inadequate,	  for	  reasons	  discussed	  in	  the	  
Introduction.	  These	  worries	  were	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  national	  political	  actors	  recurrent	  concerns	  over	  the	  Union’s	  increasing	  competencies.	  As	  Joseph	  Weiler	  says	  most	  eloquently,	  	  “As	  the	  polity	  grows,	  as	  the	  ability	  of	  national	  mechanisms	  and	  instruments	  to	  provide	  democratic	  legitimacy	  to	  European	  norms	  is	  increasingly	  understood	  as	  partial	  and	  often	  formal	  rather	  than	  real,	  the	  necessity	  of	  democratizing	  decision	  making	  at	  the	  European	  level	  becomes	  pressing.	  Such	  democratization	  requires,	  in	  its	  turn,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  polity	  with	  social	  commitment…The	  only	  normatively	  acceptable	  construct	  is	  to	  conceive	  the	  polity	  as	  a	  community	  of	  values…When	  one	  grasps	  for	  content	  for	  such	  a	  community	  of	  values,	  the	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights	  becomes	  the	  most	  ready	  currency.”	  143	  	  Consequently,	  the	  Union	  sought	  to	  create	  and	  to	  ratify	  a	  legally	  binding	  document	  in	  which	  the	  material	  and	  scope	  of	  human	  rights	  protections	  at	  the	  Community	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stricter	  and	  more	  explicit.	  The	  political	  demand	  for	  such	  an	  expansive	  document	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  product	  of	  functional	  spillover	  within	  and	  of	  itself.	  Furthermore,	  the	  very	  process	  of	  the	  Union’s	  drafting	  of	  the	  Charter	  reflects	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  spillover,	  “in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  27	  Member	  States,	  with	  their	  own	  history	  and	  culture,	  have	  declared	  their	  adhesion	  to	  these	  common	  fundamental	  values.”144	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  Charter	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  “part	  of	  the	  Iconography	  of	  European	  integration.”145	  	  	   The	  historical,	  political,	  and	  legal	  developments	  outlined	  above	  illustrate	  how	  the	  judicial	  process	  provides	  the	  ‘functional’	  means	  by	  which	  fundamental	  rights	  came	  to	  occupy	  an	  integrative	  space	  within	  the	  Union’s	  federalist-­‐like	  political	  order.	  From	  the	  time	  of	  Stauder	  to	  that	  of	  the	  present,	  the	  Court	  has	  constitutionalized	  human	  rights	  through	  its	  case	  law.	  However,	  the	  aforementioned	  narrative	  also	  highlights	  the	  important	  role	  that	  both	  supranational	  and	  national	  actors’	  political	  self-­‐interest	  maintain	  in	  influencing	  their	  endorsement	  of	  supranational	  human	  rights	  norms.	  If	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  historical	  facts,	  it	  is	  very	  much	  apparent	  that	  human	  rights	  became	  a	  vehicle	  for	  integration	  at	  the	  request	  and	  behest	  of	  the	  Member	  States;	  both	  the	  origins	  (Stauder)	  and	  culmination	  (The	  Charter)	  of	  the	  Union’s	  normative	  discourse	  on	  human	  rights	  are	  rooted	  in	  Member	  States’	  willingness	  to	  cede	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  authority	  within	  their	  human	  rights	  jurisdiction	  in	  return	  for	  the	  benefits	  associated	  with	  EU	  membership.	  Similarly,	  the	  Court	  legally	  incorporated	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rights	  due	  to	  its	  own	  desire	  in	  maintaining	  a	  “formal	  constitutional	  legitimacy	  and	  a	  legal	  basis,”146	  for	  the	  supremacy	  of	  its	  judge-­‐made	  law.	  	  What	  is	  to	  be	  emphasized,	  then,	  is	  that	  political	  self-­‐interest	  maintains	  an	  important	  role	  in	  how	  the	  integrative	  consequences	  of	  the	  Court’s	  jurisprudence	  are	  consolidated.	  Though	  the	  Court	  maintains	  discretion	  in	  crafting	  its	  legal	  rulings,	  it	  is	  clearly	  sensitive	  to	  its	  surrounding	  political	  environment	  and	  the	  supranational	  and	  national	  preferences	  that	  arise	  and	  operate	  within	  it.	  However,	  the	  question	  that	  remains	  is	  how	  such	  political,	  self-­‐interest	  influences	  the	  value-­‐choices	  the	  Court	  makes	  when	  adjudicating	  and	  crafting	  a	  supranational,	  human	  rights	  standard.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  1.6,	  the	  Court	  is	  not	  explicitly	  institutionally	  constrained	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  Member	  State	  governments,	  thereby	  making	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  question	  that	  much	  more	  relevant.	  	  
2.5	  What	  Considerations	  Influence	  Human	  Rights	  Norms?	  As	  a	  normative	  concept,	  human	  rights	  “illustrate	  the	  themes	  of	  uniformity	  and	  diversity	  and	  of	  European	  multiculturalism.”147	  Indeed,	  a	  State’s	  understanding	  of	  its	  enumerated	  rights	  is	  a	  product	  of	  its	  particularized	  historical	  discourse,	  of	  its	  social	  and	  political	  culture.	  Joseph	  Weiler	  cites	  America	  and	  Germany’s	  contrasting	  understandings	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  neo-­‐Nazi	  march	  as	  case	  and	  point.148	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  State’s	  distinct	  historical	  past	  or	  its	  cultural	  traditions	  that	  influence	  how	  it	  defines	  the	  normative	  parameters	  of	  human	  rights.	  A	  State’s	  understanding	  of	  its	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  In	  America,	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  the	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  freedom	  of	  expression	  would	  protect	  a	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guaranteed	  rights	  is	  contingent	  on,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Weiler,	  its	  conceptualization	  of	  its	  “fundamental	  boundaries.”149	  Though	  fundamental	  rights	  are	  “an	  expression	  of	  a	  vision	  of	  humanity	  that	  vests	  the	  deepest	  values	  in	  the	  individual	  that,	  hence,	  may	  not	  be	  compromised	  by	  anyone,”150	  a	  State	  does	  not	  always	  regard	  them	  as	  absolute.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  a	  State	  may	  curtail	  fundamental	  rights	  when	  attempting	  to	  strike	  the	  delicate	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  collective,	  as	  represented	  by	  government	  authority,	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  pursuit	  of	  autonomy	  and	  liberty.151	  It	  is	  the	  State’s	  establishment	  of	  this	  equilibrium	  that	  creates	  the	  fundamental	  boundary.	  If	  a	  fundamental	  right	  is	  “invariably	  the	  expression	  of	  compromise	  between	  competing	  social	  goods	  in	  the	  polity,”152	  then	  the	  fundamental	  boundary	  inherently	  determines	  that	  fundamental	  right.	  	  	   Taking	  this	  all	  into	  account,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  States	  often	  differ	  in	  how	  they	  conceptualize	  their	  fundamental	  rights	  guarantees.	  Numerous	  factors	  influence	  a	  State’s	  normative	  discourse	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  their	  articulated	  notions	  of	  the	  fundamental	  boundary;	  these	  elements	  range	  from	  that	  of	  cultural	  concerns	  (i.e.	  past	  historical	  traditions)	  to	  that	  of	  institutional	  concerns	  (i.e.	  their	  constitutional	  tradition,	  unitary	  versus	  federal).	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  this	  reality	  that	  motivated	  the	  framers	  of	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  to	  defiantly	  declare	  with	  Article	  4(1):	  	  “The	  Union	  shall	  respect	  the	  equality	  of	  Member	  States	  before	  the	  Treaties	  as	  well	  as	  their	  national	  identities,	  inherent	  in	  their	  fundamental	  structures,	  political	  and	  constitutional,	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inclusive	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  self-­‐government….”	  	  How	  does	  the	  Court	  make	  sense	  of	  such	  a	  Treaty	  requirement?	  How	  does	  the	  ECJ	  translate	  the	  various	  considerations,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  into	  a	  transnational	  context	  when	  fashioning	  a	  normative,	  legal	  framework	  for	  human	  rights	  at	  the	  Community	  level?	  	  
2.5	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice’s	  Normative	  Considerations	  for	  Judicial	  Protections	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  	  
2.5A:	  Jurisdiction	  	   	  	   As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  spillover	  has	  created	  the	  unavoidable	  expansion	  of	  Community	  competencies.	  This	  was	  especially	  so	  following	  the	  1993	  ratification	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  which	  established	  two,	  additional	  pillars	  of	  EU	  governance:	  the	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (CFSP)	  and	  the	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  (JHA).	  Consequently,	  EU	  activity	  expanded	  into	  policy	  areas	  such	  as	  immigration,	  asylum,	  security,	  and	  data	  protection.153	  These	  developments	  make	  the	  ECJ’s	  role	  in	  constructing	  legal	  norms	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  and	  dynamic	  process.	  With	  every	  additional	  policy	  domain	  subject	  to	  Community	  law	  interference,	  the	  Court	  must	  establish	  new	  legal	  norms.	  However,	  recall	  again	  that	  the	  ECJ	  maintains	  an	  unlimited	  zone	  of	  discretion;	  invoking	  the	  primacy	  of	  Community	  law,	  it	  can	  extend	  judicial	  review	  onto	  national	  legislation	  it	  deems	  to	  be	  divergent	  from	  obligations	  dictated	  by	  the	  Treaty	  and	  Community	  directives	  and	  law.	  	  This	  broad	  delineation	  of	  power	  has	  a	  crucial	  implication	  for	  how	  the	  Court	  crafts	  the	  Community’s	  human	  rights	  standards.	  Because	  the	  ECJ	  maintains	  sole	  authority	  in	  deciding	  when	  national	  legislation	  lies	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law,	  it	  can	  shift	  the	  Community’s	  ‘fundamental	  boundaries,’	  at	  its	  own	  discretion,	  and,	  by	  extension,	  define	  the	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fundamental	  right	  in	  question.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  it	  is	  this	  balance	  between	  the	  fundamental	  right	  and	  the	  fundamental	  boundary	  that	  “is	  a	  normative	  expression	  of	  core	  values,	  of	  basic	  societal	  choices.”154	  	  Despite	  the	  Court’s	  unlimited	  zone	  of	  discretion,	  the	  Court	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  cannot	  extend	  its	  jurisdiction	  to	  adjust	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary’	  of	  Community	  law	  in	  an	  inconsistent	  and	  unpredictable	  manner.	  Surely,	  this	  would	  threaten	  the	  Court’s	  political	  legitimacy.155	  Such	  actions	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  assault	  on	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  Member	  State	  policies,	  and	  be	  viewed	  as	  “a	  direct	  encroachment	  to	  the	  fundamental	  boundaries	  of	  the	  member	  state.”156	  In	  Cinetheque	  (1985),	  the	  Court	  recognized	  this,	  declaring:	  	  “Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  this	  Court	  to	  ensure	  observance	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  within	  the	  field	  of	  Community	  law,	  it	  has	  no	  power	  to	  examine	  the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  national	  legislation	  which	  concerns,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  an	  area	  which	  falls	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  national	  legislator.”	  	  Consequently,	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  has	  articulated	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  Community	  law	  becomes	  applicable	  in	  relation	  to	  human	  rights.	  	  In	  Wachauf	  (1989),	  the	  Court	  asserted	  that	  Member	  States,	  acting	  “as	  a	  decentralized	  agent	  of	  the	  Union,”	  157	  must	  consider	  fundamental	  rights	  when	  implementing	  EU	  law	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  regulations	  or	  directives.	  Often158,	  the	  Court	  contends	  that	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  Fundamental	  Boundaries:	  Common	  Standards	  and	  Conflicting	  Values	  in	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  European	  Legal	  Space."	  In	  An	  Identity	  for	  Europe:	  
The	  Relevance	  of	  Multiculturalism	  in	  EU	  Construction.	  P78	  155	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  Jacque,	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  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	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  the	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  of	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  the	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  Rossi	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Community	  regulations	  are	  expressed	  in	  broad	  enough	  terms	  to	  allow	  for	  fundamental	  rights	  to	  be	  respected.	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  holds	  that	  “where	  a	  Community	  provision	  incorporates	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  fundamental	  right,	  national	  measures	  which	  implement	  that	  provision	  must	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  provision	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  fundamental	  right	  is	  respected.”159	  	  Shortly	  after,	  the	  ECJ	  established	  another	  formula	  clarifying	  the	  relationship	  between	  Community	  law,	  national	  measures,	  and	  human	  rights.	  In	  ERT	  (1991),	  the	  Court	  declared	  the	  right	  to	  assess	  Member	  States’	  public	  policy	  derogations	  from	  Community	  law	  on	  fundamental	  rights	  grounds.	  Since	  its	  founding,	  the	  EU’s	  commitment	  to	  guaranteeing	  the	  four,	  market	  freedoms	  has	  endured;	  these	  provisions	  assure	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  workers,	  services,	  and	  capital,	  and	  they	  have	  “played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  building	  Europe’s	  economic	  constitution.”160	  The	  Union’s	  various	  Treaties	  interdict	  Member	  State	  measures	  interfering	  with	  these	  market	  freedoms,	  regardless	  their	  source.	  “The	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  interference	  may	  emanate	  from	  a	  constitutional	  norm	  is,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  irrelevant.	  Likewise,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  constitutional	  measures	  may	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  deeply	  held	  national	  societal	  more	  or	  value	  is,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  irrelevant.”161	  However,	  Treaty	  of	  Rome162	  states	  that	  a	  Member	  States’	  legislation	  constituting	  a	  violation	  of	  these	  market	  provisions	  may	  be	  exculpated	  if	  it	  is	  shown	  to	  fall	  under	  the	  derogation	  clauses;	  these	  exceptions	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds:	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  EU	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“Public	  morality,	  public	  policy	  or	  public	  security;	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  or	  plants;	  the	  protection	  of	  national	  treasures	  possessing	  artistic	  historic	  or	  archaeological	  value;	  or	  the	  protection	  of	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  property.”	  What	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  “is	  that	  defining	  what	  constitutes	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  basic	  market	  freedoms	  is,	  substantively	  and	  jurisdictionally,	  a	  matter	  of	  Community	  law	  and	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  decide,	  as	  is	  the	  exculpatory	  regime.”163	  Thus,	  the	  ECJ’s	  assertion	  in	  ERT	  that,	  	  “When	  a	  Member	  State	  invokes	  Article	  56	  and	  66	  of	  the	  Treaty	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  rules	  which	  hinder	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services,	  this	  justification,	  which	  is	  provided	  for	  in	  Community	  law,	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,	  
notably	  fundamental	  rights.”	  	  was	  groundbreaking	  for	  its	  time,	  and	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  bold,	  judicially	  activist	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Court.	  With	  this	  proclamation,	  the	  Court	  expands	  the	  doctrine	  of	  jurisdictional	  application	  formulated	  in	  Wachauf.	  Member	  States’	  derogations	  must	  be	  compatible	  with	  not	  only	  “the	  general	  administrative	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,	  but	  should	  also	  conform	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  which	  the	  Court	  claims	  to	  respect	  and	  protect.”164	  	  	   As	  it	  has	  been	  seen,	  Wachauf	  and	  ERT	  created	  normative	  constructs	  of	  judicial	  authority	  in	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction.	  The	  Court	  clearly	  delineated	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  Community	  law	  ‘absorbs’	  Member	  States’	  national	  legislation,	  and	  thus	  becomes	  susceptible	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  review.	  The	  Charter	  confirms	  to	  this	  standards,	  with	  Article	  51(1)	  stating:	  “The	  provisions	  of	  this	  Charter	  are	  addressed	  to	  the	  institutions	  and	  bodies	  of	  the	  Union	  with	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  only	  when	  they	  
are	  implementing	  Union	  law.”	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The	  judge-­‐made	  creation	  of	  these	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  creates	  a	  two-­‐fold,	  symbiotic	  effect	  on	  the	  Union’s	  human	  rights	  protections.	  It	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  extend	  judicial	  review	  of	  human	  rights	  into	  various	  national	  policy	  domains,	  but	  in	  doing	  so,	  such	  domains	  become	  susceptible	  to	  normative	  harmonization	  of	  the	  Court’s	  articulated	  human	  rights	  standards.	  In	  this	  sense,	  then,	  legal	  integration	  of	  human	  rights,	  both	  in	  scope	  and	  content,	  becomes	  contingent	  on	  how	  the	  Court	  conceptualizes	  its	  jurisdiction.	  	  
2.5B:	  Defining	  “Fundamental	  Rights	  as	  General	  Principles	  of	  Community	  Law”	  Once	  the	  ECJ	  establishes	  its	  jurisdiction	  within	  a	  certain	  policy	  domain,	  what	  considerations	  does	  it	  award	  to	  human	  rights	  when	  adjudicating?	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  with	  Stauder	  (1969),	  the	  Court	  proclaimed:	  	  
“Fundamental	  rights	  are	  enshrined	  in	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law	  and	  protected	  by	  the	  Court.”165	  	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  failed	  to	  explain	  what	  substantive,	  normative	  sources	  define	  the	  very	  character	  of	  these	  ‘fundamental	  rights.’	  The	  Court	  clarified	  its	  definition	  in	  Internationale	  
Handelsgeselleschaft	  (1970),	  asserting:	  	  “Respect	  for	  fundamental	  rights	  form	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  protected	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  The	  protection	  of	  such	  rights,	  whilst	  inspired	  by	  the	  
constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  must	  be	  ensured	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  structure	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Community.”	  	  	  Four	  years	  later,	  in	  Nold	  II	  (1974),	  the	  ECJ	  expanded	  its	  reach,	  finding	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  factoring	  in	  Member	  States’	  constitutional	  traditions,	  it	  would	  also	  consider:	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“Similarly,	  international	  treaties	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights,	  on	  which	  the	  Member	  States	  have	  collaborated	  or	  of	  which	  they	  are	  signatories,	  can	  supply	  guidelines	  which	  should	  be	  followed	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Community	  law.”	  Subsequent	  case	  law	  indicated	  that	  among	  these	  international	  conventions	  taken	  into	  account	  is	  the	  ECHR.	  Indeed,	  the	  ECJ	  made	  its	  first,	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  convention	  one	  year	  later	  in	  Rutilli	  (1975),	  and	  it	  has	  continued	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	   Thus,	  with	  Internationale	  Handelsgeselleschaft	  and	  Nold	  II,	  the	  Court	  clarified	  how	  it	  conceptualizes	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law’;	  both	  Member	  States’	  constitutional	  traditions	  and	  international	  treaties	  alike	  inspire	  the	  Court’s	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Court’s	  rights	  rhetoric	  is	  fairly	  cautious.	  It	  makes	  clear	  that	  it	  does	  not	  feel	  itself	  firmly	  anchored	  by	  these	  normative	  human	  rights	  standards.	  Rather,	  constitutional	  traditions	  are	  merely	  a	  source	  of	  “inspiration,”	  and	  international	  treaties	  supply	  only	  “guidelines.”	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  legal	  doctrine	  determining	  human	  rights	  standards	  is	  normatively	  weak,	  for	  it	  is	  based	  on	  how	  the	  Court	  infers	  meaning	  into	  these	  vague	  points	  of	  reference.	  “Principles	  are	  merely	  a	  norm	  enabling	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  optimize	  different	  entitlements	  which	  lack	  the	  rule-­‐character	  of	  codified	  and	  binding	  fundamental	  rights.”166	  
2.5C:	  The	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Principles	  	  Since	  2009,	  the	  Charter	  has	  provided	  the	  Court	  with	  another	  set	  of	  human	  rights	  standards	  it	  can	  use	  when	  adjudicating.	  Many	  of	  the	  Charter’s	  clauses	  correspond	  to	  the	  rights	  articulated	  by	  the	  ECHR,	  and	  the	  Charter	  itself	  recognizes	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Convention.	  Article	  52(3)	  states:	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  Protection	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  Post-­‐Lisbon:	  The	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  Human	  Rights	  and	  National	  Constitutions."	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Tallinn	  2012,	  by	  Julia	  Laffranque,	  1-­‐139.	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“In	  so	  far	  as	  this	  Charter	  contains	  rights	  which	  correspond	  to	  rights	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms,	  the	  meaning	  
and	  scope	  of	  those	  rights	  shall	  be	  the	  same	  as	  those	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  said	  Convention.	  This	  provision	  shall	  not	  prevent	  Union	  law	  providing	  more	  extensive	  protection.”	  However,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  Charter’s	  provisions	  also	  go	  beyond	  the	  rights	  articulated	  in	  the	  Convention,	  and	  it	  recognizes	  some	  rights	  not	  expressly	  listed	  	  (e.g.	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  elderly	  to	  lead	  a	  life	  of	  dignity	  and	  independence	  [Art.	  25],	  the	  rights	  to	  protection	  of	  personal	  data	  [Art.	  8]).	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Charter	  provides	  “much	  needed	  innovation	  to	  our	  constitutional	  norms	  that	  were	  shaped	  by	  gaining	  constitutions	  and	  international	  treaties.”167	  	  The	  rights	  provided	  are	  subdivided	  into	  six	  chapters:	  Dignity	  (Articles	  1-­‐5),	  Freedoms	  (Articles	  6-­‐19),	  Equality	  (Article	  20-­‐26),	  Citizen’s	  Rights	  (Articles	  39-­‐46),	  and	  Justice	  (Articles	  47-­‐50).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  feature	  of	  the	  Charter’s	  content	  lies	  in	  its	  innovative	  grouping	  of	  rights;	  it	  abandons	  the	  traditional	  demarcations	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  civil	  and	  political	  rights,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  economic	  and	  social	  rights.	  This	  convergence	  creates	  interesting	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  Court	  is	  to	  adjudicate	  on	  human	  rights,	  as	  tensions	  can	  arise	  between	  the	  former	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  latter.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  sub-­‐section.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Charter	  makes	  the	  distinction	  between	  rights	  and	  principles.	  Article	  51(1)	  holds	  that:	  “The	  provisions	  of	  this	  Charter	  are	  addressed	  to	  the	  institutions	  and	  bodies	  of	  the	  Union	  with	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  only	  when	  they	  are	  implementing	  Union	  law.	  They	  shall	  therefore	  respect	  the	  rights,	  observe	  the	  principles	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and	  promote	  the	  application	  thereof	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  respective	  powers.”	  Whereas	  rights	  have	  a	  binding	  and	  directly	  enforceable	  character,	  principles	  are	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  guidelines	  rather	  than	  enforceable	  entitlements.	  “It	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed,	  however,	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  rights	  and	  principles	  should	  not	  be	  drawn	  according	  to	  their	  litigabilty,	  but	  rather	  according	  to	  their	  ‘status	  of	  enforceability.’”168	  Unlike	  rights,	  principles	  cannot	  be	  invoked	  directly	  by	  individuals,	  because	  they	  are	  objective	  standards	  addressed	  to	  the	  Union’s	  Member	  States	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  given	  purpose.	  “This	  purpose	  is	  achieved	  through	  measures	  of	  implementation	  that	  themselves	  create	  rights	  for	  individuals.”169	  Thus,	  a	  principle	  only	  becomes	  a	  protected	  right	  when	  there	  has	  been	  legislation	  implementing	  such	  measures.	  To	  clarify,	  whereas	  freedom	  of	  expression	  (Art.	  11)	  is	  defined	  to	  be	  a	  right,	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  elderly	  (Art.	  25)	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  principles.	  The	  logic	  motivating	  the	  delineation	  between	  rights	  and	  principles	  lies	  in	  the	  Charter’s	  desire	  to	  leave	  a	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  Member	  States’	  legislation;	  “some	  of	  the	  principles,	  therefore,	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  defensive	  character,	  and	  primarily	  aim	  at	  protection	  national	  norms	  (specifically	  social	  standards)	  from	  a	  leveling	  by	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Union.”170	  In	  practice,	  however,	  “the	  lines	  between	  rights	  and	  principles	  are	  floating,”171	  for	  some	  articles	  contain	  both	  elements	  of	  a	  right	  and	  a	  principle	  (e.g.	  equality	  between	  men	  and	  women	  [Art.23]).	  Thus,	  how	  the	  Court	  applies	  principles	  as	  a	  standard	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  can	  be	  rather	  equivocal,	  as	  it	  depends	  on	  how	  it	  conceptualizes	  its	  jurisdiction	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over	  the	  legislative	  act	  at	  hand.	  If	  the	  Charter	  is	  to	  be	  used	  as	  an	  integrative	  tool	  in	  all	  of	  its	  capacity,	  then	  one	  expects	  the	  Court	  to	  place	  ‘hard’	  limits	  on	  the	  enforceability	  of	  the	  Charter’s	  enumerated	  principles.	  	  	   As	  it	  has	  been	  seen,	  the	  Charter’s	  normative	  scope	  is	  simultaneously	  more	  expansive	  and	   more	   demanding	   than	   that	   of	   the	   “general	   principles”	   formula.	   Not	   only	   does	   the	  Charter	  codify	   the	  past	   rights	   inferred	  by	   the	  Court’s	   ”general	  principles”	  case	   law,	  but	   it	  also	  creates	  novel	  rights.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Charter	  now	  maintains	  “the	  same	  legal	  value	  as	  the	   Treaties.”172	  As	   such,	   one	   would	   think	   that	   the	   Charter	   renders	   the	   Court’s	   “general	  principles”	   formula	  unnecessary.	  However,	   this	   is	  not	  so,	   for	  Article	  6(3)	  of	   the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  states:	  “Fundamental	   rights,	   as	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   European	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	  Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms	   and	   as	   they	   result	   from	   the	   constitutional	  traditions	   common	   to	   the	  Member	   States,	   shall	   constitute	  general	  principles	  of	   the	  Union's	  
law.”	  	  Such	  a	  declaration	  raises	  questions	  about	  how	  Article	  6(3)	  is	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Charter	  and	  its	  normative	  scope.	  Are	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law,	  as	  they	  stem	  from	  Article	  6(3),	  only	  ancillary	  to	  the	  Charter?	  Or	  will	  the	  Court	  rely	  on	  the	  Charter	  “as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  to	  elaborate	  ‘general	  principles’	  of	  EU	  law,”173	  which	  is	  dictated	  by	  its	  preceding	  case	  law?	  Only	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  over	  time	  can	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  If	  the	  Court	  aims	  to	  leverage	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  a	  means	  of	  advancing	  integration,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  general	  principles	  and	  the	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   6(1):	   “The	  Union	   recognizes	   the	   rights,	   freedoms	   and	   principles	   set	   out	   in	   the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  7	  December	  2000,	  as	  adapted	  at	  Strasbourg,	  on	  12	  December	  2007,	  which	  shall	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  value	  as	  the	  Treaties.”	  	  173	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  Rights	  Protection	  in	  Europe?	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Charter’s	  rights	  to	  be,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  similar,	  as	  it	  “would	  ensure	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  EU	  fundamental	  rights	  post-­‐Lisbon.”174If	  the	  Court	  does	  choose	  to	  utilize	  the	  Charter	  as	  one	  of	  “the	  staring	  points	  of	  its	  inquiry”175	  when	  adjudicating,	  then	  Article	  6(3)	  has	  a	  diversifying	  effect	  on	  the	  normative	  conceptualization	  of	  rights	  at	  the	  Community-­‐level.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Court	  can	  now	  simultaneously	  leverage	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  of	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  ECHR	  “in	  situations	  of	  gap	  filling	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  lacunae	  of	  the	  Charter.”176	  By	  extension,	  this	  would	  enable	  the	  Court	  to	  further	  develop	  the	  material	  scope	  of	  the	  Charter.	  	  
2.5D:	  Internal	  Market	  Guarantees	  	  	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  the	  EU’s	  foundation	  is	  rooted	  in	  its	  desire	  to	  create	  and	  to	  ensure	  a	  functioning,	  internal	  market.	  To	  attain	  this	  goal,	  the	  Union’s	  various	  treaties	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  market	  freedoms;	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons,	  services,	  and	  capital	  are	  central	  tenets	  within	  the	  Union’s	  constitutional	  order.177	  As	  such,	  the	  ECJ	  is	  legally	  obliged	  to	  respect	  these	  principles	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  matters	  of	  Community	  law.	  	  The	  ECJ’s	  case	  law	  indicates	  that	  the	  Court	  fulfills	  this	  obligation.	  In	  Dassonville	  (1974),	  the	  Court	  constructed	  a	  broad	  legal	  standard	  for	  when	  national	  legislation	  constrains	  a	  market	  freedom	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  annulment.178	  “The	  very	  fact	  that	  an	  indirect	  and	  potential	  effect	  on	  trade	  suffices	  for	  the	  national	  measure	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  34	  (Treaty	  of	  Rome)	  means	  that	  citizens	  have	  a	  far-­‐reaching	  right	  to	  challenge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Ibid.	  P173	  175	  Ibid.	  P175	  176	  Ibid.	  P177	  177	  Article	  8A	  of	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  states,	  “the	  internal	  market	  shall	  comprise	  an	  area	  without	  internal	  frontiers	  in	  which	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  services,	  and	  capital	  is	  ensured.”	  	  178	  Unless,	  of	  course,	  such	  national	  legislation	  falls	  under	  the	  derogation	  clause.	  See	  subsection	  2.5A	  for	  more	  clarification.	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national	  legislation	  which	  they	  find	  in	  their	  way	  and	  which	  restricts	  their	  (economic)	  rights.”179	  In	  subsequent	  cases,	  the	  Court	  has	  made	  various	  references	  to	  the	  fundamental	  character	  of	  the	  Treaties’	  market	  provisions.180	  The	  Court’s	  rhetoric	  uses	  words	  such	  as	  “fundamental	  freedom,”181	  “one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  Treaty,”182	  or	  “fundamental	  Community	  provision.”183	  How	  does	  the	  Court	  factor	  in	  these	  economic	  motives	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  human	  rights?	  	  	   Wachauf	  [1989]	  provides	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  with	  the	  Court	  declaring:	  	  “…The	  fundamental	  rights	  recognized	  by	  the	  Court	  are	  not	  absolute,	  however,	  but	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  social	  function.	  Consequently,	  restrictions	  may	  be	  imposed	  on	  
the	  exercise	  of	  those	  rights,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  common	  organization	  of	  the	  
market,	  provided	  those	  restrictions	  in	  fact	  correspond	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  general	  interest	  
pursued	  by	  the	  Community…and	  do	  not	  have	  a	  disproportionate	  and	  intolerable	  interference,	  impairing	  the	  very	  substance	  of	  those	  rights.”	  	  	  The	  Court’s	  equation	  of	  the	  “common	  organization	  of	  the	  market”	  with	  that	  of	  “objectives	  of	  general	  interest	  pursued	  by	  the	  Community”	  directly	  implicates	  the	  Community’s	  normative	  conception	  of	  human	  rights.	  The	  former	  explicitly	  serves	  as	  a	  mitigating	  factor	  in	  how	  the	  ECJ	  awards	  legal	  recognition	  to	  fundamental	  rights.	  Article	  52(1)	  of	  the	  Charter	  confirms	  such	  a	  legal	  approach,	  stipulating:	  	  “Any	  limitation	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  recognized	  by	  this	  Charter…May	  be	  made	  only	  if	  they	  are	  necessary	  and	  genuinely	  meet	  objectives	  of	  general	  interest	  by	  the	  Union….”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  Vries,	  Sybe	  A.	  De.	  "Balancing	  Fundamental	  Rights	  with	  Economic	  Freedoms	  According	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice."	  P175	  180	  Oliver,	  Peter,	  and	  Wulf-­‐Henning	  Roth.	  "The	  Internal	  Market	  and	  the	  Four	  Freedoms."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  
Review	  41,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  407-­‐41.	  181	  Schmidberger	  [2000],	  Angonese	  [2000],	  Omega	  [2004],	  Laval	  [2005]	  	  182	  Commission	  v.	  France	  (Spanish	  Strawberries)	  [1995]	  	  183	  Corsica	  Ferries	  France	  [1989]	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However,	  economic	  freedoms	  serve	  as	  a	  control	  on	  fundamental	  rights	  claims	  insomuch	  as	  there	  is	  a	  rigid	  delineation	  in	  the	  substantive	  content	  and	  scope	  of	  such	  market	  freedoms.	  Establishing	  such	  demarcations	  is	  difficult,	  as	  market	  freedoms	  can	  transcend	  solely	  their	  economic	  dimension,	  and	  encompass	  fundamental	  rights.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	  Charter	  provide	  the	  Court	  with	  little	  guidance,	  as	  the	  documents	  themselves	  collapse	  the	  traditional	  distinctions	  between	  economic	  and	  social	  rights.	  For	  example,	  the	  freedom	  to	  pursue	  a	  trade	  or	  profession	  (Art.	  16	  in	  the	  Charter)	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  market	  freedom	  of	  services	  and	  peoples.	  Similarly,	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  (Art.	  14	  in	  the	  ECHR,	  Art.	  21	  in	  the	  Charter)	  directly	  relates	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  provisions,	  and	  such	  a	  fundamental	  right	  can	  also	  be	  invoked	  as	  a	  protectionist	  claim	  of	  human	  dignity	  (Art.	  1	  in	  the	  Charter).	  	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  creating	  legal	  human	  rights	  norms	  becomes	  even	  more	  difficult.	  The	  ECJ	  must	  balance	  the	  Union’s	  competing	  economic	  and	  social	  interests.	  However,	  doing	  so	  is	  contingent	  on	  how	  the	  Court	  decides	  to	  separate	  two	  legal	  guarantees	  that	  diverge	  in	  substance,	  but	  can	  converge	  in	  practice.	  If	  the	  ECJ	  rules	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  economic	  freedom	  over	  that	  of	  a	  fundamental	  right,	  the	  former	  has	  an	  integrative	  effect	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  Community’s	  legal	  and	  economic	  order	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  then,	  “the	  judicial	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  human	  rights…may	  operate	  as	  a	  source	  of	  both	  unity	  and	  disunity	  in	  the	  dialectical	  process	  of	  European	  integration.”184	  	  
2.5E:	  Conclusion	  	  	   As	  it	  has	  been	  seen,	  the	  ECJ	  considers	  a	  myriad	  of	  factors	  when	  constructing	  a	  transnational,	  legal	  framework	  for	  human	  rights	  at	  the	  Community	  level.	  From	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Weiler,	  Joseph	  H.H.	  "Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Boundaries:	  Common	  Standards	  and	  Conflicting	  Values	  in	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  European	  Legal	  Space."	  In	  An	  Identity	  for	  Europe:	  
The	  Relevance	  of	  Multiculturalism	  in	  EU	  Construction.	  P81	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procedural	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  ECJ	  must,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  establish	  its	  jurisdiction	  within	  a	  certain	  policy	  field.	  Doing	  so	  is	  crucial,	  as	  it	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  constitutionalize,	  and	  by	  extension	  harmonize,	  human	  rights	  norms	  at	  the	  Community	  level.	  Once	  it	  does	  so,	  the	  Court	  must	  then	  decide	  on	  the	  substantive	  content	  characterizing	  the	  direction	  of	  such	  legal	  integration.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  the	  Court	  confronts	  two,	  distinct	  tenets	  of	  Community	  law.	  The	  ECJ	  must,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  guarantee	  the	  “common	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union,”	  as	  dictated	  in	  the	  Treaties,	  Wachauf,	  and	  Art.	  52(1)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  must	  promote	  its	  claim	  that	  “fundamental	  rights	  form	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law.”185	  As	  this	  section	  has	  shown,	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  Constitutional	  traditions	  of	  Member	  States,	  and	  the	  Charter	  form	  the	  normative,	  substantive	  basis	  from	  which	  these	  “general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law”	  are	  gathered.	  	  	   What	  should	  be	  underscored	  is	  that	  these	  considerations	  accommodate	  Member	  States’	  distinct,	  national	  identities	  and	  normative	  interests	  within	  and	  of	  themselves.	  All	  Member	  States	  are	  contracting	  parties	  to	  the	  ECHR,	  their	  Constitutional	  traditions,	  and	  the	  Charter,	  and	  they	  also	  desire	  to	  maintain	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  Thus,	  the	  normative	  content	  characterizing	  the	  Union’s	  conceptualization	  of	  rights	  reflect,	  at	  a	  bare	  minimum,	  a	  commonality	  at	  the	  transnational	  and	  national	  level,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  neo-­‐functionalist	  logic.	  	  This	  section	  has	  also	  emphasized	  the	  reality	  that	  certain	  ambiguities	  exist	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  normative	  reach	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  at	  the	  Community	  level.	  Specifically,	  questions	  remain	  over	  the	  exact	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Union’s	  growing	  competencies,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  Charter’s	  rights	  and	  principles,	  and	  the	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Charter’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law,	  as	  developed	  by	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  Union	  maintains	  a	  plurality	  of	  normative	  sources	  characterizing	  the	  very	  content	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  such	  content	  has	  an	  integrative	  effect	  on	  the	  Union’s	  legal	  order	  is	  to	  be	  determined.	  It	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  chapter	  three	  and	  four	  to	  provide	  a	  case-­‐study	  analysis	  on	  this	  matter.	  	  
2.6:	  Methods	  for	  Translating	  the	  Normative	  Considerations	  into	  a	  Coherent	  Standard	  	  	   The	  preceding	  section	  establishes	  what	  normative	  factors	  influence	  the	  Court’s	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence.	  It	  also	  reveals	  the	  competing	  interests	  that	  some	  of	  these	  considerations	  create	  (e.g.	  economic	  competencies	  vs.	  social	  rights,	  the	  Charter’s	  principles	  vs.	  rights).	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  Court	  makes	  sense	  of	  these	  various	  sources	  of	  inspiration,	  and	  comes	  to	  its	  own	  value	  judgment,	  as	  embodied	  in	  its	  legal	  judgments.	  Though	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  actual,	  substantive	  outcome	  of	  such	  reconciliations	  as	  a	  means	  of	  examining	  the	  Court’s	  integrative	  effect,	  this	  section	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  various	  doctrinal	  tools	  the	  Court	  uses	  to	  reach	  such	  legal	  conclusions.	  When	  adjudicating	  on	  matters	  of	  enshrined,	  constitutional	  rights,	  judges,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  profession,	  are	  confronted	  by	  questions	  over	  what	  the	  appropriate	  standard	  of	  protection	  should	  be	  between	  the	  individual	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  collective;	  “it	  is	  a	  key	  function	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  constitutional	  courts	  and	  is	  often	  unavoidable	  in	  solving	  conflict	  between	  fundamental	  rights.”186	  	   If	  the	  Court	  draws	  upon	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  of	  Member	  States	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  fundamental	  rights,	  should	  the	  Court	  adopt	  the	  highest	  constitutional	  standard,	  like	  that	  of	  Germany	  or	  Italy?	  Should	  such	  a	  constitutional	  standard	  be	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transposed	  as	  a	  “general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,”	  under	  Article	  6(3)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  thereby	  effectively	  expanding	  the	  material	  scope	  of	  the	  Charter?	  This	  method	  is	  characterized	  as	  maximalist.	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  be	  deserving	  of	  applause,	  for	  it	  would	  result	  in	  the	  ECJ	  widening	  its	  zone	  of	  protection	  for	  human	  rights.	  However,	  “the	  maximalist	  approach	  does	  not	  work,	  cannot	  work,	  and	  for	  good	  reason,	  has	  been	  rejected	  by	  the	  Court.”	  187	  The	  workability	  of	  such	  a	  method	  rests	  on	  idealistic	  assumptions.	  Why	  should	  the	  Union’s	  Member	  States	  accept	  the	  legal	  standard	  articulated	  by	  only	  one	  of	  many	  Member	  States?	  Not	  only	  would	  this	  create	  a	  potential	  conflict	  of	  values,	  but	  such	  a	  high	  national	  standard	  may	  also	  “be	  considered	  as	  entirely	  unsuitable	  for	  the	  Community	  as	  a	  whole.”188	  The	  Court	  articulated	  this	  reality	  in	  Hauer	  (1979),	  	  “The	  introduction	  of	  special	  criteria	  for	  assessment	  stemming	  from	  the	  legislation	  or	  constitutional	  law	  of	  a	  particular	  Member	  State	  would,	  by	  damaging	  the	  substantive	  unity	  and	  efficacy	  of	  Community	  law,	  lead	  inevitably	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  Common	  Market	  and	  the	  jeopardizing	  of	  the	  cohesion	  of	  the	  Community.”	  	  	  Take,	  for	  example,	  Ireland’s	  high-­‐level,	  constitutional	  protection	  for	  the	  unborn.	  Such	  a	  standard	  of	  protection	  is	  non-­‐existent	  in	  every	  other	  EU	  Member	  State;	  “these	  countries	  guarantee	  the	  ‘opposing’	  right	  of	  a	  woman	  to	  autonomy	  over	  her	  body.”189	  How	  is	  the	  Court	  to	  react	  to	  such	  starkly	  opposing	  conceptions	  of	  life	  of	  the	  unborn?	  If	  it	  utilizes	  a	  maximalist	  approach,	  the	  Court	  would,	  in	  effect,	  disband	  the	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  the	  other	  Member	  States	  in	  performing	  abortion	  services	  within	  the	  area	  of	  Community	  jurisdiction.	  Conversely,	  if	  the	  Court	  were	  to	  leverage	  a	  maximalist	  approach	  in	  awarding	  women	  the	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right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  Ireland’s	  constitutional	  tradition	  would	  be	  eroded.	  Such	  a	  situation	  is	  illustrative	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  “the	  community	  is	  comprised	  of	  many	  member	  states	  and	  peoples.	  Its	  basic	  values	  should	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  that	  mélange.”190A	  maximalist	  approach	  is	  antithetical	  to	  such	  an	  expression,	  for	  it	  “privileges	  the	  core	  values	  of	  one	  Member	  State,	  the	  one	  which	  happened	  to	  accord	  the	  ‘highest’	  level	  of	  protection	  to	  the	  individual.”191	  This	  brings	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  second	  flaw	  inherent	  in	  a	  maximalist	  doctrine.	  By	  awarding	  the	  EU	  citizen	  with	  the	  ‘highest’	  level	  of	  rights	  protection,	  the	  Court	  effectively	  provides	  the	  collective	  polity	  (i.e.	  the	  EU)	  and	  its	  general	  interest	  with	  the	  	  ‘lowest’	  level	  of	  protection.	  “A	  maximalist	  approach	  to	  human	  rights	  would	  result	  in	  a	  minimalist	  approach	  to	  Community	  government.”192	  As	  such,	  this	  legal	  doctrine	  threatens	  to	  bring	  integrative	  effects	  of	  constitutionalization	  to	  a	  standstill.	  	  	   How,	  then,	  does	  the	  Court	  create	  a	  transnational,	  normative	  standard	  for	  rights	  in	  light	  of	  such	  diverse	  and	  conflicting	  national	  values?	  Through	  its	  own	  case	  law193,	  the	  ECJ	  established	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality,	  and	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  “the	  necessary	  corollary	  of	  any	  such	  a	  delicate	  balancing	  exercise.”194	  The	  proportionality	  test	  contains	  three	  elements195:	  	  1) There	  must	  be	  a	  casual	  connection	  between	  the	  national	  measure	  and	  the	  aim	  pursued;	  the	  measure	  is	  relevant	  and	  pertinent	  	  2) There	  is	  no	  less	  restrictive,	  alternative	  measure	  available	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3) There	  must	  be	  a	  relationship	  of	  proportionality	  between	  the	  obstacle	  introduced,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  objective	  thereby	  pursued	  and	  its	  actual	  attainment.	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu;	  meaning	  that	  the	  measure	  will	  be	  disproportionate	  if	  the	  restriction	  is	  out	  of	  proportion	  to	  the	  aim	  sought	  by	  or	  the	  result	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  national	  rules.	  	  “How	  intrusively	  the	  proportionality	  test	  will	  be	  employed	  by	  the	  ECJ	  depends	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors.”196	  First,	  the	  Court	  must	  weight	  the	  public	  interest	  at	  stake	  and	  deem	  it	  relevant	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  jurisdiction.	  For	  example,	  a	  more	  intrusive	  proportionality	  test	  within	  the	  consumer	  policy	  domain	  is	  performed	  because	  “the	  Court	  relies	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  consumer	  to	  process	  information	  and	  make	  informed	  choices	  about	  available	  products	  and	  services.”197	  Second,	  the	  Court	  also	  considers	  “regulatory	  instrument	  used	  by	  the	  Member	  State.”198	  That	  is,	  it	  examines	  the	  national	  legislation	  in	  question,	  and	  how	  Member	  State	  utilizes	  it	  to	  attain	  its	  policy	  goals.	  As	  a	  whole,	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  articulate	  the	  logic	  of	  its	  policy	  justification	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  facet	  of	  Union	  law	  in	  question;	  this,	  in	  turn,	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  consolidate	  and	  craft	  a	  normative	  standard	  of	  protection.	  The	  Charter	  acknowledges	  the	  merits	  of	  such	  doctrinal	  balancing	  exercises	  itself,	  with	  Article	  51(1)	  proclaiming,	  “the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Charter	  are	  addressed	  to	  the	  institutions	  and	  bodies	  of	  the	  Union	  with	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity…”199	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ESTABLISHING	  CONTEXT	  FOR	  CHAPTERS	  3	  and	  4	  	   Chapter	  1	  stressed	  the	  development	  and	  subsequent	  entrenchment	  of	  various	  types	  of	  spillover	  as	  a	  means	  of	  explaining	  the	  gradual	  constitutionalization	  of	  the	  Union’s	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  Chapter	  2	  addresses	  the	  normative	  consequences	  of	  regional	  integration	  by	  establishing	  the	  symbiotic	  relationship	  that	  emerges	  between	  normative	  construction	  and	  institutionalization	  and	  that	  of	  constitutionalization.	  Collectively,	  the	  goals	  of	  Chapter	  1	  and	  Chapter	  2	  have	  been	  to	  establish	  the	  operational	  presence	  of	  neo-­‐functionalist	  logic	  as	  the	  institutional	  level.	  However,	  it	  is	  still	  unclear	  whether	  or	  not	  neo-­‐functionalism’s	  integrative	  effects	  operate	  at	  the	  substantive,	  jurisprudential	  level.	  Do	  nationalistic	  sentiments	  mitigate	  the	  Court’s	  imposition	  of	  supranational	  rights?	  Or	  does	  the	  Court	  understand	  that	  the	  Union	  must	  develop	  “as	  a	  polity	  with	  its	  own	  separate	  identity	  and	  constitutional	  sensibilities,	  that	  has	  to	  define	  its	  own	  fundamental	  balances	  –	  its	  own	  core	  values?”203If	  so,	  does	  the	  Court’s	  conceptualization	  of	  Community-­‐level	  rights	  transcend	  nationally	  embedded	  interpretations	  of	  human	  rights	  norms?	  	  	   Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  attempt	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  and	  gauge	  human	  rights’	  integrative	  effect	  on	  the	  EU	  by	  analyzing	  the	  outcomes	  of	  several	  ECJ	  rights-­‐oriented	  court	  decisions.	  The	  Court	  cases	  examined	  will	  be	  those	  in	  which	  a	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  information	  claim	  was	  invoked.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  freedom	  of	  expression	  is	  a	  provision	  within	  both	  the	  ECHR	  (Article	  10)	  and	  the	  Charter	  (Article	  11).	  Additionally,	  forms	  of	  expression	  also	  encompass	  others	  rights	  enumerated	  in	  the	  Convention	  and	  Charter,	  such	  as:	  freedom	  of	  though,	  consciences,	  and	  religion	  (Article	  9	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ECHR,	  Article	  10	  CFRF),	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  and	  of	  association	  (Article	  11	  ECHR,	  Article	  12	  CFRF),	  and	  freedom	  of	  arts	  and	  sciences	  (Article	  13	  ECHR).	  Third,	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  on	  such	  claims	  is	  well	  developed,	  and	  offers	  points	  of	  comparison	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	  Charter	  have	  been	  interpreted	  over	  the	  decades.	  Finally,	  many	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression	  cases	  involve	  interactions	  with	  market	  freedoms,	  therefore	  clarifying	  the	  values	  judges	  consider	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  	  	   This	  thesis	  divides	  its	  case-­‐study	  portion	  into	  two,	  separate	  chapters	  based	  on	  time	  period.	  Chapter	  three	  examines	  ECJ	  judgments	  from	  1985	  –	  2000.	  The	  first	  case	  examined	  is	  Cinetheque	  (1985),	  which	  is	  the	  first	  judgment	  in	  which	  a	  litigating	  party	  invoked	  a	  freedom	  of	  expression	  claim.	  ERT	  (1991)	  and	  Grogan	  (1991)	  will	  also	  be	  studied,	  as	  these	  are	  the	  only	  other	  judgments	  post-­‐1985	  involving	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  The	  final	  case	  reviewed	  in	  chapter	  three	  will	  be	  Familiapress	  (1997);	  this	  is	  because	  Familiapress	  is	  the	  
last	  judgment	  concerned	  with	  freedom	  of	  expression	  prior	  the	  proclamation	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  2000.	  	  Though	  the	  Charter	  was	  not	  legally	  binding	  until	  2009,	  “the	  legally	  binding	  nature	  of	  the	  Charger	  did	  not	  emerge	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  the	  period	  of	  its	  ‘soft’	  value	  served	  as	  a	  ‘prelude’	  during	  which	  legal	  actors	  struggled	  to	  find	  the	  right	  place	  for	  this	  significant	  instrument.”204	  As	  such,	  chapter	  four	  examines	  a	  total	  of	  five	  cases,	  dating	  from	  2000	  –	  2013.	  It	  assesses	  four	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression	  cases	  brought	  to	  the	  Court’s	  docket	  during	  this	  thirteen-­‐year	  period,	  and	  this	  involves	  cases	  from	  the	  time	  preceding	  the	  legal	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter	  to	  the	  time	  after	  it	  became	  legally	  binding.	  By	  separating	  these	  case	  studies	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐proclamation	  of	  the	  Charter,	  this	  thesis	  can	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examine	  the	  integrative	  effects	  of	  the	  Court’s	  human	  rights	  jurisprudents	  from	  a	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  perspective.	  Given	  that	  the	  Charter	  “represents	  a	  fundamental	  evolution	  in	  the	  ‘stage	  of	  integration,’”205	  such	  divisions	  by	  time	  enable	  this	  thesis	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Court’s	  rights	  adjudication	  has	  had	  a	  decisive,	  normative	  impact.	  This	  thesis	  also	  studies	  how	  this	  finding	  operates	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Union’s	  gradual	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  rights,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  Wachauf	  (1969),	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  (1993),	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  (1997),	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  (2009).	  This	  thesis	  will	  then	  examine	  the	  juridical	  outcomes	  within	  the	  analytic	  framework	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism.	  If	  neo-­‐functionalist	  logic	  transcends	  into	  the	  human	  rights	  domain,	  then	  the	  expectations	  will	  be	  as	  followed:	  	  
• Functional	  Spillover	  posits	  that	  once	  a	  policy	  objective	  has	  been	  agreed	  upon,	  “the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  authorities	  charged	  with	  implementing	  that	  objective	  will	  expand	  as	  necessary	  to	  address	  whatever	  obstacles	  stand	  in	  the	  way.”206	  With	  rights	  protections	  being	  the	  agreed	  upon	  objective,	  it	  is	  anticipated	  that	  the	  Court	  will	  expand	  the	  policy	  realms	  it	  can	  adjudicate	  this	  matter	  within.	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  2009,	  a	  subsequent	  expansion	  of	  rights-­‐oriented	  jurisdiction	  is	  to	  be	  especially	  expected,	  as	  the	  Charter	  now	  has	  the	  same	  legal	  value	  as	  the	  Treaties,	  making	  it	  an	  obligatory	  standard	  of	  review.	  	  
• Political	  Spillover	  contends	  that	  functional	  spillover	  will	  inspire	  a	  “shift	  in	  resources	  and	  policy	  efforts	  at	  the	  supranational	  level.”207	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  Court	  will	  evolve	  to	  apply	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  more	  intrusively	  when	  engaging	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in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review.	  By	  extension,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  Court	  will	  provide	  Member	  States	  with	  less	  deference	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  to	  remedy	  a	  human	  rights	  violation,	  thereby	  resulting	  in	  normative	  displacement	  or	  affirmation	  of	  the	  national	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  supranational.	  “The	  ECJ	  has	  been	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  unification	  and	  primacy	  of	  EC	  law,	  which	  leaves	  less	  scope	  to	  State	  for	  diverse	  application.”208	  	  
• Measuring	  the	  Effect	  of	  Time	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  concerns	  itself	  with	  the	  gradual	  process	  rather	  than	  the	  end	  result	  of	  integration.	  This	  thesis	  acknowledges	  the	  important	  role	  time	  plays	  in	  regional	  integration,	  and	  so	  it	  examines	  freedom	  of	  expression	  cases	  over	  the	  course	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  years.	  It	  is	  expected	  that,	  with	  the	  legal	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  2009,	  the	  integrative	  effects	  of	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover	  will	  become	  amplified.	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Defining	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	  and	  Information	  	  	  	  
The	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (Article	  10)	  	  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.  
The	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  (Article	  11)	  	  1.	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  This	  right	  shall	  include	  freedom	  to	  hold	  opinions	  and	  to	  receive	  and	  impart	  information	  and	  ideas	  without	  interference	  by	  public	  authority	  and	  regardless	  of	  frontiers.	  2.	  The	  freedom	  and	  pluralism	  of	  the	  media	  shall	  be	  respected.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  CASE	  STUDIES	  [1985	  –	  2000]	  	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  strive	  to	  show	  how	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  adheres	  to	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover.	  As	  these	  case	  studies	  will	  illustrate,	  the	  Court	  gradually	  incorporates	  rights	  guarantees	  as	  additional	  standards	  of	  legality	  when	  assessing	  national	  legislation.	  Consequently,	  rights,	  as	  a	  normative	  legal	  construct,	  come	  to	  occupy	  a	  greater	  space	  within	  the	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  law,	  as	  posited	  by	  functional	  spillover.	  These	  case	  studies	  will	  also	  show	  how	  the	  Court’s	  approach	  to	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  evolves	  in	  a	  way	  that	  coheres	  with	  political	  spillover.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Court	  will	  begin	  to	  apply	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  more	  intrusively,	  thereby	  making	  it	  more	  likely	  for	  Community	  law	  to	  absorb	  national	  law,	  and	  to	  trigger	  normative	  harmonization.	  	  3.2:	  Cinetheque	  SA	  and	  Others	  v.	  Federation	  Nationale	  des	  Cinemas	  Francais	  (1985)	  	  	   Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  
	   	   French	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623	  states	  that	  all	  imported	  audiovisual	  material	  must	  be	  licensed	  and	  approved	  by	  the	  France’s	  Ministry	  of	  Culture.	  Article	  89	  of	  the	  law	  establishes	  a	  strict,	  chronological	  order	  between	  different	  methods	  of	  cinematographic	  distribution.	  In	  particular,	  it	  holds	  that	  cinematographic	  work	  currently	  offered	  in	  cinemas	  cannot	  be	  sold	  for	  private	  use	  in	  the	  form	  of	  videocassettes	  for	  a	  period	  between	  six	  to	  eighteen	  months	  until	  after	  its	  cinematic	  closing-­‐date.	  The	  law	  permits	  the	  French	  Minister	  of	  Culture	  to	  waive	  such	  a	  requirement	  if	  agreed	  upon	  by	  “a	  committee	  composed	  of	  eight	  members	  including	  two	  representing	  video-­‐cassette	  and	  video-­‐disc	  producers.”209	  	  	   	   In	  1982,	  the	  British	  company	  Glinwood	  Films	  Limited	  released	  the	  film	  Furyo.	  In	  March	  1983,	  it	  awarded	  the	  French	  cinema	  chain	  AAA	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  distribute	  and	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show	  the	  film	  throughout	  France.	  Such	  an	  action	  was	  in	  accordance	  with	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623.	  One	  month	  later,	  Glindwood	  Films	  granted	  Cinetheque	  SA,	  a	  French	  videocassette	  company,	  the	  exclusive	  license	  to	  produce	  and	  sell	  videocassettes	  of	  Furyo	  from	  October	  1983	  onwards.	  	  Cinetheque	  received	  consent	  from	  AAA,	  and	  began	  to	  produce	  and	  sell	  such	  cassettes.	  Shortly	  after,	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  French	  Cinemas	  issued	  an	  injunction	  to	  such	  selling	  activities,	  and	  obtained	  an	  interim	  order	  for	  the	  seizure	  of	  all	  video	  recordings	  offered	  for	  sale	  to	  public	  retailers.	  The	  national	  authorities	  claimed	  that	  Cinetheque’s	  selling	  arrangement	  violated	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623,	  because	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  the	  cassettes	  preceded	  the	  mandatory	  wait	  period	  following	  the	  film’s	  cinematic	  release.	  Cinetheque	  and	  Glintwood	  Films	  brought	  action	  before	  France’s	  High	  Court,	  claiming	  that	  Article	  89	  of	  France’s	  law	  violates	  Articles	  30	  and	  59	  of	  the	  Treaty	  regarding	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  because	  it	  	  “prevents	  certain	  products	  from	  being	  made	  available	  for	  sale	  in	  the	  national	  territory	  even	  though	  they	  may	  circulate	  freely	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  other	  Member	  States.”210	  They	  also	  cited	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  asserting	  that	  the	  law	  violates	  their	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  On	  its	  end,	  France	  contends	  “that	  the	  legislation	  in	  question	  applies	  to	  imported	  and	  national	  products	  alike,	  that	  it	  was	  adopted	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  community	  legislation	  in	  a	  field	  falling	  within	  the	  exclusive	  competence	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  of	  the	  general	  interest,”211	  as	  permitted	  by	  Article	  36	  of	  the	  Treaty’s	  derogation	  clause.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  latter	  claim,	  the	  French	  government	  claims	  that	  Article	  89	  of	  French	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623	  attempts	  to	  protect	  “the	  cinema	  as	  a	  means	  of	  cultural	  expression,	  which	  was	  necessary	  in	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view	  of	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  other	  modes	  of	  film	  distribution.”212	  This	  is	  because	  the	  “cinemas	  produce	  the	  bulk	  of	  their	  [i.e.	  the	  film	  industry’s]	  revenue	  and	  income	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  exploitation	  [i.e.	  other	  forms	  of	  video	  distribution)	  is	  very	  small.”213	  In	  regards	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  claims,	  the	  French	  government	  contends,	  “it	  is	  not	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  consider	  whether	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  compatible	  wit	  the	  Convention.”214	  The	  French	  High	  Court	  referred	  the	  claims	  to	  the	  ECJ.	  	  
	   The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Referred	  to	  the	  Court	  	  1) Are	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  89,	  regulating	  the	  distribution	  of	  cinematographical	  works,	  compatible	  with	  the	  Provisions	  of	  Article	  30	  regarding	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods?215	  	  2) Are	  these	  same	  provisions	  compatible	  with	  Article	  59	  regarding	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services?216	  	  3) If	  the	  answer	  to	  either	  of	  these	  questions	  is	  in	  the	  negative,	  can	  Article	  89	  of	  the	  domestic	  law	  been	  exculpated	  under	  Article	  36’s	  derogation	  claim?217	  	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  
	   	  	   The	  Court	  first	  assesses	  the	  compatibility	  of	  France’s	  law	  with	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  It	  acknowledges	  that	  providing	  cinematographic	  works	  to	  the	  public	  by	  means	  of	  videocassette	  recordings	  “merges	  with	  the	  putting	  of	  the	  works	  on	  the	  market.”218	  	  It	  rules	  that	  Article	  89	  of	  French	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623	  cannot	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  service	  [Art.	  59].	  This	  is	  because	  the	  distribution	  of	  video-­‐cassettes	  are	  “governed	  by	  provisions	  relating	  to	  the	  free	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movement	  of	  goods	  [Art.	  30].”219	  	  The	  Court	  concludes	  that	  the	  national	  legislation	  “undeniably	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  hindering	  imports	  of	  video	  recordings	  lawfully	  produces	  and	  marketed	  in	  another	  Member	  States	  and	  in	  free	  circulation,”220	  and	  is	  thus	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  then	  considers	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  violation	  is	  justified	  under	  the	  derogation	  claim	  of	  Article	  36.	  Discussing	  the	  claims	  brought	  forth	  by	  both	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  French	  Cinemas	  and	  the	  French	  Government221,	  it	  finds	  that	  “cultural	  aims	  may	  justify	  certain	  restrictions	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  provided	  that	  those	  restrictions	  apply	  to	  national	  and	  imported	  products	  without	  distinction,	  that	  they	  are	  appropriate	  to	  the	  cultural	  aim	  which	  is	  being	  pursued	  and	  that	  they	  constitute	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  them	  which	  affects	  intra-­‐community	  trade	  the	  least.”222	  The	  Court	  examines	  whether	  or	  not	  France	  carried	  out	  such	  considerations.	  	  Studying	  other	  Member	  State	  legislation	  regarding	  the	  distribution	  of	  videocassettes	  post-­‐cinematic	  release223,	  the	  Court	  notes	  that	  all	  national	  laws	  “delay	  the	  distribution	  of	  films…during	  the	  first	  months,”224	  though	  in	  varying	  degrees.	  The	  Court	  takes	  this	  finding	  as	  indicative	  that	  such	  provisions	  are	  “considered	  necessary	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  profitability	  of	  cinematographic	  production.”225	  Consequently,	  it	  finds	  that	  “the	  Treaty	  leaves	  it	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  determine	  the	  need	  for	  such	  a	  system,	  and	  any	  temporal	  restricts	  which	  ought	  to	  be	  laid	  down.”226	  It	  rules	  that,	  because	  France’s	  policy	  does	  not	  discriminate	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  Ibid.	  	  220	  Paragraph	  18	  	  221	  Paragraphs	  14-­‐18	  222	  Paragraph	  18	  	  223	  Paragraphs	  18-­‐20	  224	  Paragraph	  20	  225	  Paragraph	  20	  	  226	  Paragraph	  20	  	  
	   74	  
national	  and	  transnational	  videocassettes,	  the	  national	  legislation	  “is	  so	  justified.”227	  As	  such,	  Article	  89	  of	  French	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623	  is	  permitted	  to	  derogate	  from	  the	  Treaty’s	  legal	  obligations.	  	  The	  Court	  devotes	  the	  final	  paragraph	  of	  its	  judgment	  to	  addressing	  the	  claim	  that	  Article	  89	  of	  French	  Law	  No.	  82-­‐623	  is	  “in	  breach	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  recognized	  by	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR.”228	  The	  Court	  states	  that,	  though	  “it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  this	  Court	  to	  ensure	  observance	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Community	  law,	  it	  has	  no	  power	  to	  examine	  the	  compatibly	  with	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  National	  legislation	  which	  concerns	  as,	  in	  this	  case,	  an	  area	  which	  falls	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  national	  legislator.”229	  	  
	   Analysis	  
	   	   Scholarly	  literature	  discussing	  the	  judicialization	  of	  human	  rights	  at	  the	  Community	  level	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  Court’s	  Cinetheque	  decision	  often.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  as	  this	  case	  was	  among	  the	  first	  judgments	  in	  which	  remedial	  action	  for	  a	  rights	  violation	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  Court’s	  docket	  following	  its	  groundbreaking	  judgment	  in	  Rutili	  (1975),	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  suggested,	  “that	  limitations	  on	  Member	  State	  action	  under	  Community	  law	  were	  paralleled	  by	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  ECHR.”230	  Scholar’s	  assessment	  of	  Cinetheque	  often	  revolves	  around	  the	  Court’s	  refusal	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  despite	  its	  preceding	  declaration	  in	  Rutili.	  As	  such,	  the	  case	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  Court’s	  original	  hesitancy	  in	  engaging	  with	  rights-­‐focused	  value	  judgments.	  What	  should	  be	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underscored	  is	  that	  Cinetheque	  sets	  a	  base	  line	  for	  the	  comparing	  future	  human	  rights	  judgments	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  supranational	  integration.	  	  In	  this	  connection,	  Cinetheque	  fails	  to	  adhere	  to	  neo-­‐functionalist	  logic.	  In	  Rutili,	  the	  Court	  articulated	  that	  fundamental	  rights	  form	  a	  legitimate	  policy	  interest,	  and	  it	  “alluded	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  considerations	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Member	  State	  action.	  It	  did	  not,	  however,	  apply	  them	  directly,	  or	  indeed	  hold	  them	  applicable,	  to	  that	  Member	  State	  action.”231	  Nevertheless,	  Rutili	  was	  understood	  as	  a	  pivotal	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  rights.	  In	  adherence	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  functional	  spillover,	  one	  would	  expect	  that,	  in	  
Cinetheque,	  the	  Court	  would	  expand	  its	  jurisdiction	  and	  partake	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  review	  as	  a	  means	  of	  pursuing	  the	  objective	  put	  forth	  in	  Rutili.	  However,	  the	  Court	  consciously	  declines	  to	  pursue	  such	  efforts,	  and	  it	  is	  extremely	  brief	  in	  discussing	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  claim	  that	  Article	  89	  of	  the	  national	  law	  violates	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Court	  renders	  such	  a	  question	  as	  null	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  France’s	  national	  policy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ECHR	  “falls	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  national	  legislator,”232	  and	  not	  that	  of	  a	  supranational	  Court.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  delineates	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary’	  of	  Community	  law	  as	  precluding	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  of	  national	  policies.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  inhibits	  the	  subsequent	  development	  of	  political	  spillover.	  Judge	  Pescatore,	  commenting	  on	  the	  
Cinetheque	  decision,	  writes:	  “this	  position	  shows	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  conscious	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  jurisdiction:	  called	  upon	  to	  guarantee	  respect	  for	  the	  law	  within	  the	  Community	  it	  has	  no	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mission	  to	  busy	  itself	  with	  the	  defense	  of	  human	  rights	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  legislative	  sovereignty	  of	  Member	  States.”233	  	  3.3:	  Elliniki	  Radiophonia	  Tileorassi	  (ERT)	  v.	  Dimotiki	  Etairia	  Pliroforissis	  (DEP)	  and	  Sotirios	  
Kouvelas	  (1991)	  	  
Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  Elliniki	  Radiophonia	  Tileorassi	  Anoinimi	  (ERT)	  is	  a	  radio	  and	  television	  Company;	  Dimotiki	  Etairia	  Pliroforoissis	  (DEP)	  is	  the	  municipal	  information	  company	  of	  Thessaloniki,	  a	  Greek	  port	  city	  located	  in	  Northern	  Greece.	  Under	  national	  Law	  no.	  1730/1987,	  ERT	  maintains	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  emit	  radio	  sound	  and	  television	  images	  by	  all	  possible	  means,	  including	  cable	  television.	  According	  to	  Article	  2(1)	  of	  that	  law,	  “ERT’s	  objects	  is,	  without	  a	  view	  to	  profit,	  to	  organize,	  exploit	  and	  develop	  radio	  and	  television	  and	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  information,	  culture,	  and	  entertainment	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  people.”234	  Article	  16(1)	  of	  that	  same	  law	  prohibits	  any	  persons	  from	  undertaking	  any	  of	  the	  broadcasting	  activities	  that	  ERT	  holds	  the	  exclusive	  right	  for,	  unless	  explicit	  authorization	  was	  granted.	  	  In	  1989,	  DEP	  formed	  a	  local	  television	  station,	  thereby	  violating	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  national	  law	  in	  question.	  ERT	  sued	  DEP,	  and	  issued	  on	  injunction	  “prohibiting	  any	  kind	  of	  broadcasting	  and	  an	  order	  for	  the	  seizure	  and	  sequestration	  of	  the	  technical	  equipment.”235	  DEP	  and	  Mr.Kouvelas	  appealed	  the	  injunction,	  relying	  “mainly	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  Community	  law	  and	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights.”236	  Specifically,	  they	  argued	  that	  Greece’s	  monopoly	  law	  infringes	  on	  their	  freedom	  to	  provide	  goods	  and	  services,	  and	  curtails	  their	  freedom	  of	  expression	  by	  not	  allowing	  them	  to	  impart	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  Pescatore	  “La	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  Justice	  des	  Communautes	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  Human	  Rights:	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information	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  television	  broadcasts	  to	  the	  public.	  For	  its	  part,	  ERT	  sought	  exculpation	  from	  the	  Treaty’s	  obligations	  under	  the	  derogation	  clause,	  claiming	  that	  the	  law	  falls	  under	  the	  ‘social	  policy’	  exception	  of	  Article	  36.	  	  
The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Brought	  to	  the	  ECJ	  	  The	  Greek	  national	  court	  referred	  to	  the	  ECJ	  for	  clarification	  of	  the	  following	  provisions:	  1. Is	  a	  law	  that	  allows	  a	  single	  TV	  broadcaster	  to	  have	  a	  television	  monopoly	  for	  the	  entire	  territory	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  consistent	  with:	  a)	  Article	  9’s	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  b)	  Article	  30’s	  prohibition	  on	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  to	  quantitative	  restriction	  on	  imports	  c)	  Article	  36’s	  derogation	  clause,	  which	  would	  exempt	  ERT	  from	  Community	  law	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  pursuing	  the	  public	  interest?237	  2. Whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  the	  same	  law	  compatible	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR?238	  3. Whether	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression	  secured	  by	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR	  imposes	  per	  se	  obligations	  on	  the	  Member	  States,	  independently	  of	  the	  written	  provisions	  of	  Community	  law	  in	  force,	  and	  if	  so	  what	  those	  obligations	  are.	  239	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  	   The	  Court	  begins	  its	  decision	  with	  a	  general	  review	  of	  the	  compatibility	  of	  a	  television	  monopoly	  with	  Community	  law.	  Citing	  Sachi	  (1974),	  the	  Court	  holds	  that	  nothing	  in	  the	  Treaty	  denies	  Member	  States	  the	  power	  to	  grant	  a	  monopoly	  for	  reasons	  of	  public	  interest	  and	  of	  a	  non-­‐economic	  nature.240	  However,	  “the	  manner	  in	  which	  such	  a	  monopoly	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is	  organized	  and	  exercised	  must	  not	  infringe	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  services.”241	  The	  Court	  finds	  that	  a	  television	  monopoly	  does	  not	  violate	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.242	  However,	  it	  notes	  that	  ERT’s	  monopoly	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  infringe	  upon	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services.243	  This	  is	  because	  ERT	  maintains	  the	  exclusive	  ability	  to	  retransmit	  programs	  from	  other	  Member	  States,	  which	  “may	  lead	  the	  undertaking	  to	  favor	  its	  own	  programs	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  foreign	  programs.	  ”244	  Such	  “discriminatory	  effects”	  245	  are	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services.	  However,	  the	  Court	  contends	  that	  only	  “the	  national	  court	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  determine,”246	  if	  such	  bias	  does,	  in	  fact,	  occur.	  	  If	  the	  Greek	  court	  determines	  that	  the	  national	  law	  infringes	  upon	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services,	  then	  ERT’s	  derogation	  claim	  becomes	  applicable	  as	  a	  means	  of	  justifying	  such	  violation.	  As	  such,	  the	  ECJ	  provides	  the	  national	  court	  with	  the	  framework	  it	  is	  to	  use	  when	  assessing	  the	  merits	  of	  ERT’s	  derogation	  invocation.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  the	  Court	  reviews	  the	  compatibility	  of	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR	  and	  television	  monopolies.	  Citing	  
Cinetheque	  (1985),	  the	  Court	  reaffirms	  its	  position	  that	  it	  “has	  no	  power	  to	  examine	  the	  computability	  with	  the	  ECHR	  of	  national	  which	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law.”247	  However,	  as	  established	  in	  Wachauf	  	  (1988),	  “the	  Community	  cannot	  accept	  measures	  which	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  observance	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  thus	  recognized	  and	  guaranteed.”248	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  mandate	  put	  forth	  in	  Wachauf,	  the	  Court	  declares	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  Paragraph	  12	  	  242	  Paragaphs	  13	  -­‐	  16	  243	  Paragraph	  20	  244	  Paragraph	  22	  	  245	  Paragraph	  26	  246	  Paragraph	  23	  	  247	  Paragraph	  42	  248	  Paragraph	  41	  
	   79	  
that	  where	  a	  Member	  State	  justifies	  its	  Treaty	  derogations	  under	  Article	  36	  	  “on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy,	  public	  security,	  and	  public	  health,”249	  such	  derogation	  “must	  be	  appraised	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	  embodied	  in	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR,”250	  because	  it	  forms	  “a	  general	  principle	  of	  law	  the	  observance	  of	  which	  is	  ensured	  by	  the	  Court.”251	  As	  such,	  the	  ECJ	  requires	  the	  Greek	  court	  to	  review	  the	  monopoly	  legislation	  with	  deference	  to	  the	  ECHR	  and	  its	  provisions.	  However,	  the	  national	  court	  is	  obliged	  to	  undertake	  this	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  only	  if	  it	  has	  already	  determined	  that	  the	  national	  law	  does	  result	  in	  a	  bias	  inhibiting	  other	  Member	  States’	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services.	  	  
Analysis	  	  The	  Court’s	  ruling	  enables	  Member	  States	  to	  create	  and	  to	  maintain	  public	  enterprises	  with	  exclusive	  or	  special	  rights,	  insofar	  as	  such	  exclusive	  rights	  do	  not	  result	  in	  discriminatory	  practices,	  which	  inhibit	  other	  Member	  States’	  from	  exercising	  their	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services.	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  Court	  secured	  the	  EU’s	  legitimate	  interest	  in	  pursuing	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  motivating	  further	  integration	  within	  the	  economic	  domain,	  ERT	  also	  expands	  the	  operational	  presence	  of	  human	  rights	  within	  the	  Community’s	  legal	  order.	  As	  such,	  it	  adheres	  to	  the	  neo-­‐functionalist	  paradigm.	  By	  requiring	  that	  a	  Member	  States’	  derogation	  respect	  fundamental	  rights,	  the	  Court	  expanded	  the	  policy	  domains	  in	  which	  it	  could	  partake	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review.	  Undoubtedly,	  this	  strengthens	  the	  integration	  process,	  as	  supranational	  judicial	  review	  triggers	  normative	  harmonization.	  With	  regard	  to	  functional	  spillover,	  ERT	  expanded	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction	  “into	  areas	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previously	  reserved	  for	  Member	  State.”252	  Consequently,	  since	  1991,	  the	  Court	  has	  been	  “free	  to	  determined	  whether	  Member	  state	  acts	  are	  in	  compliance	  with	  human	  rights	  as	  protected	  on	  the	  Community	  level,	  and	  as	  conceived	  by	  the	  Court	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  ‘general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law.’”253	  	  On	  this	  front,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  ERT	  marks	  the	  first	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  explicitly	  tested	  the	  conformity	  of	  national	  legislation	  with	  provisions	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  has	  re-­‐defined	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary,’	  as	  previously	  established	  Cinetheque.	  ERT	  “is	  a	  development	  of	  Rutili	  precisely	  in	  that	  is	  uses	  the	  ECHR	  as	  an	  additional	  standard	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  to	  judge	  Member	  State	  action,	  rather	  than,	  as	  in	  Rutili,	  merely	  a	  declaration	  which	  happens	  to	  echo	  general	  principles	  of	  existing	  Community	  law.”254	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  underscore	  that	  in	  the	  Cinetheque,	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  leverage	  the	  mandate	  it	  had	  established	  in	  Rutili	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  engaging	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review.	  In	  this	  regard,	  ERT’s	  novelty	  lies	  in	  the	  Court’s	  sharp	  departure	  from	  the	  precedent	  it	  had	  set	  forth	  in	  Cinetheque.	  	  The	  political	  spillover	  effects	  of	  ERT	  are	  also	  apparent,	  but	  only	  at	  the	  macro	  level.	  By	  narrowing	  the	  derogation	  clause	  to	  encompass	  fundamental	  rights,	  the	  Court	  recognizes	  the	  ECHR	  as	  part	  of	  Community	  law	  much	  more	  explicitly	  than	  it	  has	  in	  the	  past.	  Despite	  these	  far-­‐reaching	  legal	  consequences,	  the	  harmonizing	  effects	  of	  Court’s	  supranational	  decision	  could	  not	  be	  measured	  in	  relation	  to	  Greece’s	  national,	  normative	  conceptualization	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  ECJ	  granted	  the	  national	  court	  complete	  discretion	  in	  applying	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  for	  its	  determination	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of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  national	  law	  results	  in	  discriminatory	  retransmissions.	  By	  extension,	  the	  Greek	  court	  is	  obliged	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  only	  if	  the	  national	  court	  concludes	  their	  to	  be	  an	  infringement	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services.	  Thus,	  though	  the	  Court	  set	  the	  precedent	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  its	  jurisdiction,	  it	  did	  not	  leverage	  this	  mandate	  in	  a	  way	  that	  created	  a	  substantive,	  normative	  change	  in	  Greece’s	  freedom	  of	  expression	  protections.	  	  3.4	  Society	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Unborn	  Children	  Ireland	  Limited	  (SPUC)	  v.	  Grogan	  (1991)	  	  
Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  	   Since	  1861,	  abortion	  has	  been	  prohibited	  in	  Ireland.	  Section	  58	  of	  the	  Offences	  Against	  the	  Persons	  Act	  (1861)	  makes	  it	  a	  criminal	  offence	  for	  a	  pregnant	  woman	  to	  attempt	  to	  procure	  an	  abortion,	  and	  for	  others	  to	  provide	  assistance	  to	  that	  end.	  The	  prohibition	  was	  confirmed	  after	  a	  referendum	  in	  1983,	  in	  which	  a	  new	  provision	  was	  added	  to	  the	  Irish	  Constitution.	  “Article	  40.3.3	  not	  only	  outlawed	  interference	  by	  public	  authorities	  with	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  unborn,	  but	  also	  provided	  for	  a	  clear	  positive	  obligation	  to	  defend	  it.”255	  The	  Constitution	  proclaims:	  	  “The	  State	  acknowledges	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  unborn	  and,	  with	  due	  regard	  to	  the	  equal	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  mother,	  guarantees	  in	  its	  law	  to	  respect	  and,	  as	  far	  as	  practicable,	  by	  its	  law	  to	  defend	  and	  vindicate	  that	  right.”	  	  The	  decision	  was	  praised	  by	  many,	  including	  Chief	  Justice	  Finlay,	  who	  referred	  to	  the	  new	  amendment	  as	  “a	  decision	  by	  the	  people	  to	  insert	  into	  the	  Constitution	  a	  specific	  guarantee	  and	  protection	  for	  a	  fundamental	  right	  perceived	  to	  be	  threatened	  by	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  societies	  of	  countries	  outside	  Ireland.”256	  By	  virtue	  of	  the	  amendment,	  Ireland	  became	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the	  only	  EU	  Member	  State	  formally	  recognizing	  the	  Constitutional	  right	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  fetus.	  Ireland	  has	  “exercised	  extreme	  vigilance	  in	  ensuring	  that	  this	  fundamental	  right	  is	  protected	  in	  effective	  fashion.”257	  In	  March	  1988,	  the	  Irish	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  it	  is	  unlawful	  to	  assist	  pregnant	  women	  to	  travel	  abroad	  to	  obtain	  an	  abortion	  or	  even	  to	  provide	  information	  about	  clinics	  abroad	  that	  are	  willing	  to	  carry	  out	  abortion.	  It	  was	  within	  this	  context	  that	  the	  Grogan	  disputes	  arose.	  	  	   The	  Society	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Unborn	  Children	  (SPUC)	  is	  a	  company	  incorporated	  under	  Irish	  law	  whose	  purpose	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  decriminalization	  of	  abortion	  and,	  more	  generally	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  unborn	  life	  form	  the	  moment	  of	  conception.	  In	  September	  1989,	  SPUC	  requested	  several	  student	  publications	  to	  not	  include	  any	  information	  as	  to	  the	  identity,	  location,	  and	  method	  of	  communication	  with	  abortion	  clinics.	  The	  student	  organizations	  declined	  SPUC’s	  request.	  Subsequently,	  “SPUC	  initiated	  proceedings	  against	  the	  representatives	  of	  three	  student	  organizations	  for	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  publication	  of	  information	  such	  as	  that	  described	  above	  was	  unlawful	  and	  for	  an	  interlocutory	  injunction	  restraining	  the	  publication	  nor	  distribution	  of	  such	  information	  until	  the	  hearing	  of	  the	  full	  action.”258	  The	  student	  organizations,	  represented	  by	  Mr.	  Grogan,	  appealed	  the	  injunction	  to	  Ireland’s	  High	  Court.	  The	  defendants	  claimed	  that	  pregnant	  women	  residing	  in	  Ireland	  may,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Community	  Law,	  travel	  to	  another	  Member	  State	  where	  abortion	  was	  permitted,	  thereby	  exercising	  their	  right	  to	  receive	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services	  [Article	  59].	  They	  also	  argued	  that,	  as	  a	  corollary	  to	  the	  right	  established	  by	  Art.	  59	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  Irish	  women	  maintain	  the	  right	  to	  obtain	  information	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regarding	  such	  abortion	  services	  in	  other	  Member	  States.	  Mr.	  Grogan	  also	  contended	  that	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  regarding	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  to	  impart	  information,	  also	  guaranteed	  such	  a	  corollary	  right.	  In	  October	  1989,	  the	  High	  court	  “decided	  in	  the	  proceedings	  on	  the	  motion	  for	  an	  interlocutory	  injunction	  to	  refer	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling.”259	  
The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Brought	  to	  the	  ECJ	  	  The	  Irish	  High	  Court	  referred	  to	  the	  ECJ	  for	  clarification	  on	  the	  following:	  	  1) Does	  the	  organized	  activity	  or	  process	  of	  carrying	  out	  an	  abortion	  or	  the	  medical	  termination	  of	  pregnancy	  come	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  “services”	  provided	  for	  within	  Article	  59	  of	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  the	  EU?260	  	  2) In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  measures	  providing	  for	  approximation	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  Member	  States	  concerning	  the	  organized	  activity	  or	  process	  of	  carrying	  out	  an	  abortion	  or	  the	  medical	  termination	  of	  pregnancy,	  can	  a	  Member	  State	  prohibit	  the	  distribution	  of	  specific	  information	  about	  the	  identity,	  location,	  and	  means	  of	  communication	  with	  a	  specified	  clinic	  or	  clinics	  in	  another	  Member	  State	  where	  abortions	  are	  performed?261	  	  3) Is	  there	  a	  right	  at	  Community	  law	  in	  a	  person	  in	  Member	  State	  A	  to	  distribute	  specific	  information	  about	  the	  identity,	  location,	  and	  means	  of	  communication	  with	  a	  specified	  clinic	  or	  clinics	  in	  Member	  State	  B	  where	  abortions	  are	  performed,	  where	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  is	  prohibited	  under	  both	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  criminal	  law	  of	  Member	  State	  A	  but	  is	  lawful	  under	  certain	  conditions	  in	  Member	  State	  B?262	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The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  
	   The	  Court	  rules	  that	  because	  abortion	  “is	  a	  medical	  activity	  which	  is	  normally	  provided	  for	  remuneration	  and	  may	  be	  carried	  out	  as	  part	  of	  a	  professional	  activity,”263	  it	  is	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  service	  within	  the	  legal	  scope	  of	  the	  Treaty.	  	  The	  Court	  justifies	  its	  claim	  by	  citing	  Luisi	  (1982)	  and	  Carbon	  (1983),	  two	  cases	  in	  which	  Court	  held	  that	  “medical	  activities	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  59.”264	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  rejects	  SPUC’s	  argument	  that	  “the	  provisions	  of	  abortion	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  being	  a	  service,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  grossly	  immoral	  and	  involves	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  life	  of	  a	  human	  being,	  namely	  the	  unborn	  child.”265	  	  	   The	  Court	  then	  questions	  the	  compatibility	  between	  the	  injunction	  banning	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  student’	  pamphlets,	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services,	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  to	  impart	  information.	  	  “The	  question	  which	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  particular	  context	  of	  Grogan	  is	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  of	  that	  Member	  States,	  and	  in	  particular	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  Convention,	  that	  a	  Member	  State	  prohibits	  the	  provision	  and	  receipt	  of	  information	  by	  way	  of	  assistance	  about	  abortions	  lawfully	  carried	  out	  in	  other	  Member	  states,	  thereby	  infringing	  individual’s	  freedom	  of	  expression.”266	  	  	  The	  Court	  finds	  that	  economic	  link	  “between	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  students	  associations	  …and	  medical	  terminations	  of	  pregnancies	  carried	  out	  in	  clinics	  in	  another	  Member	  State	  is	  too	  tenuous,“267	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  restriction	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  student	  associations	  “are	  not	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  clinics	  whose	  addressees	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they	  publish,”268	  and	  the	  pamphlets	  are	  not	  “distributed	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  economic	  operators	  established	  in	  another	  Member	  State.”269	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Court	  contends	  that	  the	  pamphlets’	  content	  “constitutes	  a	  manifestation	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  impart	  and	  receive	  information	  which	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  economic	  activity	  carried	  on	  by	  clinics	  established	  in	  another	  Member	  State.”270	  	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  in	  the	  decision	  that	  the	  Court	  discusses	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  jurisdictional	  authority.	  Citing	  ERT	  (1991),	  the	  Court	  recognizes	  that,	  though	  it	  is	  obligated	  to	  “assess	  the	  compatibility	  of	  national	  legislation	  wit	  fundamental	  rights,”271	  it	  “has	  no	  such	  jurisdiction	  with	  regard	  to	  national	  legislation	  lying	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law.”272	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  finds	  that	  the	  latter	  provision	  is	  applicable	  in	  the	  current	  case.	  Because	  the	  student	  organizations	  distribute	  the	  information	  without	  remuneration,	  “their	  publications	  lost	  their	  relevance	  to	  Community	  law,”273	  thereby	  rendering	  the	  defendant’s	  freedom	  of	  expression	  claim	  null.	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  SPUC’s	  injunction	  “is	  not	  contrary	  to	  Community	  law,”274	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  Union’s	  delineated	  competencies.	  	  
Analysis	  
	   Considering	  that	  “it	  is	  difficult	  to	  image	  a	  more	  controversial	  and	  divisive	  topic”275	  than	  that	  of	  abortion,	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  was	  shockingly	  brief.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  this	  very	  reality	  that	  motivated	  the	  Court	  to	  be	  cautious	  throughout	  its	  judgment,	  continuously	  emphasizing	  its	  jurisdictional	  limits	  throughout.	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   By	  concluding	  that	  the	  “scope	  ratione	  materia	  of	  Article	  59,	  ”276	  encompasses	  abortion	  services,	  the	  Court	  places	  the	  national	  provision	  “squarely	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law,”277	  thereby	  enabling	  it	  to	  engage	  in	  judicial	  review.	  Such	  a	  declaration	  has	  strong	  merits,	  for	  it	  enables	  the	  ECJ	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  aiding	  Community’s	  continuous	  pursuit	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Grogan	  falls	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Court’s	  past	  case-­‐law	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services;	  “If	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  recent	  case	  law278…one	  is	  struck	  in	  particular	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  dealt	  with	  the	  requirement	  of	  economic	  activity	  loosely	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  narrowing	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  movement.”279	  Thus,	  with	  Grogan,	  the	  Court	  implicitly	  consolidates	  its	  past	  case	  law,	  articulating	  that	  free	  movement	  provisions	  are	  effective	  for	  certain	  categories	  of	  persons	  who	  were	  not	  necessarily	  economically	  active.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  in	  this	  economic	  realm	  is	  motivated	  by	  its	  “integrationalist	  desire.”280	  	  	   However,	  just	  as	  quickly	  as	  the	  Court	  seems	  to	  declare	  the	  relevancy	  of	  Community	  law,	  so	  too	  do	  they	  reject	  it.	  However,	  now	  the	  Court	  refuses	  to	  extend	  its	  jurisdictional	  authority	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  With	  Grogan,	  the	  court	  simply	  concludes	  that,	  because	  the	  students	  do	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  economic	  operator,	  they	  cannot	  appeal	  to	  the	  Treaty	  for	  protection	  of	  their	  rights	  under	  Article	  59.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  first	  paragraph	  of	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR	  guarantees	  everyone	  to	  “hold	  opinions	  and	  to	  receive	  and	  impart	  information	  and	  ideas	  without	  interference	  by	  public	  authority	  and	  regardless	  of	  frontiers.”281	  This	  clause	  has	  particular	  relevance	  to	  the	  type	  of	  information	  at	  issue	  in	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Grogan.	  Yet,	  the	  Court	  seems	  blind	  to	  this	  fact,	  choosing	  instead	  to	  sharply	  limit	  its	  judicial	  authority.	  	  	   What	  is	  striking	  is	  that	  the	  Court	  could	  have	  protected	  the	  students’	  right	  to	  distribute	  the	  pamphlets	  –	  and	  by	  extension,	  their	  freedom	  of	  expression	  -­‐	  from	  an	  economic	  perspective,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  fundamental	  rights	  perspective,	  but	  it	  chose	  not	  to.	  The	  means	  by	  which	  it	  could	  have	  done	  so	  were	  legitimate:	  citing	  its	  precedent.	  In	  GB-­‐INNO	  (1988),	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  a	  prohibition	  on	  advertising	  obstructed	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Treaty.	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  “recognized	  access	  to	  information	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  corollary	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.”282	  Their	  reasoning	  centered	  upon	  the	  “importance	  of	  maintaining	  the	  link	  between	  protecting	  the	  consumer	  and	  providing	  the	  consumer	  with	  information.”283	  In	  the	  proceedings,	  Mr.	  Grogan	  cited	  GB-­‐INN’s	  logic	  to	  defend	  the	  student’s	  right	  to	  distribute	  the	  pamphlets.	  The	  Court	  refused	  to	  draw	  upon	  its	  past	  precedent,	  contending,	  “a	  link	  had	  existed	  between	  the	  advertiser	  and	  the	  provider	  of	  goods	  in	  GB-­‐INNO	  that	  did	  not	  existed	  in	  Grogan.”284	  However,	  if	  one	  examines	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  GBI-­‐INNO,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  Court’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  is	  out	  of	  context	  and	  misleading.	  	  In	  “GB-­‐INNO	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  link	  between	  the	  seller	  and	  the	  advertiser,	  but	  between	  the	  consumer	  and	  the	  advertisement.”285	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  extend	  GB-­‐INNO’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  information	  to	  the	  consumer	  to	  the	  factual	  context	  of	  Grogan.	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Court	  defined	  abortion	  as	  a	  service	  at	  the	  very	  start	  of	  its	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judgment.	  In	  this	  sense,	  then,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  seems	  questionable,	  as	  it	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  commercial	  and	  non-­‐commercial	  information,	  both	  of	  which	  play	  an	  equal	  role	  in	  protecting	  the	  consumer,	  as	  the	  GB-­‐INNO	  decision	  stressed.	  “One	  is	  left	  with	  the	  suspicion	  that	  the	  Court’s	  approach	  in	  Grogan	  is	  a	  clever	  judicial	  strategy,	  enabling	  it,	  with	  a	  great	  sight	  of	  relief,	  to	  avoid	  dipping	  as	  much	  as	  its	  little	  finger	  in	  the	  murky	  waters	  of	  morality	  or	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  balance	  exercise	  as	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  competing	  (highly	  sensitive)	  fundamental	  rights.”286	  As	  a	  whole,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  approach	  to	  rights	  Grogan	  is	  one	  of	  caution.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  not	  only	  by	  the	  Court’s	  declaration	  that	  fundamental	  rights	  questions	  are	  null	  in	  the	  Grogan	  context,	  but	  also	  by	  its	  hesitancy	  to	  apply	  its	  precedent	  in	  GB-­‐INNO	  to	  the	  case	  at	  hand.	  	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  Court	  fails	  to	  leverage	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  as	  an	  integrative	  tool.	  By	  declining	  to	  extend	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  to	  the	  measure	  at	  hand,	  the	  Court	  inhibits	  the	  processes	  of	  functional	  spillover,	  and	  by	  extension,	  that	  of	  political	  spillover.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Grogan	  illustrates	  the	  potential	  dynamics	  that	  may	  limit	  neo-­‐functionalist	  logic.	  Clearly,	  the	  ECJ,	  “as	  a	  reluctant	  constitutional	  adjudicator,”287	  prefers	  to	  evade	  “giving	  substantive	  ruling	  on	  a	  sensitive	  issues,	  ”288	  such	  as	  abortion.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Court’s	  judicial	  restraint	  “has	  been	  noted	  by	  virtually	  all	  commentators	  of	  the	  judgment.”	  
289	  The	  Court’s	  rhetoric	  throughout	  Grogan	  also	  confirms	  such	  a	  characterization.	  Almost	  immediately,	  the	  court	  eschewed	  “any	  assessment	  or	  comment	  as	  to	  any	  immorality	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  Ibid.	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  288	  Ibid.	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  Lawson,	  Rick.	  "The	  Irish	  Abortion	  Cases:	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attaching	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  abortion,”290	  noting	  simply	  that	  “whatever	  the	  merits	  of	  those	  argument	  on	  the	  moral	  plane,”291	  it	  was	  not	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  substitute	  its	  assessment	  for	  that	  of	  the	  legislature	  where	  abortion	  is	  legal.	  	  “In	  this	  manner,	  the	  Court	  attempted	  to	  avoid	  being	  embroiled	  in	  the	  on-­‐going	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  of	  abortion	  and	  to	  avoid	  the	  distasteful	  spectacles	  its	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  colleagues	  have	  had	  to	  witness.”292	  	  
Grogan’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  sovereign	  competencies	  of	  the	  national	  legislature	  also	  deserves	  attention	  in	  that	  it	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Court’s	  rhetoric	  in	  Cinetheque.	  	  Recall	  that	  in	  Cinetheque,	  the	  Court	  argued	  that,	  because	  France’s	  national	  law	  on	  cinematographic	  distribution	  forms	  part	  of	  their	  cultural	  policy,	  its	  remedial	  relationship	  with	  fundamental	  rights	  claims	  is	  an	  area,	  which	  “falls	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  national	  legislature.”293	  In	  
Grogan,	  the	  Court	  takes	  a	  similar	  approach,	  but	  it	  shifts	  its	  rhetoric.	  Now,	  the	  Court	  declares,	  “It	  has	  no	  such	  jurisdiction	  with	  regard	  to	  national	  legislation	  lying	  outside	  the	  
scope	  of	  Community	  law.”294	  This	  change	  in	  emphasis	  from	  that	  which	  is	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  national	  legislator	  to	  that	  which	  is	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  Community	  law	  is	  subtle,	  but	  nonetheless	  reflects	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  integration,	  as	  championed	  by	  neo-­‐functionalist	  theory.	  It	  seems	  that,	  in	  the	  seven	  years	  following	  its	  Cinetheque	  judgment,	  the	  Court	  has	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  Union’s	  evolving	  competencies,	  realizing	  that	  sovereign	  legislative	  action,	  though	  implemented	  separately	  Community	  law,	  has	  the	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  The	  Society	  for	  the	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potential	  to	  enter	  the	  sphere	  of	  Community	  obligations.	  Thus,	  the	  Court’s	  adjusted	  language	  illustrates	  that	  the	  Union’s	  ‘fundamental	  boundaries,’	  are	  a	  “shifting	  target.”295	  	  Despite	  this	  change	  in	  language,	  Cinetheque	  and	  Grogan	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  the	  Court	  fails	  to	  leverage	  freedom	  of	  expression	  as	  a	  supranational,	  legal	  norm	  that	  may	  push	  integration	  forward	  by	  expanding	  the	  operational	  domain	  of	  rights	  in	  relation	  Community	  law.	  In	  this	  regard,	  ERT’s	  integrative	  consequences	  are	  distinct	  from	  that	  of	  Cinetheque	  and	  
Grogan.	  Though	  ERT	  did	  not	  cause	  an	  explicit,	  normative	  shift	  in	  how	  Greece	  conceptualizes	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  protections	  relative	  to	  its	  national	  monopoly	  law,	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  created	  the	  possibility	  for	  supranational	  harmonization	  to	  occur	  
potentially.	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  in	  ERT	  maintains	  some	  resemblance	  to	  that	  of	  Cinetheque	  and	  Grogan.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Court	  emphasizes	  its	  jurisdictional	  limits	  in	  ERT	  as	  well,	  though	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree;	  recall	  that	  the	  ECJ	  required	  the	  Greek	  court	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  review	  only	  if	  a	  casual	  connection	  was	  established	  between	  the	  infringement	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services	  and	  the	  national	  policy.	  Thus,	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  judgments,	  the	  Court	  stresses	  the	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  law	  in	  a	  way	  that	  limits	  its	  ability	  to	  generate	  supranational,	  substantive	  change	  in	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees	  and	  Community	  law.	  	  The	  only	  difference	  amongst	  these	  cases	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  such	  jurisdiction	  is	  emphasized;	  whereas	  in	  Cinetheque	  and	  Grogan,	  the	  Court	  places	  ‘hard’	  limits	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  judicial	  review,	  in	  ERT	  the	  Court	  takes	  a	  ‘softer’	  approach	  by	  requiring	  freedom	  of	  expression	  to	  be	  respected	  only	  if	  the	  national	  court	  determines	  such	  action	  to	  be	  necessary.	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3.5	  Vereinigte	  Familiapress	  v.	  Heinrich	  Bauer	  Verlag	  (1997)	  	  
Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  	   Heinrich	  Bauer	  Verlag	  (HBV)	  is	  a	  Germany	  publishing	  company	  that	  produces	  and	  distributes	  Laura,	  a	  weekly	  magazine	  containing	  crossword	  puzzles	  for	  which	  small	  cash	  prizes	  –	  ranging	  from	  500DM	  to	  5,000DM	  -­‐	  are	  awarded	  to	  the	  reader	  who	  submits	  the	  correct	  solution.	  Laura	  is	  distributed	  in	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  alike.	  Vereingte	  Familiapress	  is	  an	  established	  newspaper	  operating	  in	  Austria.	  In	  1992,	  Austria	  introduced	  paragraph	  9a(1)(1)	  of	  the	  Austrian	  Unfair	  Competition	  Law,	  which	  placed	  a	  general	  prohibition	  on	  offering	  consumers	  free	  gifts	  linked	  to	  the	  sale	  goods	  or	  supply	  of	  services.	  As	  such,	  any	  periodical	  containing	  prizes,	  competition,	  or	  invitations	  to	  take	  part	  in	  such	  free	  gift	  exchanges	  is	  in	  breach	  of	  Austrian	  law.	  Familiapress	  brought	  action	  against	  its	  Germany	  competitor	  HBV,	  claiming	  that	  Laura	  violated	  Austria’s	  Unfair	  Competition	  Law,	  and	  requiring	  that	  HBV	  cease	  selling	  publications	  infringing	  upon	  the	  relevant	  law.	  Germany’s	  Unfair	  Competition	  Law	  does	  not	  contain	  any	  provisions	  to	  the	  same	  affect.	  	   HBV	  defended	  Laura,	  contending	  that	  Austria’s	  law	  encroaches	  on	  their	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  by	  curtailing	  their	  ability	  to	  publish	  their	  desired	  content.	  HBV	  also	  claimed	  that	  Austria’s	  law	  violates	  their	  right	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  [Art.	  30].	  The	  Austrian	  government	  dismissed	  HBV’s	  argument,	  claiming	  that	  Austria’s	  Unfair	  Competition	  Law	  can	  be	  exculpated	  because	  it	  falls	  under	  the	  Treaty’s	  derogation	  clause;	  the	  law’s	  intention	  is	  to	  promote	  consumer	  protection,	  prevent	  tax	  evasion,	  protect	  the	  public	  health	  of	  citizens	  from	  compulsive	  gambling,	  and	  preserve	  press	  diversity	  by	  ensuring	  that	  small	  publishers	  are	  not	  forced	  to	  compete	  with	  larger	  publishers	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  monetary	  value	  of	  the	  prize	  published.	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Given	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  equivalent	  provision	  under	  German	  competition	  law,	  the	  Austrian	  High	  Court	  inquired	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  law	  affects	  intra-­‐Community	  trade,	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  it	  could	  be	  justified	  under	  the	  Treaty’s	  derogation	  clause.	  
Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Referred	  to	  the	  Court	  	  1) Is	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  precluding	  application	  of	  legislation	  of	  Member	  State	  A	  prohibiting	  an	  undertaking	  established	  in	  Member	  State	  B	  from	  selling	  in	  Member	  State	  A	  periodical	  produced	  in	  Member	  State	  B,	  where	  that	  periodical	  contains	  prize	  puzzle	  competitions	  or	  games	  which	  are	  lawfully	  organized	  in	  Member	  State	  B?296	  	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  
	   The	  Court	  rules	  in	  favor	  of	  HBV,	  finding	  that	  Austria’s	  law	  inhibits	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.297	  As	  such,	  it	  then	  assesses	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  Austria’s	  violation	  of	  Treaty	  obligations	  can	  be	  exculpated	  under	  the	  derogation	  clause.	  It	  reaffirms	  the	  principles	  set	  forth	  in	  ERT	  (1991),	  stating	  “where	  a	  Member	  State	  relies	  on	  overriding	  requirements	  to	  justify	  rules	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  obstruct	  the	  exercise	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  such	  a	  justification	  must	  also	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law	  and	  in	  particular	  of	  fundamental	  rights.”298	  	  Examining	  the	  relevant	  Austrian	  bill’s	  memorandum,	  the	  Court	  notes	  that	  Austria	  pursues	  the	  legitimate	  interest	  of	  preserving	  press	  diversity.	  The	  judgment	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  law	  was	  enacted	  because	  Austria	  maintains	  “a	  very	  high	  degree	  of	  concentration	  of	  press,”299	  with	  the	  largest	  press	  group	  in	  Austria	  maintaining	  “54.5%	  of	  the	  market	  share,	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as	  compared	  with	  only	  34.7%	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  23.9%	  in	  Germany.”300	  As	  such,	  “maintenance	  of	  press	  diversity	  may	  constitute	  an	  overriding	  requirement	  justifying	  a	  restriction	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  Such	  diversity	  helps	  safeguard	  freedom	  of	  expression.”301	  However,	  the	  Court	  also	  notes	  “Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR	  does	  permit	  derogations	  from	  that	  freedom	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  maintaining	  press	  diversity,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  prescribed	  by	  law	  and	  are	  necessary	  in	  a	  democratic	  society.”302	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  in	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  that	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  issue	  at	  hand	  crystallizes.	  The	  Court	  must	  balance	  two	  competing	  fundamental	  rights	  claims	  –	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  press	  diversity	  –	  both	  of	  which	  stem	  from	  the	  same	  provision	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  Given	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  Court	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  employing	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality,	  and	  ensuring	  that	  “the	  national	  prohibition…is	  proportionate	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  maintaining	  press	  diversity	  and	  where	  that	  objective	  might	  not	  be	  attained	  by	  measures	  less	  restrictive	  of	  both	  intra-­‐Community	  trade	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression.”303	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  Court	  requires	  Austria	  to	  determine	  “first,	  whether	  newspapers	  which	  offer	  the	  chance	  of	  winning	  a	  prize	  in	  games,	  puzzles,	  or	  competition	  are	  in	  competition	  with	  those	  small	  press	  publishers	  who	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  offer	  comparable	  prizes	  and	  whom	  the	  contested	  legislation	  is	  intended	  to	  protect,	  and,	  second,	  whether	  such	  a	  prospect	  of	  winning	  constitutes	  an	  incentive	  to	  purchase	  capable	  of	  bring	  about	  a	  shift	  in	  demand.”304	  It	  is	  only	  once	  such	  instructed	  market	  research	  is	  carried	  out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  300	  Paragraph	  17	  	  301	  Paragraph	  18	  302	  Paragraph	  26	  303	  Paragraph	  27	  	  304	  Paragraph	  28	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that	  Austria’s	  Unfair	  Competition	  Law	  can	  be	  assessed	  as	  validly	  derogating	  from	  Article	  30	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  preserving	  press	  diversity.	  The	  Court	  then	  concludes	  its	  judgment	  by	  stating	  that,	  “it	  is	  for	  the	  national	  court	  to	  determine	  whether	  those	  conditions	  are	  satisfied.”305	  	  
Analysis	  	  	   	  In	  comparison	  to	  past	  cases,	  the	  Court	  was	  surprisingly	  brief	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  the	  economic	  measure	  at	  hand,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  compatibility	  of	  Article	  30	  with	  Austria’s	  Unfair	  Competition	  Law.	  Instead,	  the	  Court	  directed	  most	  of	  its	  efforts	  in	  assessing	  the	  compatibility	  of	  Austria’s	  law	  with	  fundamental	  rights.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  as	  the	  substantive	  conflict	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  Familiapress	  is	  complex;	  “the	  very	  same	  provision	  of	  the	  ECHR	  in	  fact	  could	  potentially	  be	  invoked	  in	  support	  of	  the	  two	  conflicting	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  parties:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  positive	  freedom	  of	  expression	  protected	  under	  Article	  10.1,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  a	  negative	  restriction	  on	  that	  freedom,	  which	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  preserve	  press	  diversity	  and	  which	  may	  be	  admissible	  under	  Article	  10.2”306	  	  When	  assessed	  in	  a	  continuum	  with	  the	  previous	  freedom	  of	  expression	  case	  examined,	  Familiapress	  marks	  a	  positive	  shift	  in	  how	  the	  Court	  employs	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  an	  integrative	  tool	  within	  the	  Community’s	  supranational,	  legal	  framework.	  As	  such,	  it	  adheres	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  By	  reaffirming	  the	  principles	  set	  forth	  in	  ERT	  (1991),	  the	  Court	  legitimizes	  fundamental	  rights’	  ability	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  positive,	  interpretative	  tool	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  matters	  of	  Community	  law.	  In	  this	  case,	  freedom	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  Bavasso,	  Antonio	  F.	  "Case	  C-­‐368/95	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  Vertriebs	  GmbH	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  Bauer	  Verlag,	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of	  expression	  serves	  as	  “an	  invalidating	  function.	  It	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  lawfulness	  of	  Community	  acts	  as	  well	  as	  national	  measures.”307	  The	  Court’s	  judgment	  also	  coheres	  to	  the	  posited	  dynamics	  of	  political	  spillover.	  By	  inviting	  the	  national	  court	  to	  conduct	  extensive	  market	  research	  in	  determining	  the	  Austrian	  law’s	  relationship	  to	  press	  diversity,	  the	  Court	  approaches	  its	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  with	  strict	  scrutiny.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  awards	  less	  deference	  to	  Austria	  in	  determining	  the	  parameters	  of	  its	  fundamental	  rights	  violation.	  Though	  the	  Court	  “is	  actually	  imposing	  on	  the	  national	  court	  an	  excessively	  onerous	  task,”308	  it	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  strengthening	  the	  normative	  coherence	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  protections	  at	  the	  national	  and	  supranational	  level.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Court,	  by	  requiring	  Austria	  to	  conduct	  such	  extensive	  market	  research,	  forces	  Austria	  to	  become	  more	  elaborate	  and	  detailed	  in	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  press	  diversity	  protections.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  can	  be	  said	  to	  displace,	  to	  some	  degree,	  Austria’s	  normative	  conceptualization	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  press	  diversity.	  Now,	  Austria	  must	  expand	  on	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  protections,	  but	  it	  must	  do	  with	  by	  factoring	  in	  supranational	  considerations	  regarding	  Community	  competences,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  (Article	  30).	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  Familiapress	  will	  cause	  normative	  change	  insofar	  as	  the	  national	  court	  complies	  with	  the	  ECJ’s	  instructions,	  and	  determines	  that	  the	  national	  law	  does,	  in	  fact,	  preserve	  press	  diversity.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  maximal,	  integrative	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  become	  contingent	  upon	  the	  national	  court’s	  ruling.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Familiapress	  exhibits	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  spillover	  in	  a	  way	  that	  contrasts	  sharply	  to	  that	  of	  Cinetheque	  and	  ERT.	  	  Whereas	  the	  operational	  presence	  of	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political	  spillover	  was	  rendered	  inapplicable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Cinetheque,	  in	  ERT	  political	  spillover	  was	  observed	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Court	  required	  Greece	  to	  evaluate	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees	  insofar	  as	  a	  causal	  relationship	  was	  established	  between	  the	  national	  provision	  and	  the	  violation	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  services.	  In	  Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  also	  requires	  the	  national	  court	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  contingent	  relationship,	  but	  it	  now	  provides	  the	  national	  court	  with	  a	  much	  more	  stringent	  framework	  under	  which	  such	  a	  determination	  is	  to	  be	  made.	  This	  positive	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  integrative,	  supranational	  policy	  making	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  in	  1993	  and	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  in	  1997,	  the	  same	  year	  as	  this	  case.	  In	  their	  respective	  provisions,	  these	  Treaties	  declare:	  	  “The	  Union	  shall	  respect	  fundamental	  rights,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  signed	  in	  Rome	  on	  4	  November	  1950,	  and	  as	  they	  result	  from	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  
general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law.”	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  novel	  incorporation	  and	  ratification	  of	  this	  amendment,	  the	  Court’s	  past	  case	  law	  is	  codified.	  What	  should	  be	  noted	  is	  that	  Cinetheque,	  Grogan,	  and	  ERT	  predate	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  two	  Treaties.	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  ratification	  of	  these	  Treaties	  motivated	  the	  Court	  to	  become	  more	  intrusive	  when	  assessing	  the	  merits	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  protections	  in	  relation	  to	  national	  legislation	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  Court’s	  seems	  to	  view	  this	  amendment	  as	  a	  mandate	  for	  continuing	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  of	  national	  measures	  implemented	  separately	  from	  Community	  law.	  	  	  The	  Court’s	  utilization	  of	  market	  relations	  to	  justify	  the	  remedial	  protection	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  also	  deserves	  to	  be	  discussed.	  By	  taking	  such	  an	  approach	  in	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Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  drives	  integration	  forward	  in	  both	  economic	  and	  rights-­‐oriented	  domains.	  	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  employ	  a	  similar	  strategy	  in	  Grogan.	  Recall	  that	  Court	  declined	  to	  protect	  the	  students’	  distribution	  of	  pamphlets	  (a	  manifestation	  of	  their	  freedom	  of	  expression)	  on	  the	  legal	  grounds	  that	  there	  is	  a	  corollary	  right	  to	  receive	  information	  regarding	  services.	  In	  Familiapress,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Court	  leverages	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  guarantees	  as	  a	  means	  of	  assessing	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  press	  diversity	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  	  What	  explains	  these	  different	  legal	  approaches?	  The	  answer	  is	  fairly	  straightforward:	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  services	  in	  question	  is	  strikingly	  different.	  Whereas	  press	  diversity	  is	  often	  viewed	  in	  neutral	  terms	  amongst	  the	  Union’s	  liberal	  democratic	  Member	  States,	  abortion	  is	  a	  decisive	  and	  controversial	  subject.	  Furthermore,	  all	  of	  the	  Union’s	  Member	  States	  guarantee	  press	  diversity	  within	  their	  constitutions,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  so	  for	  abortion	  services;	  by	  and	  large,	  Member	  States’	  national	  legislation	  widely	  diverge	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  medical	  termination	  of	  pregnancy.309	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  integrationalist	  impulse	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  a	  standstill	  when	  a	  strong,	  normative	  consensus	  of	  the	  guaranteed	  fundamental	  right	  and	  its	  remedial	  relationship	  to	  the	  violation	  at	  hand	  is	  lacking	  amongst	  Member	  States.	  	  
3.6	  Concluding	  Observations	  	  	   When	  examining	  these	  four	  cases	  as	  a	  continuum,	  the	  operational	  presence	  of	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover	  at	  the	  jurisprudential	  level	  becomes	  increasingly	  apparent.	  The	  Court’s	  departure	  from	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  it	  championed	  in	  Cinetheque	  is	  strikingly	  more	  evident	  when	  assessed	  in	  relation	  to	  ERT	  and	  Familiapress.	  Whereas	  in	  the	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former	  case	  the	  Court	  refuses	  to	  utilize	  fundamental	  rights	  protections	  as	  an	  additional	  standard	  of	  review	  for	  national	  legislation	  derogating	  from	  Community	  law,	  in	  the	  latter	  cases,	  the	  Court	  champions	  such	  an	  approach.	  	  The	  only	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  Grogan,	  and,	  as	  noted	  previously,	  this	  is	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  Court’s	  desire	  to	  stray	  away	  from	  contentious	  political	  debates.	  From	  a	  comparative	  standpoint,	  ERT	  and	  Familiapress	  cohere	  with	  neo-­‐functionalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  integration	  and	  time.	  In	  Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  feels	  far	  less	  restrained	  in	  engaging	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  than	  it	  did	  six	  years	  earlier	  in	  ERT;	  as	  discussed,	  this	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  to	  award	  far	  less	  deference	  to	  the	  national	  court	  in	  determining	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  By	  continuously	  reaffirming	  the	  derogation	  precedent	  it	  set	  forth	  in	  ERT,	  the	  Court	  simultaneously	  expands	  its	  jurisdictional	  competencies.	  This	  directly	  implicates	  the	  Court’s	  ability	  to	  partake	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review,	  thereby	  creating	  far	  more	  opportunities	  from	  which	  the	  integrative	  effects	  of	  normative	  harmonization	  can	  unfold.	  	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  that	  ERT	  inaugurated	  the	  erosion	  of	  Member	  State	  competences	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  favorable	  to	  supranational	  integration.	  Though	  it	  has	  always	  been	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  Court,	  both	  substantively	  and	  jurisdictionally,	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  State’s	  derogation	  claim	  is	  justified,	  by	  incorporating	  human	  rights-­‐review	  into	  this	  determination	  process,	  the	  Court	  interferes	  “with	  the	  core	  of	  the	  sovereign	  value	  choices	  of	  the	  particular	  state.”310	  Take,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  scenario.	  A	  Member	  State	  justifies	  a	  policy	  that	  violates	  the	  Treaty’s	  economic	  obligations	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  preserving	  public	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  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Boundaries:	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  and	  Conflicting	  Values	  in	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  European	  Legal	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  In	  An	  Identity	  for	  Europe:	  
The	  Relevance	  of	  Multiculturalism	  in	  EU	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  P89	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morality	  for	  the	  general	  public	  interest.	  The	  Member	  State	  may	  be	  aware	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  infringes	  on	  a	  some-­‐said	  fundamental	  right	  for	  its	  citizen,	  but	  it	  deems	  such	  a	  violation	  as	  acceptable	  due	  to	  the	  balance	  it	  strikes	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  that	  of	  the	  collective.	  In	  essence,	  the	  Member	  State	  has	  made	  a	  distinct	  value-­‐choice	  embodying	  its	  self-­‐determination	  and	  autonomy.	  Prior	  to	  ERT,	  the	  Member	  State	  is	  able	  to	  maintain	  such	  a	  value-­‐choice	  so	  long	  as	  it	  convinces	  the	  Court	  that	  the	  said	  national	  policy	  does,	  in	  fact,	  preserve	  public	  morality.	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  Court	  does	  not	  question	  the	  Member	  States’	  ‘fundamental	  boundary,’	  but	  only	  examines	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  market	  freedom	  in	  question.	  Following	  the	  publication	  of	  ERT,	  such	  a	  scenario	  is	  no	  longer	  viable.	  The	  Court	  now	  maintains	  full	  authority	  to	  question	  the	  Member	  State’s	  value-­‐choice,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  so	  from	  the	  solely	  perspective	  of	  economic	  interests.	  Rather,	  the	  Court	  now	  maintains	  jurisdiction	  in	  legitimizing	  or	  negating	  the	  Member	  States’	  policy	  preferences	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary.’	  In	  this	  framework,	  the	  Member	  State	  will	  have	  to	  take	  into	  account	  fundamental	  rights	  considerations,	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  ECJ’s	  previous	  case	  law,	  when	  crafting	  its	  future	  policy	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  justified	  derogations.	  	  As	  a	  whole,	  chapter	  three	  illustrates	  the	  evolving	  and	  positive	  relationship	  between	  supranational	  integration	  and	  the	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  rights.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  after	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  and	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam,	  the	  Court	  exhibited	  a	  strong	  preference	  towards	  constructing	  substantive	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees,	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  transcend	  national	  norms,	  and	  displace	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary’	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  supranational	  (see	  Familiaress).	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  chapter	  four	  to	  determine	  if	  such	  integrative	  effects	  are	  continued	  and	  amplified	  following	  the	  proclamation	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  2000.	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CHAPTER	  4:	  CASE	  STUDIES,	  PART	  II	  [2000	  –	  2013]	  
	   Chapter	  four	  focuses	  on	  cases	  following	  the	  proclamation	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  2000,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  legal	  ratification	  in	  2009.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  references	  to	  the	  Charter	  gradually	  replace	  those	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  In	  continuum	  with	  the	  previous	  case	  studies	  examined,	  the	  Court	  continues	  to	  incorporate	  rights	  guarantees	  as	  additional	  standards	  of	  legality	  when	  assessing	  national	  legislation,	  as	  functional	  spillover	  posits.	  	  It	  should	  be	  underscored	  that,	  in	  cases	  concerning	  Member	  State	  implementation	  of	  EU	  Directives,	  rights	  considerations	  become	  especially	  more	  salient	  within	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning.	  Political	  spillover	  also	  becomes	  apparent,	  though	  only	  to	  a	  certain	  degree.	  As	  initiated	  by	  Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  continues	  its	  trend	  of	  applying	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  intrusively,	  which	  makes	  it	  more	  likely	  for	  Community	  law	  to	  absorb	  national	  law,	  thereby	  triggering	  normative	  harmonization.	  However,	  as	  these	  case	  studies	  will	  show,	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  do	  not	  always	  permeate	  substantively	  within	  the	  national	  legal	  orders,	  inciting	  normative	  change	  at	  the	  subnational	  level.	  	  4.1	  Eugen	  Schmidberger,	  Internatjonale	  Transporte	  und	  Planzuge	  v.	  Republic	  of	  Austria	  (2003)	  	  
Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  
	   Schmidberger	  is	  a	  European	  haulage	  company	  based	  in	  Southern	  Germany.	  It	  transports	  timber	  and	  steel	  to	  Italy	  via	  Austria	  by	  way	  of	  the	  Brenner	  Pass,	  “which	  is	  the	  most	  convenient	  transport	  route	  for	  most	  goods	  traffic	  heading	  to	  Italy	  from	  Northern	  Europe.	  Without	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Brenner	  Pass,	  motorists	  are	  restricted	  to	  using	  routes	  such	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as	  the	  Tauern	  motorway,	  which	  undoubtedly	  constitutes	  a	  considerable	  detour.”311	  The	  Transitforum	  Austria	  Toril	  (TAT)	  is	  an	  environmental	  group	  whose	  cause	  focuses	  on	  the	  environmental	  effects	  of	  heavy	  goods	  traffic	  on	  the	  Brenner	  motorway.	  After	  consultation	  with	  the	  relevant	  Austrian	  authorities,	  TAT	  received	  authorization	  to	  partake	  in	  a	  thirty-­‐hour	  demonstration,	  in	  which	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  Brenner	  Pass	  was	  closed	  off.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  demonstration,	  Schmidberger’s	  lorries	  were	  considerably	  delayed	  in	  reaching	  their	  destination	  in	  Italy.	  	  Schmidberger	  brought	  an	  action	  against	  the	  Austrian	  government	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  Article	  30,	  which	  ensures	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  and	  Article	  10,	  which	  requires	  loyal	  cooperation	  amongst	  Member	  States	  in	  fields	  of	  Community	  law.	  Schmidberger	  complained	  that	  Austrian	  authorities	  had	  failed	  in	  their	  duty	  to	  guarantee	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  thereby	  incurring	  a	  liability	  toward	  the	  firm	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  was	  prevented	  from	  operating	  its	  vehicles	  on	  their	  normal	  transit	  routes.	  As	  such,	  Schmidberger	  requested	  that	  he	  be	  reimbursed	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  his	  earnings	  and	  additional	  related	  expenses.	  Schmidberger	  justified	  its	  claim	  by	  citing	  the	  Court’s	  past	  judgment	  in	  Commission	  v.	  France	  (1997);	  in	  this	  ruling,	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  France	  had	  failed	  to	  fulfill	  its	  obligations	  under	  Article	  30	  and	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  because	  it	  had	  not	  taking	  sufficient	  action	  to	  counter	  violent	  acts	  perpetrated	  by	  individuals	  and	  farmers,	  which	  had	  the	  effective	  of	  impeding	  Spanish	  produce	  from	  being	  imported	  to	  France.	  	  The	  Austrian	  government	  rejected	  Schmidberger’s	  claims,	  contending	  that	  its	  Constitution	  and	  Laws	  on	  Assembly	  of	  1953	  permit	  organized	  demonstrations	  under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  311	  Brown,	  Christopher.	  "Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Eugen	  Schmidberger,	  Internationale	  Transporte	  Und	  Planzuge	  v.	  Austria.	  Judgment	  of	  12	  June	  2003,	  Full	  Court."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  40,	  no.	  6	  (2003):	  1459-­‐510.	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certain	  conditions,	  with	  which	  TAT	  complied.	  For	  example,	  the	  information	  such	  as	  the	  date	  of	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  Brenner	  motorway	  had	  been	  announced	  in	  advance	  to	  Austria,	  Germany,	  and	  Italy.	  Additionally,	  Austria	  argued	  that	  the	  demonstration	  did	  not	  result	  in	  substantial	  traffic	  jams,	  and	  that	  the	  restriction	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  arising	  from	  the	  demonstration	  is	  permitted	  because	  it	  was	  neither	  permanent	  nor	  serious.	  As	  such,	  Austria	  contended	  that	  the	  “interests	  involved	  should	  lean	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  freedoms	  of	  expression	  and	  assembly,	  since	  fundamental	  rights	  are	  inviolable	  in	  a	  democratic	  society.”312	  The	  Austrian	  government	  cited	  the	  Court’s	  derogation	  precedent,	  as	  established	  in	  ERT	  (1991),	  as	  the	  legal	  justification	  for	  its	  demonstration.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  demonstration	  infringed	  on	  Community	  law,	  requiring	  Austria’s	  High	  Court	  to	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  the	  ECJ.	  	  
The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Referred	  to	  the	  Court	  	  1. Are	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  under	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  meaning	  that	  a	  Member	  State	  is	  obliged	  to	  keep	  major	  transit	  routes	  clear	  of	  all	  restrictions	  and	  impediments,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  requiring	  that	  a	  political	  demonstration	  to	  be	  held	  on	  a	  transit	  route,	  of	  which	  notice	  has	  been	  given,	  may	  not	  be	  authorized,	  if	  it	  can	  also	  be	  held	  at	  a	  place	  away	  from	  the	  transit	  route	  with	  a	  comparable	  effect	  on	  public	  awareness?313	  	  2. Does	  a	  Member	  State’s	  failure	  to	  indicate	  in	  its	  national	  legislation	  concerning	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  the	  principles	  of	  Community	  law,	  in	  particular	  the	  provisions	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  constitute	  itself	  as	  a	  sufficiently	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serious	  infringement	  of	  Community	  law,	  thereby	  enabling	  the	  Member	  State	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  liable	  under	  the	  principles	  of	  Community	  law?314	  	  3. “Is	  the	  objective	  of	  an	  officially	  authorized	  political	  demonstration…to	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  of	  a	  higher	  order	  of	  than	  the	  provisions	  of	  Community	  law	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  under	  Article	  28	  EC?”	  315	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  	   The	  Court	  began	  its	  judgment	  by	  underscoring	  the	  importance	  the	  Community’s	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  provisions,	  proclaiming	  it	  to	  be	  “one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  Community.”316Citing	  Commission	  v.	  France	  (1997),	  the	  Court	  reaffirms	  its	  position	  that	  Member	  States	  ensure	  the	  prevention	  of	  obstacles	  “to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  that	  are	  created…by	  actions	  by	  private	  individuals	  on	  its	  territory	  aimed	  at	  products	  originate	  in	  other	  Member	  States.”317	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  holds	  that	  Member	  States	  must	  “take	  all	  necessary	  and	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  fundamental	  freedom	  is	  respect	  on	  their	  territory.”318	  	  In	  addition	  to	  citing	  Article	  30	  and	  its	  judicial	  precedent,	  the	  Court	  also	  justifies	  such	  a	  declaration	  by	  contending,	  “Article	  10	  of	  the	  Treaty	  requires	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  take	  all	  appropriate	  measures,	  whether	  general	  or	  particular,	  to	  ensure	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  obligations	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  Treaty.”319	  Now	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  laid	  out	  the	  basis	  for	  its	  legal	  reasoning,	  it	  concludes	  that	  the	  demonstration	  infringes	  upon	  the	  free	  movement	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of	  goods	  [Art.	  30]	  when	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  provisions	  concerning	  loyal	  cooperation	  among	  Member	  States	  [Art.	  10].320	  	  As	  to	  be	  expected,	  the	  Court	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  violation	  can	  be	  exculpated	  under	  the	  derogation	  clause.	  	  The	  Court	  affirms	  Austria’s	  derogation	  defense,	  asserting	  it	  to	  be	  “inspired	  by	  considerations	  linked	  to	  respect	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  the	  demonstrators	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  freedom	  of	  assembly,	  which	  are	  enshrined	  in	  and	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	  Austrian	  Constitution.”321	  The	  Court	  declares	  such	  objectives	  to	  be	  buttressed	  by	  provisions	  of	  Community	  law	  as	  well,	  given	  that	  these	  “principles	  are	  established	  by	  past	  case-­‐law,”322	  and	  “reaffirmed…in	  Article	  F.2	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  Maastricht.”323	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  declares	  Austria’s	  derogation	  claim	  to	  be	  of	  	  “legitimate	  interest.”324	  	  However,	  the	  Court	  notes	  that	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  guarantees	  are	  never	  absolute.	  Citing	  Familiapress	  (1997)	  and	  the	  explicit	  wording	  of	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  Court	  declares	  such	  rights	  to	  be	  “subject	  to	  certain	  limitations	  justified	  by…the	  public	  interest.”325It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  the	  Court	  emphasizes	  the	  necessity	  of	  employing	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  as	  a	  means	  of	  balancing	  these	  competing	  interests.	  Though	  the	  Court	  declares,	  “The	  competent	  authorities	  enjoy	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  discretion	  in	  that	  regard,”326	  the	  Court	  itself	  must	  also	  “determine	  whether	  the	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restrictions	  placed	  upon	  intra-­‐Community	  trade	  are	  proportionate…to	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights.”327	  	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  Court	  rejects	  Schmidberger’s	  justification	  that	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  of	  Commission	  v.	  France	  is	  applicable	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  present	  case.	  The	  Court	  draws	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  Schmidberger	  and	  Commission	  v.	  France,	  finding	  that:	  1)	  the	  obstruction	  was	  relatively	  minor,	  lasting	  for	  a	  set	  time	  period,	  and	  only	  on	  one	  road328	  2)	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  demonstration	  was	  not	  to	  restrict	  trade	  in	  goods	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  or	  from	  a	  particular	  source329	  3)	  the	  necessary	  authorities	  had	  taken	  measures	  to	  limit	  disruptions	  to	  road	  traffic330	  4)	  The	  isolated	  incident	  did	  not	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  intra-­‐Community	  trade	  as	  a	  whole.	  331	  	  Weighing	  all	  of	  these	  factors,	  the	  Court	  reaffirms	  Austria’s	  view	  that	  	  “The	  imposition	  of	  stricter	  conditions	  concerning	  the	  site	  and	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  demonstration”	  332	  would	  mitigate	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  demonstration,	  and	  curtail	  the	  demonstrator’s	  right	  to	  assembly.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Court	  contends	  that	  	  “all	  the	  alternative	  solutions…	  would	  have	  been	  liable	  to	  cause	  much	  more	  serious	  disruption	  to	  intra-­‐Community	  trade	  and	  public	  order.”333	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  concludes,	  “the	  national	  authorities	  were	  reasonably	  entitled”334	  in	  allowing	  the	  demonstrations	  to	  occur,	  and	  that	  such	  a	  demonstration	  “is	  not	  incompatible	  with	  Articles	  30	  of	  the	  Treaty.”335	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By	  and	  large,	  commentators	  have	  hailed	  Schmidberger	  as	  an	  example	  “where	  the	  judges	  in	  Luxembourg	  acted	  as	  genuine	  human	  rights	  judges.”336In	  line	  with	  Dassonville	  (1974)	  and	  Commission	  v.	  France	  (1997),	  the	  Court	  rules	  the	  demonstration	  to	  constitute	  a	  trade	  barrier.	  However,	  the	  Court	  exculpates	  Austria’s	  treaty	  violation	  on	  purely	  human	  rights	  grounds,	  defining	  the	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  as	  a	  “legitimate	  interest”337	  when	  viewed	  “in	  relation	  to	  its	  social	  function.”338Thus,	  “in	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  seemed	  to	  take	  human	  rights	  seriously	  and	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Court	  contrasted	  with	  that	  of	  previous	  cases	  where	  it	  gave	  priority	  to	  free	  movement	  over	  the	  arguments	  given	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  justify	  their	  restrictions.”339	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Court’s	  judgment,	  Austrian	  citizens’	  are	  now	  awarded	  an	  additional	  tier	  of	  legal	  protection	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  	  This	  case	  adheres	  to	  the	  neo-­‐functionalist	  paradigm	  in	  several	  ways.	  By	  reaffirming	  
ERT	  (1991),	  the	  Court	  consolidates	  its	  past	  case	  law	  authorizing	  its	  right	  to	  partake	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  of	  national	  legislation	  derogating	  from	  Community	  law.	  	  By	  extension,	  the	  Court	  further	  entrenches	  the	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  it	  has	  previously	  established,	  cohering	  with	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  Schmidberger	  also	  adheres,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  political	  spillover,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Court’s	  employment	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality.	  In	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  Familiapress	  (1997),	  the	  Court	  engages	  in	  such	  a	  balancing	  exercise	  intrusively;	  it	  devotes	  several	  paragraphs	  of	  its	  judgment	  to	  examining	  how	  Austria	  carried	  out	  its	  own	  balancing	  test	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before	  validating	  the	  national	  court’s	  claim.	  Though	  such	  judicial	  behavior	  indicates	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  political	  spillover	  is	  present,	  Schmidberger	  fails	  to	  result	  in	  a	  normative	  shift	  in	  Austria’s	  conceptualization	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  freedom	  of	  assembly.	  The	  Court	  simply	  validates	  Austria’s	  legislation	  and	  the	  permission	  it	  awarded	  to	  the	  demonstrators	  in	  carrying	  out	  their	  right	  to	  assembly.	  This	  contrasts	  sharply	  to	  Familiapress,	  where	  the	  Court	  required	  Austria	  to	  revise	  the	  national	  legislation	  at	  hand	  and	  to	  determine	  its	  remedial	  relationship	  with	  press	  diversity,	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  and	  free	  movement	  of	  services.	  However,	  this	  difference	  in	  normative	  impact	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  
Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  found	  Austria	  to	  be	  in	  potential	  violation	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  whereas	  in	  Schmidberger,	  no	  remedial	  action	  with	  regards	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  were	  necessary.	  Rather,	  the	  Community’s	  conceptualization	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  simply	  aligned	  with	  that	  of	  Austria’s.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Schmidberger	  fails	  to	  incite	  normative	  change	  at	  the	  substantive	  and	  national	  level,	  the	  decision	  signals	  a	  positive	  shift	  in	  how	  the	  Court	  conceptualizes	  fundamental	  rights	  guarantees	  in	  relation	  to	  judicial	  review	  of	  national	  measures.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  when	  it	  is	  viewed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  preceding	  case,	  Familiapress.	  Recall	  that	  that	  in	  ERT	  (1991),	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  make	  any	  balancing	  value	  judgments	  to	  the	  rights	  violation	  in	  question,	  declaring	  such	  an	  exercise	  to	  be	  solely	  within	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  national	  court.	  In	  Familiapress	  and	  Schmidberger,	  the	  Court	  actively	  participates	  in	  such	  considerations,	  reassessing	  all	  of	  the	  facts	  itself	  before	  validating	  the	  national	  court’s	  derogation	  claims.	  Whereas	  in	  Familiapress	  this	  shift	  in	  judicial	  behavior	  was	  accredited	  to	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht,	  in	  Schmidberger	  it	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Charter,	  which	  was	  proclaimed	  in	  2000,	  three	  years	  prior	  to	  this	  case.	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The	  Charter,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  both	  economic	  and	  non-­‐market	  rights,	  implies	  that	  there	  be	  no	  hierarchical	  approach	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  such	  rights.	  Thus,	  under	  the	  Charter,	  Austria’s	  actions	  were	  no	  longer	  acting	  in	  derogation	  from	  Community	  law,	  but	  rather	  “as	  an	  agent	  of	  the	  Union,	  as	  the	  Charter	  stipulates.”340	  Though	  the	  Charter	  was	  not	  ratified	  until	  2009,	  the	  Court	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  its	  presence,	  and	  their	  “pre-­‐Lisbon	  use	  of	  the	  Charter	  may	  have	  eased	  the	  way	  for	  its	  progressive	  incorporation	  into	  judicial	  reasoning,	  thus	  preventing	  the	  impression	  of	  sudden	  change.”341	  	  However,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  in	  Schmidberger	  also	  illustrates	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  may	  be	  consciously	  curbed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  mitigates	  a	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  supranational	  policy	  making	  among	  Member	  States.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  Court’s	  reference	  to	  the	  national	  authorities’	  “wide	  margin	  of	  discretion”342	  deserves	  to	  be	  analyzed.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Court’s	  judgment,	  Member	  States,	  “as	  a	  matter	  of	  Community	  law…enjoy	  some	  room	  for	  maneuverer	  when	  considering	  how	  to	  limit	  the	  interference”343	  of	  a	  Treaty	  provisions	  when	  such	  a	  breach	  comes	  from	  private	  individuals.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  Court	  did	  apply	  a	  more	  intrusive	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  test	  by	  re-­‐evaluating	  all	  of	  the	  procedural	  facts	  against	  one	  another,	  it	  was	  more	  lenient	  in	  how	  it	  conceptualized	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  those	  facts.	  The	  Court’s	  declaration	  of	  discretion	  “arguably	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  struggle	  to	  instill	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  Community	  law	  over	  national	  law…the	  collective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  340	  Morijn,	  John.	  "Balancing	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Common	  Market	  Freedoms	  in	  Union	  Law:	  Schmidberger	  and	  Omea	  in	  the	  Light	  of	  the	  European	  Constitution."	  European	  Law	  Journal	  12,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  15-­‐40.	  341	  Sanchez,	  Sara	  Iglesias.	  "The	  Court	  and	  the	  Charter:	  The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Entry	  Into	  Force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  on	  the	  ECJ's	  Approach	  to	  Fundamental	  Rights."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  49,	  no.	  5	  (2012):	  1565-­‐612.	  342	  Paragraph	  82	  	  343	  Brown,	  Christopher.	  "Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Eugen	  Schmidberger,	  Internationale	  Transporte	  Und	  Planzuge	  v.	  Austria.	  Judgment	  of	  12	  June	  2003,	  Full	  Court."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  40,	  no.	  6	  (2003):	  1459-­‐510.	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conscience	  of	  the	  ECJ…leads	  it	  tread	  very	  carefully	  around	  the	  interface	  of	  (Community)	  economic	  rights	  and	  (national	  constitutional)	  fundamental	  rights.”344	  In	  this	  regard,	  Schmidberger	  exemplifies	  how	  the	  Court	  intentionally	  delineates	  its	  competencies	  in	  a	  way	  that	  avoids	  displacing	  national	  rights-­‐oriented	  norms.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  such	  an	  intention	  can	  also	  be	  observed	  in	  ERT,	  a	  judgment	  that	  occurred	  a	  decade	  earlier.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  Court	  explicates	  some	  margin	  of	  deference	  to	  the	  national	  court	  in	  assessing	  the	  merits	  of	  their	  derogation	  claim.	  The	  only	  difference	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  such	  deference	  is	  justified.	  In	  ERT,	  the	  ECJ	  awards	  the	  Greek	  Court	  the	  sole	  ability	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  its	  derogation	  claim	  –	  and	  by	  extension	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees	  -­‐	  are	  even	  applicable	  to	  the	  current	  case345,	  and	  its	  legal	  reasoning	  rests	  on	  solely	  a	  jurisdictional	  claim.	  In	  Schmidberger,	  the	  Court	  asserts	  that	  Austria’s	  derogation	  invocation	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  and	  it	  assesses	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  national	  claims	  with	  stricter	  scrutiny.	  In	  this	  connection,	  Schmidberger	  clearly	  illustrates	  that	  human	  rights	  have	  come	  to	  occupy	  a	  more	  integrative	  space	  within	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  since	  the	  time	  of	  ERT.	  However,	  in	  Schmidberger,	  the	  Court	  fails	  to	  maximize	  the	  integrative	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  because	  it	  explicitly	  states	  that	  it’s	  ruling	  was	  conditioned	  by	  the	  discretion	  it	  awarded	  to	  Austria	  in	  justifying	  its	  derogation	  claims.	  Thus,	  both	  ERT	  and	  
Schmidberger	  show	  how	  the	  Court	  continues	  to	  be	  receptive	  to	  the	  value	  judgments	  national	  courts	  make	  when	  justifying	  their	  derogation	  claim.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  344	  Ibid.	  P1506	  345	  Recall	  that	  in	  ERT,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  Greece’s	  law	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  infringe	  upon	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services,	  and	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  effects	  are	  observed	  is	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  national	  court.	  As	  such,	  Greece’s	  derogation	  claim	  (and	  with	  it,	  the	  guarantees	  for	  freedom	  of	  expression)	  is	  a	  applicable	  only	  if	  the	  national	  court	  determines	  that	  its	  national	  law	  is	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Treaty.	  
	   110	  
Additionally,	  if	  one	  examines	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  judgment,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  Court	  carved	  out	  itself	  a	  very	  narrow	  precedent	  in	  regards	  to	  when	  a	  freedom	  of	  expression	  claim	  trumps	  an	  economic	  freedom.	  Whereas	  Commission	  v.	  France	  (1997)	  has	  been	  hailed	  as	  an	  exceedingly	  broad	  judgment	  regarding	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  demonstrations	  and	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  Schmidberger	  lies	  at	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  The	  Court	  makes	  sharp	  distinctions	  between	  Commission	  v.	  France	  and	  
Schmidberger,	  enumerating	  the	  specific	  precautions	  undertaken	  by	  Austria	  in	  enabling	  the	  demonstration	  to	  take	  place.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  narrows	  the	  applicability	  of	  this	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  precedent	  for	  future	  demonstrations,	  thereby	  failing	  to	  “furnish	  sufficiently	  helpful	  indications	  to	  the	  national	  courts	  for	  the	  future.”346	  This	  becomes	  especially	  problematic	  given	  that,	  as	  the	  Union’s	  competencies	  continue	  to	  evolve,	  rights	  question	  are	  “likely	  to	  come	  increasingly	  to	  the	  fore	  as	  fundamental	  rights	  protections	  become	  more	  frequently	  invoked.”347	  	  It	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  Court	  seems	  to	  be	  constructing	  its	  rights	  jurisprudence	  on	  an	  incremental,	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  thereby	  limiting	  human	  rights’	  integrative	  effects.	  Such	  legal	  reasoning	  may	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  Court’s	  steadfast	  commitment	  to	  protecting	  economic	  freedoms	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  and	  attempting	  to	  find	  the	  least	  restrictive	  means	  by	  which	  market	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  rights	  can	  be	  balanced.	  In	  this	  connection,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Court	  sidestepped	  Austria’s	  third	  preliminary	  question	  regarding	  the	  normative	  hierarchy	  of	  economic	  and	  non-­‐market	  freedoms.348	  Clearly,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	  Ibid.	  P1509	  347	  Ibid.	  P1510	  348	  The	  third	  preliminary	  question	  is	  as	  follows:	  “Is	  the	  objective	  of	  an	  officially	  authorized	  political	  demonstration…to	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  of	  a	  higher	  order	  of	  than	  the	  provisions	  of	  Community	  law	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  under	  Article	  28	  EC?”	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Court	  “views	  the	  EU	  not	  so	  much	  as	  an	  organization	  fully	  committed	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  as	  an	  economic	  power	  accepting	  human	  rights	  as	  a	  breaking	  force	  on	  economic	  rights.”349	  	  4.2	  Mesopotamia	  Broadcast	  A/S	  METV	  and	  ROJ	  TV	  A/S	  v.	  Germany	  (2010)	  
Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  	   Directive	  89/552/EEC,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Television	  Without	  Frontiers”	  Directive,	  seeks	  to	  remove	  obstacles	  to	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  television-­‐broadcasting	  services	  within	  the	  EU.	  Article	  22(1)	  of	  the	  Directive	  requires	  that	  Member	  States	  ensure	  that	  their	  national	  broadcaster’s	  programs	  do	  not	  contain	  any	  incitement	  to	  hatred	  on	  grounds	  of	  race,	  sex,	  religion	  and	  nationality.	  In	  addition,	  Article	  2(a)	  stipulates	  that	  Member	  State	  A	  cannot	  restrict	  the	  retransmission	  on	  their	  territory	  of	  programs	  broadcasted	  by	  a	  television	  broadcaster	  established	  Member	  State	  B	  for	  reasons	  related	  to	  the	  incitement	  of	  hatred,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  assess	  exclusively	  by	  Member	  State	  B.	  	  	   The	  Danish	  company	  Mesopotamia	  Broadcast	  is	  the	  holder	  of	  several	  television	  licenses	  in	  Denmark.	  It	  operates	  Roj	  TV,	  which	  broadcasts	  programs	  via	  satellite,	  mainly	  in	  Kurdish,	  throughout	  Europe	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Roj	  TV	  commissions	  program	  to	  be	  transmitted	  by	  a	  company	  established	  in	  Germany.	  Among	  Roj	  TV’s	  transmitted	  programs	  was	  a	  2008	  segment	  that	  called	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	  difference	  between	  Kurds	  and	  Turks	  by	  violent	  means,	  encouraging	  such	  actions	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  Turkey	  and	  Germany	  as	  well.	  The	  segment	  was	  explicit	  in	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurdistan	  Workers	  Party	  (PKK)’s	  efforts	  in	  recruiting	  young	  Kurds	  as	  guerrilla	  fighters	  against	  the	  Republic	  of	  Turkey.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  EU	  classifies	  the	  PKK	  as	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  In	  2008,	  the	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Germany	  authorities	  prohibited	  Mesopotamia	  broadcast,	  and	  by	  extension	  Roj	  TV,	  from	  conducting	  any	  activities	  in	  Germany.	  They	  based	  their	  prohibition	  on	  German	  law.	  	  	   Article	  9(1)	  of	  Germany’s	  Constitution	  guarantees	  the	  freedom	  of	  association.	  Article	  9(1[b])	  prohibits	  associations	  “whose	  purposes	  or	  activities	  infringe	  criminal	  laws,	  or	  which	  conflict	  with	  the	  constitutional	  order	  or	  the	  principles	  of	  international	  understanding.”350	  In	  2000,	  the	  Germany	  government	  amended	  its	  Public	  Law	  of	  Associations,	  with	  Article	  3	  declaring	  “a	  measure	  for	  maintains	  security	  and	  public	  order	  may	  be	  adopted	  against	  associations	  abusing	  the	  freedom	  of	  association	  only	  under	  this	  law.”351	  As	  such,	  Germany	  argued	  that	  Roj	  TV’s	  broadcasting	  of	  pro-­‐PKK	  efforts	  conflicts	  with	  the	  “principles	  of	  international	  understanding,”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  3	  of	  Germany’s	  Public	  Law	  on	  Associations	  when	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  9	  of	  its	  Constitutional	  Law.	  The	  German	  government	  “took	  the	  view	  that	  those	  programs	  are	  clearly	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  PKK,	  reflecting	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  a	  militaristic	  and	  violent	  approach…Roj	  TV	  does	  not	  report	  the	  conflict	  impartially	  but	  supports	  the	  PKK’s	  use	  of	  guerrilla	  units	  and	  terrorist	  attacks…thereby	  playing	  a	  role	  in	  inciting	  violent	  confrontations	  between	  persons	  of	  Turkish	  and	  Kurdish	  origin	  in	  Turkey	  and	  in	  exacerbating	  tensions	  between	  Turks	  and	  Kurds	  living	  in	  Germany.”352	  The	  German	  Federal	  Administrative	  Court	  shared	  the	  federal	  government’s	  opinion,	  ruling	  that	  Roj	  TV	  had	  infringed	  on	  the	  laws	  in	  question.	  	  For	  its	  part,	  Roj	  TV	  disagreed	  with	  the	  national	  ruling,	  contending	  it	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  EU	  Directive	  on	  grounds	  that	  it	  violated	  their	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	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to	  impart	  services	  [Art.	  59],	  	  as	  acknowledged	  in	  Recital	  1	  and	  4	  of	  the	  Directive’s	  preamble.	  Furthermore,	  Roj	  TV	  contended	  that,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Directive,	  Germany	  could	  not	  prevent	  a	  retransmission	  of	  its	  programs	  because	  only	  the	  Danish	  Radio	  and	  Television	  Board	  could	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  transmissions	  incite	  hatred	  on	  grounds	  of	  race,	  sex,	  religion	  and	  nationality.	  Roj	  TV	  made	  no	  claim	  that	  the	  German	  law,	  by	  prohibiting	  the	  broadcasting	  of	  its	  television	  content,	  infringed	  on	  its	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  The	  German	  authorities	  rebutted	  Roj	  TV’s	  claims	  by	  citing	  the	  Treaty’s	  derogation	  clause	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  their	  actions;	  they	  contended	  that	  the	  national	  laws	  governing	  the	  constitutionally	  enshrined	  right	  to	  association	  were	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  Directive’s	  obligations	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  public	  interest.	  The	  German	  Federal	  Administrative	  Court	  referred	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  ECJ.	  	  
The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Referred	  to	  the	  Court	  	  1. “Does,	  and	  if	  so,	  under	  what	  circumstances,	  national	  legislation	  concerning	  the	  prohibition	  of	  an	  association	  for	  infringement	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  international	  understanding	  fall	  within	  the	  field	  coordinated	  by	  the	  Directive,	  and	  is	  thus	  precluded	  by	  Article	  2a	  of	  the	  Directive?”353	  	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  	   The	  Court	  first	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  content	  of	  Roj	  TV’s	  broadcasts	  are	  in	  violation	  of	  Article	  22(1)’s	  provisions	  regarding	  the	  “incitement	  of	  hatred.”	  Citing	  the	  EU	  Commission’s	  drafting	  process,	  the	  Court	  contends	  that	  Article	  22(1)	  was	  inserted	  to	  with	  “public	  order	  considerations,”354	  in	  mind,	  and	  was	  “designed	  to	  forestall	  any	  ideology	  which	  fails	  to	  respect	  human	  values,	  in	  particular	  initiatives	  which	  attempt	  to	  justify	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violence.”355	  The	  Court	  validates	  Germany’s	  claim	  that	  Roj	  TV	  “plays	  a	  role	  in	  stirring	  up	  violent	  confrontations	  between	  persons	  of	  Turkish	  and	  Kurdish	  origins,”356	  and	  subsequently	  rules	  that	  Roj	  TV’s	  broadcasts	  are	  in	  violation	  of	  Article	  22(1)	  of	  the	  Directive.	  	  	   The	  Court	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  address	  whether	  or	  not	  Germany’s	  Public	  Law	  on	  Association,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  its	  Constitutional	  Law,	  violates	  Article	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Directive,	  which	  prohibits	  discriminatory	  retransmissions	  of	  broadcasts.	  Citing	  its	  precedent	  in	  De	  
Agostini	  (1995)	  and	  TV-­‐Shop	  (1995),	  the	  Court	  notes	  that	  the	  Directive	  “does	  not	  in	  principle	  preclude	  the	  application	  of	  national	  rules	  with	  the	  general	  aim	  of	  consumer	  protection,”357	  insofar	  as	  such	  a	  law	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  retransmission	  of	  television	  programs	  from	  other	  Member	  States.	  The	  Court	  buttresses	  this	  claim	  by	  also	  citing	  Recital	  8	  of	  the	  Directive’s	  preamble	  which	  states,	  	  “the	  broadcasting	  and	  distribution	  of	  television	  services	  is	  also	  a	  specific	  manifestation	  of	  a	  more	  general	  principle,	  namely	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression	  as	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  10(1)	  of	  the	  ECHR…Furthermore,	  it	  follows	  from	  Article	  6(2)	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  to	  respect	  the	  rights,	  freedoms,	  and	  principles	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights…so	  that	  any	  measure	  aimed	  at	  restricting	  the	  reception	  and/or	  suspending	  the	  retransmission	  of	  television	  broadcasts	  must	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  abovementioned	  principles.”358	  	  Given	  its	  past	  case	  law	  and	  this	  preamble,	  the	  Court	  questions	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  German	  law	  on	  associations	  is	  compatible	  with	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  association	  guarantees.	  The	  Court	  notes	  that	  the	  national	  legislation	  “concerns	  only	  the	  activities	  of	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associations	  in	  general,”359	  and	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  specifically	  prevent	  the	  retransmission	  of	  Roj	  TV’s	  transnational	  television	  broadcasts.	  Rather,	  the	  national	  provisions	  prohibit	  Roj	  TV’s	  activities	  in	  Germany	  in	  its	  capacity	  as	  an	  association,	  which	  limits	  screening	  in	  public,	  German	  spaces.360	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  “the	  reception	  and	  private	  use	  of	  Roj	  TV’s	  programs	  is	  not	  prohibited	  and	  remains	  in	  fact	  possible	  in	  practice.”361As	  such,	  Germany’s	  law	  does	  not	  “constitute	  an	  obstacle	  to	  retransmissions,”362	  as	  precluded	  by	  Article	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Directive.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  judgment	  requires	  the	  national	  court	  verify	  whether	  the	  national	  provision	  violates	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  provide	  services	  by	  preventing	  “retransmissions	  per	  se	  in	  the	  Member	  State	  receiving	  the	  broadcasts.”363	  	  
Analysis	  	  As	  seen	  by	  judgments	  spanning	  the	  time	  of	  Cinetheque	  to	  that	  of	  Schmidberger,	  the	  Court	  has	  preferred	  to	  take	  a	  “hands	  off	  attitude”364	  when	  assessing	  the	  rights	  violation	  at	  hand,	  unless	  prompted	  otherwise	  by	  a	  litigating	  party	  or	  the	  referring	  national	  court.	  However,	  Roj	  TV	  departs	  from	  this	  observed	  trend.	  In	  their	  judgment,	  the	  ECJ	  cites	  Recital	  8	  of	  the	  Directive’s	  preamble	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  their	  assertion	  that	  it	  is	  obligated	  assess	  the	  national	  legislation	  from	  a	  human	  rights	  perspective	  as	  well.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Roj	  TV	  coheres	  to	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  By	  contending	  that	  freedom	  of	  expression	  serves	  as	  a	  self-­‐justifiable,	  interpretative	  principle	  due	  to	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter365,	  the	  Court	  expands	  the	  policy	  domains	  within	  which	  supranational	  rights	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guarantees	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  “an	  invalidating	  function”	  366	  for	  national	  measures.	  Thus,	  Roj	  
TV	  illustrates	  how	  Court’s	  jurisprudence	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  drive	  forward	  the	  dynamics	  of	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover.	  This	  is	  because,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  Charter’s	  acquisition	  of	  Treaty-­‐level	  status,	  fundamental	  rights	  can	  be	  more	  elastically	  deployed	  as	  an	  integrative	  tool	  in	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning.	  	  However,	  Roj	  TV	  is	  notable	  in	  that,	  insomuch	  as	  it	  illustrates	  the	  Charter’s	  creation	  of	  an	  integrative	  impulse,	  it	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  limits	  can	  be	  consciously	  placed	  on	  the	  integrative	  effects	  that	  such	  an	  impulse	  would	  have	  otherwise.	  At	  the	  substantive,	  jurisprudential	  level,	  Roj	  TV	  fails	  to	  exhibit	  the	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover.	  Recall	  that,	  in	  their	  judgment,	  the	  Court	  acknowledges	  that	  Germany’s	  law	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  retransmissions	  of	  television	  broadcasts	  from	  other	  Member	  States,	  a	  violation	  of	  both	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services	  and	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  Despite	  this	  admission,	  the	  Court	  awards	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  discretion	  to	  the	  German	  Court	  in	  concluding	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  discriminatory	  effects	  are	  to	  be	  observed,	  and	  it	  fails	  to	  provide	  the	  national	  judiciary	  with	  any	  concrete	  framework	  under	  which	  such	  determinations	  are	  to	  be	  made.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  creates	  the	  possibility	  for	  supranational	  harmonization	  to	  occur	  only	  potentially.	  As	  such,	  the	  judgment	  will	  have	  a	  normative	  impact	  on	  Germany’s	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees	  only	  if	  the	  German	  court	  determines	  there	  to	  be	  a	  casual	  connection	  between	  a	  bias	  in	  transnational	  television	  retransmissions	  and	  the	  national	  policy.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  integrative	  outcome	  of	  Roj	  TV	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  ERT.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  Court	  leaves	  it	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  national	  court	  to	  determine	  whether	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or	  not	  remedial	  action	  is	  necessary	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees.	  At	  this	  juncture,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  underscore	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  cases	  are	  twenty	  years	  apart.	  Given	  that	  neo-­‐functionalism	  posits	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  integration	  and	  time,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  Court	  take	  a	  far	  less	  deferential	  approach	  in	  Roj	  TV.	  In	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  Roj	  TV	  stands	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  Familiapress,	  where	  the	  Court	  imposed	  on	  the	  Austrian	  national	  court	  the	  very	  cumbersome	  task	  of	  conducting	  extensive	  market	  research	  as	  a	  means	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  national	  legislation	  in	  question	  did	  not	  violate	  non-­‐market	  and	  market	  rights.	  	  What	  explains	  the	  Court’s	  contrasting	  approaches	  in	  deploying	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality?	  A	  plausible	  explanation	  is	  that,	  in	  Familiapress,	  the	  Austrian	  law	  placed	  a	  far	  more	  explicit	  burden	  on	  the	  market	  freedoms	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression	  claims	  when	  compared	  to	  contested	  national	  provisions	  at	  stake	  in	  Roj	  TV.	  In	  fact,	  in	  Roj	  TV,	  the	  Court	  itself	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  national	  legislation	  in	  question	  does	  not,	  at	  least	  on	  face	  value,	  impede	  intra-­‐Community	  trade	  in	  the	  manner	  precluded	  by	  Article	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Directive.	  Given	  the	  Union’s	  commitment	  to	  economic	  integration,	  it	  seems	  logical	  that	  this	  reality,	  in	  the	  factual	  context	  of	  Roj	  TV,	  motivates	  the	  Court	  to	  award	  the	  national	  judiciary	  much	  deference	  in	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  remedial	  action	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  necessary.	  Thus,	  Roj	  TV	  indicates	  that,	  even	  with	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter,	  the	  Court	  chooses	  to	  “not	  always	  interfere	  with	  the	  actual	  merits	  of	  the	  policy	  pursued,”	  367	  leaving	  “considerable	  latitude	  to	  the	  state	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  devices.”368	  This	  tendency	  seems	  to	  be	  especially	  pronounced	  when	  the	  Court	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  assess	  the	  congruency	  between	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a	  Community	  obligation	  and	  that	  of	  a	  national	  constitutional	  norm,	  such	  as	  law	  on	  association,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  Roj	  TV	  and	  Schmidberger.	  	  4.3	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  v.	  SABAM	  (2011)	  	  	  Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  
	   From	  the	  outset,	  it	  should	  be	  established	  that	  this	  case	  deals	  with	  freedom	  of	  expression	  as	  it	  manifests	  itself	  in	  data	  protection.	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  is	  an	  Internet	  service	  provider	  (ISP),	  providing	  its	  customers	  with	  access	  to	  the	  Internet	  without	  offering	  other	  services,	  such	  as	  file	  sharing	  or	  file	  downloading.	  Sabam	  is	  a	  Belgian	  management	  company,	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  authorizing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  musical	  works	  of	  authors,	  composers,	  and	  editors	  by	  third	  parties.	  In	  2004,	  Sabam	  learned	  that	  users	  of	  Scarlet’s	  services	  were	  downloading	  works	  from	  Sabam’s	  catalogue	  by	  means	  of	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  networks	  (also	  known	  as	  torrents)	  without	  authorization	  and	  without	  paying	  royalties.	  As	  such,	  Sabam	  brought	  interlocutory	  proceedings	  against	  Scarlet	  before	  the	  highest	  Court	  in	  Brussels,	  “claiming	  that	  the	  company	  was	  the	  best	  place,	  as	  an	  ISP,	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  bring	  to	  an	  end	  copyright	  infringements	  committed	  by	  its	  customers”369	  Upon	  application	  from	  Sabam,	  the	  Belgian	  Court	  ordered	  Scarlet	  to	  bring	  such	  copyright	  infringements	  to	  an	  end	  by	  making	  it	  impossible	  for	  its	  customers	  to	  send	  or	  receive,	  in	  any	  way,	  electronic	  files	  containing	  a	  musical	  work	  in	  Sabam’s	  repertoire.	  It	  cited	  the	  national	  legislation	  implementing	  Article	  8(3)	  Directive	  2001/29	  (Information	  Society	  Directive),	  which	  enables	  “holders	  of	  intellectual	  property	  right	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  injunction	  against	  intermediaries,	  such	  as	  ISPS,	  whose	  services	  are	  being	  used	  by	  a	  third	  party	  to	  infringe	  their	  rights.”	  Additionally,	  it	  deferred	  to	  Article	  11	  of	  Directive	  2004/48	  (Copyright	  Enforcement),	  which	  states	  “Member	  States	  shall	  ensure	  that,	  where	  a	  judicial	  decision	  is	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taken	  finding	  any	  infringement	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  the	  judicial	  authorities	  may	  issue	  the	  infringer	  an	  injunction	  aimed	  at	  prohibiting	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  infringement.”	  Both	  of	  these	  Directives’	  preambles	  emphasize	  the	  ensuring	  the	  rights	  set	  forth	  by	  Article	  17(2)	  of	  the	  Charter	  regarding	  the	  right	  to	  intellectual	  property.	  	  	  	   Scarlet	  appealed	  to	  Belgian	  court,	  making	  four	  claims:	  1)	  That	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  ruling’s	  injunction	  since	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  permanence	  of	  filtering	  and	  blocking	  systems	  had	  not	  been	  proved,	  and	  that	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  equipment	  for	  doing	  so	  was	  faced	  with	  numerous	  practical	  obstacles,	  such	  as	  problems	  with	  the	  network	  capacity	  and	  impact	  on	  the	  network.	  As	  such,	  the	  injunction	  would	  violate	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  Charter	  regarding	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  2)	  Any	  attempt	  to	  block	  the	  files	  concerned	  was	  doomed	  to	  fail	  in	  the	  short	  term	  because	  there	  were	  several	  peer-­‐peer	  software	  products,	  which	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  third	  parties	  to	  check	  their	  content.	  3)	  The	  injunction	  was	  contrary	  to	  Directive	  2000/31	  (E-­‐Commerce	  Directive),	  which	  states	  “Member	  States	  are	  prevented	  from	  imposing	  a	  monitoring	  obligation	  on	  service	  providers	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  obligations	  of	  a	  general	  nature.”370	  4)	  The	  injunction	  also	  violated	  Directive	  2002/58	  (E-­‐Privacy),	  which	  prevents	  the	  processing	  of	  personal	  data	  and	  ensures	  that	  the	  individual’s	  right	  to	  privacy	  and	  protection	  of	  personal	  data	  are	  not	  compromised,	  as	  stipulated	  by	  Article	  7	  and	  8	  of	  the	  Charter.	  5)	  The	  proposed	  filtering	  system	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  violate	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  Charter	  regarding	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  to	  impart	  information	  because	  it	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  lawful	  and	  unlawful	  content	  	  	  	   Given	  that	  both	  litigating	  parties	  cited	  Community	  law	  as	  justification	  for	  their	  respective	  claims,	  the	  Belgian	  Court	  referred	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  ECJ.	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The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Referred	  to	  the	  Court	  	  1. Do	  Directive	  2001/29	  (Information	  Society	  Directive)	  and	  Directive	  2004/48	  (Copyright	  Enforcement	  Directive),	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Directive	  2000/31	  (E-­‐Commerce	  Directive),	  and	  construed	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Articles	  8	  and	  10	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  permit	  a	  Member	  States	  to	  authorize	  a	  national	  court,	  before	  which	  substantive	  proceedings	  have	  been	  brought	  to	  do	  the	  following:	  1)	  To	  issue	  an	  injunction	  against	  intermediaries	  whose	  services	  are	  used	  by	  a	  third	  party	  to	  infringe	  a	  copyright	  or	  related	  right	  2)	  To	  order	  an	  ISP	  to	  install,	  for	  all	  of	  its	  customers,	  as	  a	  preventative	  measure,	  exclusively	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  that	  ISP	  3)	  and	  for	  an	  unlimited	  period	  of	  time,	  a	  system	  for	  filtering	  all	  electronic	  communications,	  both	  incoming	  and	  outgoing…	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  on	  its	  network	  the	  movement	  of	  electronic	  files	  containing	  ...works	  of	  which	  the	  applicant	  claims	  to	  hold	  rights?371	  	  2. If	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  is	  in	  the	  affirmative,	  do	  these	  directive	  require	  a	  national	  court	  to	  impose	  such	  filtering	  obligations	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  when	  deciding	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  dissuasive	  effect	  of	  the	  measures	  sought?372	  	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  
	   The	  Court	  begins	  its	  ruling	  by	  validating	  Sabam’s	  legal	  justification	  for	  the	  injunction.	  It	  finds	  that	  the	  relevant	  articles	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Enforcement	  Directive,	  enable	  holders	  of	  intellectual	  property	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  injunction	  against	  intermediaries,	  such	  as	  ISPS,	  whose	  services	  are	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being	  used	  by	  a	  third	  party	  to	  infringe	  their	  rights.373	  The	  Court	  declares,	  “The	  rules	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  injunctions…are	  a	  matter	  for	  national	  law.”374	  Citing	  its	  precedent	  in	  
L’Oreal	  and	  Others	  (2009),	  the	  Court	  asserts	  that	  such	  national	  rules	  respect	  the	  limitations	  arising	  from	  European	  Union	  law.	  In	  particular,	  the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive,	  which	  prohibits	  Member	  States	  from	  adopting	  measures	  requiring	  an	  ISP	  to	  carry	  out	  general	  monitoring	  of	  the	  information	  that	  it	  transmits	  on	  its	  network.	  375	  	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  examines	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  national	  injunction	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive.376	  The	  Court	  thoroughly	  enumerates	  the	  various	  actions	  that	  Scarlet	  would	  be	  required	  to	  undertake	  if	  such	  an	  injunction	  is	  validated.377	  It	  concludes	  that,	  in	  light	  of	  its	  findings,	  “the	  injunction	  would	  require	  the	  ISP	  to	  carry	  out	  general	  monitoring,	  something	  which	  is	  prohibited	  by	  the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive”378	  	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  of	  the	  judgment	  that	  the	  Court	  incorporates	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  into	  their	  legal	  reasoning.	  The	  Court	  states	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  injunction	  “must	  also	  be	  taken	  of	  the	  requirements	  that	  stem	  from	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  applicable	  fundamental	  rights,	  such	  as	  those	  mentioned	  by	  the	  referring	  Court.”379	  Given	  the	  competing	  rights	  claims	  cited	  by	  both	  litigating	  parties,	  the	  Court	  declares	  that	  “a	  fair	  balance	  between	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  intellectual	  property	  right	  enjoyed	  by	  copyright	  holders	  and	  that	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  enjoyed	  by…	  ISPs	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  Charter,”380is	  necessary.	  Citing	  its	  precedent	  in	  Promusicae	  (2008),	  the	  Court	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asserts	  that	  national	  legislators	  and	  courts	  are	  responsible	  for	  such	  a	  balance.381	  However,	  the	  Court	  also	  contends	  that	  it	  maintai-­‐ns	  enough	  knowledge	  of	  the	  facts	  to	  partake	  in	  such	  a	  judgment	  exercise	  as	  well.	  	  It	  concludes	  that,	  because	  “the	  monitoring	  has	  no	  limitation	  in	  time,	  is	  directed	  at	  all	  future	  infringements	  and	  is	  intended	  to	  protect	  not	  only	  existing	  works,	  but	  also	  future	  works	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  created,”382	  “such	  an	  injunction	  would	  result	  in	  a	  serious	  infringement	  of	  freedom	  of	  the	  ISP	  to	  conduct	  its	  business.”383	  As	  such,	  the	  national	  injunction	  “is	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  not	  respecting	  the	  requirement	  that	  a	  fair	  balance	  be	  struck,”384	  for	  it	  exerts	  a	  disproportionate	  burden	  on	  Scarlet’s	  pursuit	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  business,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  Charter.	  The	  Court	  also	  justifies	  its	  reasoning	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  injunction	  “may	  also	  infringe	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  that	  ISP’s	  customers,	  namely	  their	  right	  to	  protection	  of	  their	  personal	  data	  and	  their	  freedom	  to	  receive	  or	  impart	  information,	  which	  are	  rights	  safeguard	  by	  Articles	  8	  and	  Articles	  11	  of	  the	  Charter	  respectively.”385	  This	  is	  because	  the	  injunction	  would	  involve	  a	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  all	  content	  and	  the	  collection	  an	  identification	  of	  users’	  IP	  addressed,	  which	  are	  protected	  as	  personal	  data.386	  Similarly,	  the	  injunction	  could	  potentially	  undermine	  freedom	  of	  information	  since	  that	  system	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  unlawful	  content	  and	  lawful	  content.387	  	  Consequently,	  the	  Court	  finds	  that	  Belgium’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  injunction	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive,	  and	  that	  it	  violates	  Articles	  17,	  Articles	  8,	  and	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Articles	  11	  of	  the	  Charter.	  As	  such,	  the	  Court’s	  reply	  is	  that	  EU	  law	  precludes	  an	  injunction	  requiring	  an	  ISP	  to	  install	  such	  an	  extensive	  filtering	  system.	  	  
Analysis	  	  	   Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  reflects	  the	  ongoing	  tension	  among	  legislators	  and	  courts	  in	  balancing	  copyright	  with	  networks	  commercial	  interest	  and	  customers’	  freedoms.	  	  By	  ruling	  that	  ISP	  filtering	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enforcing	  copyright	  is	  contrary	  to	  Community	  law,	  the	  Court	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  copyright	  holders	  to	  enforce	  their	  rights.	  The	  inverse	  effects	  of	  the	  decision	  have	  been	  welcomed	  as	  a	  ruling	  guaranteeing	  a	  free	  and	  open	  Internet	  throughout	  Europe.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  other	  cases	  examined	  in	  that	  its	  immediate	  consequences	  are	  more	  pronounced.	  Several	  Member	  States’,	  such	  as	  Italy,	  Ireland,	  and	  the	  UK,	  have	  proposed	  measures	  based	  on	  filtering	  technologies	  to	  ensure	  copyright	  protection,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  national	  judicial	  rulings	  have	  dealt	  with	  such	  requirements.	  These	  national	  decisions	  will	  now	  have	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment.	  Member	  States	  may	  no	  longer	  require	  as	  extensive	  filtering	  systems	  as	  the	  one	  that	  was	  to	  be	  imposed	  on	  Scarlet,	  and	  if	  a	  Member	  State	  conceives	  of	  a	  less	  extensive	  filtering	  system,	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  makes	  clear	  that	  it	  must	  nevertheless	  respect	  the	  freedom	  of	  conduct	  a	  business,	  the	  protection	  of	  personal	  data,	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  impart	  information.388	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  illustrates	  that	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  can,	  in	  fact,	  result	  in	  a	  significant	  displacement	  of	  nationally	  conceived	  rights-­‐oriented	  norms,	  just	  as	  political	  spillover	  posits.	  Such	  outcomes	  have	  not	  been	  identifiable	  in	  previous	  cases	  this	  thesis	  has	  assessed.	  This	  judgment	  also	  seems	  to	  validate	  Weiler’s	  assertion	  that	  “drafting	  a	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new	  charter,	  it	  was	  said,	  would	  give	  the	  chance	  of	  introducing	  much	  needed	  innovation	  to	  our	  constitutional	  norms	  that	  were	  shaped	  by	  aging	  constitution	  and	  international	  treaties.”389	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  Court’s	  deployment	  of	  the	  Charter	  as	  a	  standard	  of	  review	  resulted	  in	  strengthening	  rights	  protections	  at	  the	  transnational	  level	  in	  novel	  domains,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Internet.	  	  	   The	  Court’s	  employment	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  is	  also	  notable.	  The	  Court	  cites	  its	  precedent	  in	  Promusicae	  (2008),	  asserting	  that	  national	  courts	  are	  entitled	  to	  “strike	  a	  fair	  balance	  between	  the	  protection	  of	  copyright	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  such	  measures.”390However,	  the	  Court	  circumvents	  the	  precedent’s	  mandate,	  proceeding	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  in	  an	  intrusive	  manner.	  As	  it	  did	  in	  Schmidberger	  and	  Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  thoroughly	  considers	  all	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  as	  a	  means	  of	  validating	  the	  national	  courts	  own	  value	  judgment.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  doing	  so,	  the	  Court	  asserts	  that	  the	  Belgian	  court	  failed	  to	  properly	  take	  into	  account	  the	  injunctions	  potential	  ability	  to	  infringe	  on	  third-­‐party	  customer’s	  right	  to	  protection	  of	  personal	  data	  and	  to	  receive	  and	  impart	  information,	  a	  direct	  violation	  of	  Articles	  8	  and	  11	  of	  the	  Charter	  respectively.	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  imposed	  on	  the	  Member	  State’s	  national	  measure	  an	  additional	  standard	  of	  rights	  protection	  it	  was	  to	  guarantee	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  valid.	  This	  signals	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdictional	  limits	  (functional	  spillover),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  deference	  the	  Court	  awards	  to	  the	  national	  court	  in	  remedying	  a	  rights	  violation	  (political	  spillover).	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It	  is	  also	  worth	  underscoring	  that	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  serves	  as	  another	  example	  of	  how	  the	  Charter	  expands	  the	  Court’s	  ability	  to	  advance	  integration	  within	  the	  legal	  realm.	  The	  Court	  considers	  a	  myriad	  of	  rights	  when	  adjudicating,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  property,	  the	  protection	  of	  personal	  data,	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business,	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  to	  impart	  information.	  Whereas	  some	  of	  these	  rights	  are	  stipulated	  within	  the	  contested	  Directives’	  preambles,	  others	  (specifically,	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression)	  are	  invoked	  by	  one	  of	  the	  litigating	  parties	  and	  the	  national	  court	  at	  their	  own	  accord.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  “the	  Charter	  has	  improved	  the	  centrality	  and	  weight	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  reinforcing	  both	  their	  visibility	  in	  the	  legal	  discourse	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  their	  roles	  as	  parameters	  of	  constitutionality.”391	  	  4.4	  Sky	  Osterreich	  GmbH	  v.	  Osterreichischer	  Rundfunk	  (2013)	  	  
Facts	  of	  the	  Case	  	  	   Article	  15	  of	  Directive	  2010/13	  (Audiovisual	  Media	  Services	  Directive)	  allows	  television	  channel	  operators	  to	  acquire	  exclusive	  broadcasting	  rights	  for	  events	  of	  high	  public	  interest.	  However,	  other	  channels	  must	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  access	  such	  events	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  short	  new	  reports.	  As	  such,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  exclusive	  right	  must	  provide	  other	  broadcasts	  with	  access	  to	  its	  signal	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  freely	  choose	  the	  short	  extracts	  they	  desire	  for	  their	  brief	  television	  reports.	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Directive	  permits	  that	  owners	  maintain	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  be	  compensated	  for	  access	  to	  their	  signal,	  but	  that	  this	  compensation	  may	  not	  exceed	  the	  additional	  costs	  directly	  incurred	  by	  the	  owner	  in	  providing	  that	  access.	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   In	  2009,	  the	  television	  channel	  Sky	  Osterreich	  acquired	  by	  legal	  contract	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  broadcast	  Europa	  Soccer	  League	  matches	  in	  the	  2009/2010	  and	  2011/2012	  seasons	  in	  Austria	  territory.	  KommAustria,	  Austria’s	  regulatory	  audiovisual	  media	  authority,	  authorized	  Sky	  Osterreich	  to	  broadcast	  via	  satellite	  the	  soccer	  games	  on	  television.	  Ossterreichischer	  Rundfunk	  (ORF)	  is	  Austria’s	  public	  broadcaster.	  In	  2010,	  ORF	  entered	  into	  an	  agreement	  with	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  who	  granted	  ORF	  the	  right	  to	  produce	  short	  news	  report,	  provided	  that	  ORF	  compensated	  Sky	  Osterreich	  with	  the	  payment	  of	  700	  euro	  per	  minute	  of	  such	  reports.	  Such	  an	  agreement	  was	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  5	  of	  Austria’s	  Federal	  Law	  on	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Exclusive	  Broadcasting	  Rights;	  this	  law	  was	  Austria’s	  national	  response	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  EU’s	  Audiovisual	  Service	  Media	  Directive.	  	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  KommAustria	  determined	  that	  ORF	  did	  not	  need	  to	  grant	  monetary	  compensation	  to	  Sky	  Osterreich	  when	  utilizing	  its	  video	  clips	  to	  produce	  short	  news	  reports	  because	  the	  operational	  costs	  Sky	  Osterreich	  incurred	  in	  providing	  ORF	  with	  access	  to	  its	  satellite	  signal	  were	  non-­‐existent.	  ORF	  and	  KommAustria	  cited	  the	  explicit	  wording	  of	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Directive	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  their	  claim.	  Sky	  Osterreich	  contested	  the	  Directive’s	  financial	  conditions,	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  had	  no	  control	  in	  determining	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  providing	  other	  broadcasters	  with	  access	  to	  its	  satellite	  signals.	  Sky	  Osterreich	  also	  asserted	  that	  KommAustira	  and	  ORF	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  millions	  of	  euros	  it	  spends	  every	  year	  in	  acquiring	  such	  exclusive	  licensing	  and	  production.	  Furthermore,	  Sky	  Osterreich	  contended	  that	  because	  it	  had	  entered	  into	  a	  contract	  with	  ORF	  prior	  to	  the	  Directive’s	  implementation,	  the	  debate	  over	  remuneration	  had	  no	  legal	  basis.	  Finally,	  because	  the	  contract	  had	  codified	  such	  broadcasting	  licensing	  as	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an	  asset,	  Sky	  Osterreich	  claimed	  that	  Article	  15(6)	  of	  the	  Directive	  violated	  both	  his	  right	  to	  property	  and	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business,	  as	  laid	  down	  by	  Article	  17	  and	  16	  of	  the	  Charter	  respectively.	  Neither	  litigating	  party	  invoked	  freedom	  of	  expression	  claims.	  	  
The	  Preliminary	  Question(s)	  Referred	  to	  the	  Court	  1. Is	  Article	  15(6)	  of	  Directive	  2010/13	  compatible	  with	  Articles	  16	  and	  17	  of	  the	  Charter?392	  	  
The	  Court’s	  Ruling	  	  
	   The	  Court	  first	  assesses	  the	  admissibility	  of	  Sky’s	  claim	  that	  KommAustria	  and	  ORF	  maintain	  no	  legal	  basis	  for	  their	  denial	  of	  remuneration	  because	  their	  contract	  with	  Sky	  Osterreich	  precedes	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Directive.	  The	  Court	  notes	  that,	  when	  Sky	  Osterreich	  entered	  into	  its	  contract	  with	  ORF	  in	  2009,	  the	  requirements	  of	  Directive	  2007/65	  (a	  former	  edition	  of	  the	  Audiovisual	  Media	  Directive)	  were	  already	  in	  entered	  into	  force,	  and	  contained	  provisions	  matching	  Article	  15(6)	  of	  the	  current	  in	  question.393	  As	  such,	  Sky	  Osterreich	  cannot	  circumvent	  the	  requirements	  of	  Article	  15(6)	  based	  on	  the	  established	  legal	  position	  his	  contractual	  clause	  awarded	  him.	  By	  extension,	  the	  Court	  rules	  that	  Sky	  Osterreich’s	  right	  to	  property,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Charter,	  had	  not	  been	  violated.394	  	  	   The	  Court	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  determine	  the	  compatibility	  of	  Article	  15(6)	  of	  the	  Directive	  with	  Article	  17	  of	  the	  Charter,	  regarding	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  business.	  The	  Court	  agrees	  with	  Sky	  Osterreich’s	  argument	  that	  because	  it	  “cannot	  decided	  freely	  on	  the	  price	  to	  be	  charged	  for	  access	  to	  the	  signal	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  short	  news	  reports,”395	  the	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provision	  in	  dispute	  “amounts	  to	  an	  interference	  with	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  of	  holders	  of	  exclusive	  broadcasting	  rights.”396	  However,	  the	  Court	  notes	  “the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  is	  not	  absolute,	  but	  must	  be	  viewed	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  social	  function…may	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  interventions	  on	  the	  public	  authorities	  which	  may	  limit	  the	  exercise	  of	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  public	  interest.”397	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  Court	  notes	  that	  Article	  52(1)	  of	  the	  Charter	  requires	  “the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  to	  be	  implemented,”398	  as	  a	  means	  of	  assessing	  whether	  or	  not	  Article	  15(6)	  of	  the	  Directive	  causes	  a	  disproportionate	  burden	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  	  The	  Court	  notes	  that	  the	  EU	  legislature	  was	  aware	  that	  “the	  marketing	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	  of	  events	  of	  high	  interest	  to	  the	  public	  is…liable	  to	  restrict	  considerably	  the	  access	  of	  information	  relating	  to	  those	  events.”399	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  argues	  that	  the	  EU	  legislature	  inserted	  Article	  15(6)	  into	  the	  Directive	  as	  a	  means	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  freedom	  to	  receive	  and	  to	  impart	  information	  is	  protected.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  provision	  “puts	  any	  broadcaster	  in	  the	  position	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  short	  news	  reports	  and	  thus	  to	  inform	  the	  general	  public…	  irrespective	  of	  their	  commercial	  power	  and	  financial	  capacity.”400	  The	  Court	  also	  justifies	  its	  interpretation	  of	  the	  EU	  legislature’s	  intentions	  by	  citing	  Recital	  48	  of	  the	  Directive’s	  preamble;	  it	  reads,	  “…to	  promote	  pluralism	  through	  the	  diversity	  of	  news	  production	  and	  programming	  across	  the	  EU	  and	  to	  respect	  the	  principles	  recognized	  by	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  Charter.”	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The	  Court	  then	  notes	  that	  the	  Directive	  maintains	  several	  other	  clauses	  (e.g.	  Article	  15[3],	  Article	  15[5])	  which	  strive	  to	  offset	  the	  burden	  Article	  15(6)	  places	  on	  the	  broadcaster’s	  ability	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  As	  such,	  the	  Court	  rules	  that	  Article	  15(6)’s	  infringement	  of	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  “is	  appropriate”401	  and	  that,	  “it	  is	  apparent	  that	  less	  restrictive	  legislation	  would	  not	  achieve	  the	  objective	  pursued	  by	  Article	  15(6).”402	  Consequently,	  the	  Court	  finds	  that	  the	  contested	  Directive,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  national	  legislation	  in	  question,	  is	  proportional	  in	  its	  balancing	  between	  the	  guarantees	  of	  Article	  11	  and	  Article	  17	  of	  the	  Charter.	  	  As	  such,	  Sky	  Osterreich’s	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  and	  right	  to	  property	  were	  not	  violated.	  	  
Analysis	  	  	  	   Sky	  Osterreich	  is	  similar	  to	  Familiapress	  and	  Scarlett	  Extended	  SA	  in	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  confronted	  with	  assessing	  several	  competing	  fundamental	  rights	  guarantees.	  The	  ECJ	  must	  check	  whether	  the	  Directive	  strikes	  a	  fair	  balance	  between	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  freedom	  of	  citizens	  to	  receive	  and	  impart	  information	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  media	  pluralism	  on	  the	  other.403	  	   The	  Court	  concludes	  that	  ensuring	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  media	  pluralism	  warrants	  the	  burden	  the	  Directive	  places	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  The	  Court	  justifies	  its	  invocation	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  by	  quoting	  Recital	  48	  of	  the	  Directive’s	  preamble,	  which	  explicitly	  cites	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  Charter.	  Thus,	  “the	  fact	  that	  these	  interests	  [freedom	  of	  expression]	  are	  recognized	  by	  the	  Charter	  is	  an	  extra	  reason	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  take	  them	  seriously”404when	  adjudicating.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  401	  Paragraph	  53	  402	  Paragraph	  54	  403	  Paragraph	  59	  	  404	  Hins,	  Wouter.	  "The	  Freedom	  to	  Conduct	  a	  Business	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Receive	  Information	  for	  Free:	  Sky	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This	  logic	  is	  observable	  in	  not	  only	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  but	  also	  in	  Roj	  TV	  and	  Scarlet	  
Extended	  SA.	  In	  both	  of	  these	  former	  cases,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  is	  explicitly	  informed	  by	  various	  rights	  guarantees,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  cited	  in	  the	  Directive’s	  preambles.	  Furthermore,	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  Court	  awards	  remedial	  action	  towards	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees	  despite	  fact	  that	  neither	  the	  referring	  national	  court,	  nor	  the	  litigating	  parties	  invoked	  the	  right	  as	  an	  established	  legal	  position.	  In	  this	  connection,	  Sky	  
Osterreich	  confirms	  a	  trend	  that	  has	  remained	  constant	  throughout	  the	  case	  studies	  examined	  post-­‐2009:	  the	  Charter’s	  legal	  ratification	  expands	  the	  Court’s	  mandate	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review,	  and	  it	  enables	  rights	  to	  acquire	  a	  self-­‐justifiable	  legal	  position	  with	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order.	  Both	  of	  these	  observable	  outcomes	  are	  indicative	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  	  
Sky	  Osterreich	  also	  exhibits	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  spillover.	  The	  Court	  makes	  “a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  assessment	  of	  the	  proportionality	  of	  the	  restriction	  under	  Article	  52(1)	  of	  the	  Charter,”405	  before	  concluding	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  Directive	  (and	  by	  extension	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees)	  with	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  The	  Court’s	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  Directive’s	  codification	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Charter.	  Roj	  TV	  and	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  also	  exhibited	  similar	  legal	  reasoning;	  recall	  that	  the	  Court’s	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  was	  conditioned	  by	  the	  Directive’s	  citation	  of	  the	  Charter.	  In	  this	  connection,	  references	  to	  the	  Charter	  in	  EU	  legislation	  create	  far	  more	  opportunities	  for	  transnational,	  normative	  harmonization	  to	  emerge	  within	  national	  legal	  orders.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Directive’s	  codification	  of	  rights	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  more	  elastically	  deploy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Osterreich."	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  51,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  665-­‐78.	  P675	  405	  Ibid.	  P666	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such	  rights	  as	  additional	  standards	  of	  legality.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this,	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  can	  institutionalize	  the	  Charter’s	  supranational	  rights	  within	  the	  national	  policy	  domains	  governed	  by	  the	  Directive.	  Such	  an	  outcome	  coheres	  with	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  political	  spillover.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  EU	  citizens	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  is	  ensured	  by	  securing	  media	  plurality	  as	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  enabling	  television	  broadcasters	  to	  create	  short	  news	  reports	  of	  popular	  events,	  even	  if	  a	  corporation	  maintains	  a	  monopoly	  of	  such	  exclusive	  broadcasting	  rights.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Sky	  Osterreich	  displaced	  not	  only	  Austria’s	  national	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business,	  but	  also	  Germany’s.	  In	  1988,	  the	  Germany	  Constitutional	  Court	  decided	  that	  a	  law	  allowing	  broadcasters	  to	  transmit	  short	  television	  reports	  of	  important	  news	  events	  without	  having	  to	  pay	  compensation	  infringed	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business,	  as	  enshrined	  by	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  German	  Constitution.	  In	  2006,	  the	  Austrian	  Constitutional	  Court	  made	  a	  comparable	  decision.	  “The	  ECJ	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  this	  history,	  but	  one	  could	  expect	  that	  testing	  the	  EU	  directive	  against	  the	  Charter	  would	  give	  the	  same	  result	  as	  testing	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  law”406	  against	  their	  Constitutions.	  However,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  seen,	  “The	  ECJ	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Germany	  and	  Austrian	  constitutional	  Courts.”407On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  concludes	  that	  denial	  of	  remuneration	  under	  Article	  15(6)	  of	  the	  Directive	  is	  justified	  in	  its	  restriction	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  ensuring	  media	  plurality	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  Thus,	  Sky	  Osterreich	  is	  similar	  to	  
Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  in	  that	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  normatively	  impacted	  the	  Member	  States’	  remedial	  action	  towards	  the	  right	  in	  question.	  Whereas	  in	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA,	  the	  Court’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  406	  Ibid.	  	  407	  Ibid.	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judgment	  requires	  Member	  States	  to	  revisit	  national	  legislation	  requiring	  ISP	  filterating	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  ensuring	  freedom	  of	  expression	  (among	  other	  rights),	  in	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  altered	  Austria’s	  conceptualization	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  This	  normative	  displacement	  of	  the	  national	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  supranational	  coheres	  with	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  political	  spillover.	  	  4.5:	  Concluding	  Observations	  	  Chapter	  three	  illustrated	  the	  evolving	  and	  positive	  relationship	  between	  supranational	  integration	  and	  the	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  rights.	  It	  found	  that,	  after	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  and	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam,	  the	  Court	  exhibited	  a	  strong	  preference	  towards	  constructing	  substantive	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees,	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  transcend	  national	  norms	  (see	  Familiapress).	  As	  such,	  it	  was	  projected	  that	  such	  integrative	  effects	  would	  be	  continued	  and	  amplified	  following	  the	  Charter’s	  introduction	  in	  2000.	  Chapter	  four	  was	  tasked	  with	  testing	  the	  accuracy	  of	  this	  prediction.	  Accordingly,	  this	  chapter	  finds	  that,	  with	  the	  proclamation	  of	  the	  Charter,	  the	  operational	  presence	  of	  rights	  as	  a	  normative	  legal	  construct	  has	  expanded	  within	  the	  jurisdictional	  bounds	  of	  Community	  law.	  	  The	  dynamics	  of	  functional	  spillover	  become	  evident	  in	  every	  case	  study	  examined	  in	  chapter	  four.	  From	  the	  time	  of	  Schmidberger	  to	  that	  of	  Sky	  Osterreich	  (2014),	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  have	  evolved	  in	  a	  way	  that	  awards	  human	  rights	  a	  self-­‐justifiable	  legal	  logic.	  In	  Schmidberger	  and	  Roj	  TV,	  the	  Court	  adheres	  to	  the	  derogation	  precedent	  set	  by	  ERT	  (1991),	  thereby	  consolidating	  and	  entrenching	  the	  effects	  of	  functional	  spillover	  it	  had	  created	  in	  1991;	  recall	  that	  ERT	  inaugurated	  the	  erosion	  of	  Member	  State	  competences	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within	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  favorable	  to	  supranational	  integration.408	  	  
Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  and	  Sky	  Osterreich	  also	  evidence	  the	  positive	  and	  causal	  relationship	  existing	  between	  the	  Charter’s	  ratification,	  jurisdiction,	  and	  functional	  spillover	  (as	  a	  measure	  of	  integration).	  In	  both	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  Court	  leverages	  human	  rights	  guarantees	  as	  additional	  standards	  by	  which	  to	  assess	  the	  admissibility	  of	  Member	  State	  legislation	  implementing	  Directives.	  In	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  and	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  is	  conditioned	  by	  the	  contested	  Directive’s	  preambles,	  which	  explicitly	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  Charter.409	  	  By	  validating	  the	  rights	  incorporated	  in	  EU	  legislative	  instruments,	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  illustrate	  how	  rights	  have	  acquired	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  legal	  logic	  that	  expands	  their	  operational	  role	  within	  the	  jurisdictional	  bounds	  of	  Community	  law.	  	  This	  above	  fore	  mentioned	  finding	  is	  also	  buttressed	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  Roj	  TV	  and	  
Sky	  Osterreich,	  the	  Court	  introduced	  freedom	  of	  expression	  into	  its	  review	  process	  at	  its	  own	  accord,	  and	  absent	  any	  prompting	  by	  the	  litigating	  parties	  or	  the	  referring	  national	  court.	  The	  only	  exceptions	  to	  this	  trend	  are	  Schmidberger	  and	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  national	  courts’	  preliminary	  question	  accounted	  for	  this	  right.	  Though	  the	  Court’s	  incorporation	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  in	  Roj	  TV	  and	  Sky	  Osterreich	  is	  most	  likely	  conditioned	  by	  the	  Directive’s	  preambles,	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  “Progressively,	  references	  to	  the	  Charter	  were	  freed	  from	  the	  mediation	  of	  secondary	  acts.	  Its	  value	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  408	  This	  is	  because	  the	  ECJ	  now	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  incorporate	  fundamental	  rights	  considerations	  as	  additional	  standards	  of	  legality	  when	  assessing	  the	  merits	  of	  a	  Member	  State’s	  derogation	  claim.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanation	  revisit	  Paragraph	  2,	  Section	  3.6	  (Concluding	  Remarks).	  	  409	  In	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  the	  contested	  Directive	  cites	  freedom	  of	  expression	  as	  an	  applicable	  right	  that	  is	  to	  be	  protected	  within	  the	  policy	  domains	  governing	  audiovisual	  media	  services.	  In	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA,	  the	  various	  Directives	  refer	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  property,	  the	  right	  to	  privacy,	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  protection	  of	  personal	  data.	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generalized	  as	  a	  reaffirming	  instrument…independent	  of	  explicit	  mentions	  in	  the	  recitals	  or	  provisions	  of	  the	  instruments	  at	  issue.”410	  It	  should	  be	  underscored	  that	  such	  a	  trend	  cannot	  be	  identified	  in	  any	  of	  the	  judgments	  analyzed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  In	  Cinetheque,	  
Grogan,	  ERT,	  and	  Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  adjudicated	  on	  freedom	  of	  expression	  at	  the	  request	  of	  either	  the	  domestic	  court	  or	  one	  of	  the	  litigating	  parties.	  Thus,	  chapter	  four	  confirms	  what	  chapter	  three	  already	  alluded	  to:	  the	  Court’s	  mandate	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  of	  national	  legislation	  has	  steadily	  expanded	  since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  
Cinetheque	  (1985),	  as	  posited	  by	  functional	  spillover.	  	  	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  contends	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  are	  contingent	  upon	  the	  emergence	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  Taken	  together,	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  conclude	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  spillover	  animate	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning,	  though	  only	  to	  a	  certain	  degree.	  As	  inaugurated	  in	  Familiapress,	  the	  Court	  has	  become	  more	  willing	  to	  reassess	  Member	  States’	  personal	  value	  judgments	  in	  their	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality.	  In	  Schmidberger,	  Scarlett	  Extended	  SA,	  and	  Sky	  Osterreich,	  the	  Court	  continues	  to	  apply	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  intrusively;	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  judgments,	  the	  Court	  examines	  how	  the	  national	  judiciaries	  carried	  out	  their	  own	  balancing	  tests	  before	  validating	  the	  national	  court’s	  claim.	  The	  only	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  Roj	  TV,	  and	  this	  point	  will	  be	  discussed	  shortly.	  What	  should	  be	  underscored	  is	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  reflects	  the	  fundamental	  balance	  between	  a	  common	  good	  and	  the	  right	  of	  the	  individual.	  When	  the	  Court	  reassesses	  Member	  States’	  application	  of	  proportionality	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  protected	  human	  right,	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  “a	  direct	  encroachment	  to	  the	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fundamental	  boundaries	  of	  the	  member	  state.”411	  This	  is	  because	  “the	  material	  difference	  between	  different	  human	  rights	  regimes	  is,	  typically,	  not	  in	  the	  category	  of	  rights	  that	  are	  protected	  but	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  balances	  are	  struck.”412	  However,	  such	  stringent	  employment	  of	  proportionality	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  substantive,	  judicial	  outcomes.	  When	  examined	  in	  relation	  to	  chapter	  three,	  chapter	  four	  concludes	  that,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  the	  Court’s	  jurisprudence	  does	  not	  effectively	  displace	  the	  national	  application	  of	  the	  right	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  supranational,	  thereby	  not	  altering	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary.’	  	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  often	  due	  to	  either	  the	  Court’s	  preference	  in	  leaving	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  discretion	  to	  the	  national	  court	  in	  determining	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  rights	  violation	  occurred	  (ERT,	  Roj	  TV,	  Familiapress),	  its	  desire	  to	  avoid	  the	  remedial	  question	  by	  stressing	  its	  delineated	  competencies	  (Cinetheque,	  Grogan),	  or	  its	  determination	  that	  the	  national	  measure	  coheres	  to	  the	  Community’s	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  right	  in	  question	  (Schmidberger).	  However,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  that	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  and	  Sky	  Osterreich	  prove	  to	  be	  exceptions	  to	  this	  finding,	  in	  that	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  resulted	  in	  the	  supranational	  institutionalization	  of	  several	  rights	  protections	  within	  national	  legal	  orders.	  What	  explains	  these	  judgments	  varying	  outcomes	  with	  regard	  to	  normative	  harmonization?	  And	  what	  do	  these	  differences	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  Court’s	  rationale	  for	  imposing	  different	  value	  judgments?	  	  	   Upon	  closer	  examination,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  contested	  national	  legislation,	  as	  referred	  to	  the	  Court,	  directly	  affect	  transnational,	  normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  411	  Weiler,	  Joseph	  H.H.	  "Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Boundaries:	  Common	  Standards	  and	  Conflicting	  Values	  in	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  European	  Legal	  Space."	  In	  An	  Identity	  for	  Europe:	  
The	  Relevance	  of	  Multiculturalism	  in	  EU	  Construction.	  P78.	  	  412	  Weiler,	  Joseph	  H.H.,	  and	  Nicolas	  J.S.	  Lockhart.	  ""Taking	  Rights	  Seriously"	  Seriously:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Its	  Fundamental	  Rights	  Jurisprudence."	  P585	  
	   136	  
diffusion.	  In	  all	  six	  of	  the	  cases	  concerning	  derogation	  claims	  (Cinetheque,	  ERT,	  Grogan,	  
Familiapress,	  Schmidberger,	  Roj	  TV),	  the	  Court	  decision	  failed	  to	  incite	  explicit,	  supranational	  harmonization	  with	  regards	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  However,	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  referred	  to	  the	  Court	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  Member	  State	  implementation	  of	  a	  Directive	  (Scarlet	  Extended	  SA,	  Sky	  Osterreich),	  such	  effects	  were	  observed.	  	  	   Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  and	  Sky	  Osterreich	  are	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  strong	  integrative	  impulse	  created	  by	  legal	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning	  revolves	  around	  the	  Directives’	  preambles,	  which	  explicitly	  reference	  the	  Charter,	  and	  articulates	  that	  guaranteeing	  non-­‐market	  protections	  are	  among	  one	  of	  the	  Directive’s	  intentions.	  Thus,	  when	  a	  Member	  State	  transposes	  the	  Directives	  into	  national	  law,	  they	  are	  to	  respect	  the	  Directive’s	  enumerated	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  well.	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  creation	  of	  political	  spillover	  within	  the	  human	  rights	  domain	  becomes	  inevitable	  when	  the	  Court	  adjudicates	  on	  a	  Member	  State	  policy	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  Directive’s	  imposed	  obligation.	  	  	   In	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA,	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  forcing	  several	  Member	  State	  governments	  to	  reconstruct	  their	  recently	  inaugurated	  policies	  regarding	  filtering	  technologies	  geared	  towards	  ensuring	  copyright	  protection	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  guaranteeing	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  protection	  of	  personal	  data,	  and	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  In	  
Sky	  Osterreich,	  the	  Court	  concludes	  that	  the	  Directive	  (and	  by	  extension	  the	  national	  law)	  strikes	  the	  proportional	  balance	  between	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  a	  business.	  This	  judgment	  effectively	  institutionalized	  freedom	  of	  expression	  protections	  within	  national	  policy	  domains	  governing	  audiovisual	  media	  services.	  Recall	  that	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment	  in	  Sky	  Osterreich	  contrasts	  sharply	  to	  the	  Austrian	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  past-­‐
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case	  law.	  Thus,	  political	  spillover	  as	  a	  “process	  of	  adaptive	  behavior,	  that	  is,	  the	  incremental	  shifting	  of	  expectations,	  the	  changing	  of	  values,”413	  becomes	  readily	  apparent	  in	  legal	  disputes	  stemming	  from	  a	  normative,	  Community	  source	  such	  as	  a	  Directive.	  	   However,	  this	  is	  not	  so	  in	  cases	  arising	  from	  derogation	  claims.	  In	  Cinetheque,	  ERT,	  
Grogan,	  Familiapress,	  Schmidberger,	  and	  Roj	  TV,	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  failed	  to	  result	  in	  the	  normative	  diffusion	  of	  Community-­‐inspired	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees.	  In	  
Schmidberger,	  the	  Court	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  craft	  a	  broad	  judgment	  in	  which	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  market	  freedoms	  could	  have	  been	  institutionalized	  at	  the	  supranational	  level.	  Had	  the	  Court	  chosen	  to	  do	  so,	  litigating	  parties	  and	  national	  courts	  alike	  could	  have	  invoked	  Schmidberger	  “as	  a	  statement	  of	  existing	  law	  and	  proceed	  to	  make	  arguments	  in	  the	  next	  case	  from	  that	  benchmark,	  thereby	  shifting	  their	  expectations,”414	  thereby	  further	  diffusing	  its	  normative	  impact	  throughout	  Member	  States’	  legal	  systems.	  However,	  recall	  that	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  established	  a	  very	  narrow	  precedent;	  the	  Court	  enumerated	  the	  specific	  precautions	  undertaken	  by	  Austria	  prior	  to	  the	  demonstration	  as	  among	  the	  primary	  justification	  for	  its	  validation	  of	  Austria’s	  derogation	  claims.	  Thus,	  Schmidberger	  illustrates	  that,	  even	  when	  the	  opportunity	  presents	  itself,	  the	  Court	  seems	  to	  prefer	  to	  construct	  its	  right	  jurisprudence	  on	  an	  incremental,	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  thereby	  mitigating	  its	  maximal	  integrative	  effects.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  Court	  opts	  to	  not	  engage	  in	  such	  an	  approach	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  matters	  concerning	  the	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internal	  market.	  For	  years,	  scholars	  have	  commented	  on	  the	  Court’s	  tendency	  to	  broadly	  define	  the	  substantive	  scope	  of	  the	  Treaty’s	  market	  freedoms.415	  	  	  Additionally,	  even	  as	  fundamental	  rights	  have	  come	  to	  occupy	  a	  critical	  space	  with	  the	  Union’s	  jurisdictional	  framework,	  the	  Court	  has	  continued	  its	  preference	  of	  awarding	  Member	  State	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  discretion	  in	  determining	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  the	  national	  law	  derogating	  from	  Community	  obligations	  and	  the	  contested	  rights	  violation.	  This	  observation	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ERT	  and	  Roj	  TV,	  two	  judgments	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  acknowledges	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  Member	  State	  policy	  to	  violate	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guarantees,	  but	  rules	  such	  determinations	  to	  be	  made	  solely	  by	  the	  referring	  domestic	  court.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Court	  reaches	  identical	  conclusions	  in	  both	  judgments,	  despite	  their	  twenty-­‐year	  gap,	  is	  striking	  in	  the	  paradigmatic	  context	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism.	  This	  is	  because	  neo-­‐functionalism	  posits	  that	  a	  positive	  relationship	  exists	  between	  the	  progression	  of	  time	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  competencies,	  motivating	  a	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  supranational	  decision-­‐making.	  As	  such,	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  Court	  to	  award	  less	  deference	  to	  the	  domestic	  court	  on	  matters	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  over	  time.	  Yet,	  as	  these	  case	  studies	  illustrate,	  such	  integrationalist	  driven	  judicial	  behavior	  has	  yet	  to	  surface	  in	  the	  context	  of	  cases	  concerning	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  Member	  States’	  derogation	  claims.	  	  The	  only	  anomaly	  to	  this	  identifiable	  pattern	  is	  Familiapress.	  Recall	  that	  the	  ECJ	  established	  strict	  set	  of	  criteria416	  that	  the	  national	  legislation	  was	  to	  satisfy	  in	  order	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  415	  See	  Vries,	  Sybe	  A.	  De.	  "Balancing	  Fundamental	  Rights	  with	  Economic	  Freedoms	  According	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice."	  ULR	  Utrecht	  Law	  Review	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2013):	  169.	  416	  The	  Court	  forced	  Austria	  to	  conduct	  extensive	  market	  research	  as	  a	  means	  of	  determining	  whether	  the	  national	  law	  maintains	  a	  proportional	  relationship	  in	  protecting	  press	  diversity	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  free	  movement	  	  of	  goods.	  By	  requiring	  this,	  the	  Court	  forces	  Austria	  to	  become	  more	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Austria’s	  derogation	  claim	  to	  be	  validated.	  By	  extension,	  it	  is	  now	  more	  difficult	  for	  Austria’s	  law	  to	  be	  exculpated	  from	  the	  Treaty’s	  obligations,	  and	  this	  makes	  the	  national	  law	  more	  susceptible	  to	  supranational	  harmonization.	  Thus,	  political	  spillover	  is	  apparent	  in	  Familiapress	  insofar	  as	  supranational	  preferences	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  permeate	  into	  the	  Austria’s	  national	  legal	  order.	  However,	  Familiapress’s	  display	  of	  political	  spillover	  is	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  Court’s	  steadfast	  commitment	  to	  ensuring	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  In	  the	  factual	  context	  of	  this	  case,	  the	  Court	  realized	  it	  could	  protect	  both	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  simultaneously,	  and	  so	  it	  took	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so	  by	  crafting	  a	  stringent	  derogation	  framework.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
Familiapress	  shows	  how	  the	  Court	  may	  choose	  to	  take	  a	  stricter	  approach	  to	  rights	  protection,	  when	  doing	  so	  also	  benefits	  the	  EU’s	  market	  relations.	  Paradoxically,	  this	  reality	  may	  also	  explain	  why	  the	  Court	  took	  such	  a	  deferential	  approach	  in	  applying	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  in	  Roj	  TV.	  Recall	  that	  the	  Court	  noted	  that	  Germany’s	  legislation	  does	  not,	  at	  least	  on	  face	  value,	  impeded	  intra-­‐Community	  trade.	  This	  reality	  seems	  to	  have	  compelled	  the	  Court	  to	  leave	  questions	  regarding	  fundamental	  rights	  at	  the	  complete	  discretion	  of	  the	  domestic	  court.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  should	  still	  be	  stressed	  that	  Familiapress	  will	  cause	  normative	  change	  only	  if	  the	  Austrian	  court	  determines	  that	  the	  national	  law	  does	  preserve	  press	  diversity.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  maximal,	  integrative	  effects	  of	  political	  spillover	  become	  contingent	  upon	  the	  national	  court’s	  ruling.	  	  Despite	  Familiapress	  being	  the	  one	  exception,	  the	  overall	  pattern	  is	  clear:	  when	  the	  Court	  adjudicates	  on	  a	  Member	  State	  measure	  in	  application	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  policy,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  hesitant	  to	  engage	  in	  rights-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review.	  This	  preference	  for	  awarding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  elaborate	  in	  its	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  press	  diversity	  protections,	  and	  Austria	  must	  factor	  in	  supranational	  considerations,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	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a	  margin	  of	  deference	  to	  the	  domestic	  court	  seems	  to	  become	  even	  more	  pronounced	  when	  the	  Court	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  assess	  the	  congruency	  between	  constitutional	  norms,	  as	  manifested	  in	  a	  national	  policy,	  in	  relation	  to	  Community	  law.	  In	  addition	  to	  Roj	  TV417,	  
Schmidberger	  and	  Grogan	  are	  also	  case	  and	  point.	  Recall	  that	  in	  Schmidberger,	  the	  Court	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  more	  restrained	  in	  its	  conceptualization	  of	  Austria’s	  deployment	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  because	  the	  Community	  violation	  had	  its	  origins	  in	  an	  enshrined	  constitutional	  guarantee	  and	  stemmed	  from	  the	  activities	  of	  private,	  third	  party	  individuals.	  In	  Grogan,	  the	  Court	  simply	  leveraged	  market	  relations	  to	  render	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  question	  null,	  thereby	  avoiding	  the	  contentious	  debate	  on	  the	  Community’s	  rights	  relation	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  services.	  	  As	  a	  whole,	  these	  findings	  illustrate	  to	  what	  degree	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  a	  neo-­‐functionalist	  paradigm	  becomes	  helpful	  in	  explaining	  how	  the	  Court’s	  rights-­‐based	  adjudication	  enhances	  European	  integration.	  It	  is	  clear	  that,	  “the	  judicial	  practice	  after	  Lisbon	  shows	  that	  the	  enhanced	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  system	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  has	  so	  far	  not	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  stricter	  application	  of	  a	  uniform	  standard	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  towards	  the	  Member	  States.”418	  Such	  an	  approach	  to	  the	  constitutionalization	  of	  rights	  undoubtedly	  mitigates	  the	  integrative	  effects	  that	  such	  legal	  norms	  could	  otherwise	  have.	  The	  question	  that	  remains	  is	  what	  explains	  this	  judicial	  behavior	  as	  manifested	  in	  this	  thesis’	  empirical	  findings.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.6	  Judicial	  Restraint:	  A	  Possible	  Explanation	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  417	  The	  ECJ	  was	  to	  assess	  the	  congruency	  between	  a	  national	  law	  concerning	  Germany’s	  constitutional	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  with	  that	  of	  a	  Directive’s	  obligations.	  	  418	  Sanchez,	  Sara	  Iglesias.	  "The	  Court	  and	  the	  Charter:	  The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Entry	  Into	  Force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  on	  the	  ECJ's	  Approach	  to	  Fundamental	  Rights."P1606	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Taken	  together,	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  reveal	  the	  Court’s	  overall	  penchant	  for	  judicial	  restraint	  within	  the	  jurisdictional	  domain	  of	  rights.	  By	  extension,	  these	  findings	  also	  illustrate	  that	  nationally	  entrenched	  sociopolitical	  preferences	  and	  normative	  interests	  animate	  the	  Court’s	  calculated	  judicial	  behavior,	  and	  that	  this	  constrains	  and	  alters	  the	  dynamics	  of	  supranational	  integration.	  	  At	  this	  juncture,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  very	  same	  political	  self-­‐interest	  that	  characterized	  the	  battle	  between	  the	  ECJ	  and	  Member	  States’	  judiciaries	  over	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  supremacy	  during	  the	  1960s	  continues	  to	  endure	  in	  the	  present	  context.419	  Since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  EU,	  Member	  States	  and	  their	  judiciaries	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  “a	  bill	  of	  rights	  are,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  a	  powerful	  vehicle	  of	  integration.”420	  As	  such,	  they	  possess	  the	  ability	  to	  erode	  their	  constitutional	  traditions,	  to	  threaten	  their	  policy	  sovereignty,	  and	  “to	  undermine	  their	  own	  carefully	  curated	  case	  law.”421For	  their	  part,	  the	  Court	  has	  been	  concerned	  with	  mitigating	  the	  impression	  of	  the	  Union’s	  democratic	  deficit422,	  ensuring	  the	  supremacy	  of	  Community	  law,	  and	  maintaining	  its	  political	  legitimacy.	  	  Though	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  Court	  have	  been	  coalescing	  around	  the	  establishment	  of	  Community-­‐level	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  since	  the	  1960s,	  such	  worries	  seem	  to	  be	  even	  more	  relevant	  in	  the	  present	  day	  than	  they	  were	  in	  then.	  Since	  the	  establishment	  of	  two,	  additional	  pillars	  of	  governance	  -­‐	  the	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  and	  the	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  –	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  in	  1993,	  the	  Union’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  419	  Revisit	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  3	  	  420	  Mancini,	  Frederico.	  "The	  Making	  of	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe."	  P608.	  	  421	  Sweet,	  Alec	  Stone.	  "Chapter	  1:	  The	  European	  Court	  and	  Integration."	  In	  The	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe.	  P18	  422	  See	  Jensen,	  Thomas.	  2009.	  "The	  Democratic	  Deficit	  of	  the	  European	  Union."	  Living	  Reviews	  In	  Democracy	  1,	  1-­‐8.	  Academic	  Search	  Complete,	  EBSCOhost	  (accessed	  March	  27,	  2016).	  
	   142	  
competencies	  have	  expanded	  into	  policy	  domains	  such	  as	  immigration,	  asylum,	  security,	  and	  data	  protection.	  It	  is	  by	  no	  accident	  that	  with	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  2009,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  defiantly	  declared	  with	  Article	  4(1):	  	  “The	  Union	  shall	  respect	  the	  equality	  of	  Member	  States	  before	  the	  Treaties	  as	  well	  as	  their	  national	  identities,	  inherent	  in	  their	  fundamental	  structures,	  political	  and	  constitutional,	  inclusive	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  self-­‐government….”	  	  Such	  an	  acknowledgement	  is	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  the	  Union	  respecting	  Member	  States’	  conceptualization	  of	  their	  ‘fundamental	  boundaries,’	  and	  the	  Charter’s	  structure	  also	  exemplifies	  this	  fact.	  Take,	  for	  example,	  the	  Charter’s	  distinction	  between	  rights	  and	  principles.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Section	  2.5C,	  the	  logic	  motivating	  the	  delineation	  between	  rights	  and	  principles	  lies	  in	  the	  Charter’s	  desire	  to	  leave	  a	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  Member	  States’	  legislation;	  “some	  of	  the	  principles,	  therefore,	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  defensive	  character,	  and	  primarily	  aim	  at	  protection	  national	  norms	  (specifically	  social	  standards)	  from	  a	  leveling	  by	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Union.”	  This	  notion	  of	  ensuring	  Member	  States	  sovereign	  competencies	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  Article	  52(2)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  which	  proclaims:	  	  “The	  rights	  recognized	  by	  this	  Charter	  which	  are	  based	  on	  the	  Community	  Treaties	  or	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  shall	  be	  exercised	  under	  the	  conditions	  and	  within	  the	  limits	  
defined	  by	  those	  Treaties.”	  	  Such	  a	  declaration	  coheres	  nicely	  with	  the	  above	  fore	  mentioned	  text	  of	  Article	  4(1)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon.	  	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  provisions	  “emphasize	  that	  the	  Charter	  does	  not	  entail	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  Union	  competences,	  nor	  of	  the	  field	  of	  application	  of	  Union	  law,	  and	  it	  conveys	  the	  message	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  Charter	  and	  is	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completely	  willing	  to	  abide	  by	  them.”423	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  to	  “not	  always	  interfere	  with	  the	  actual	  merits	  of	  the	  policy	  pursued,”	  424	  and	  to	  leave	  “considerable	  latitude	  to	  the	  state	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  devices,”425	  is	  logical.	  Such	  employment	  of	  judicial	  restraint	  with	  regards	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  adjudication	  simultaneously	  accommodates	  and	  protects	  the	  political	  self-­‐interest	  of	  both	  the	  ECJ	  and	  the	  Member	  States’	  national	  judiciaries.	  	  
Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  this	  thesis	  observes	  a	  stronger	  integrative	  effect	  in	  the	  judgments	  concerning	  national	  legislation	  implementing	  EU	  Directives.	  “When	  EU	  legal	  instruments	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  the	  Charter	  in	  their	  preambles	  or	  provisions,	  this	  was	  taken	  as	  a	  signal	  of	  commitment	  by	  the	  legislature,	  meaning	  that	  the	  Charter	  could	  be	  referred	  to	  be	  the	  judges	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  becoming	  involved	  in	  judicial	  activism.”426	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  assessing	  Member	  States’	  derogation	  claims,	  “the	  Court	  has	  maintained	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  deference,	  entrusting	  the	  national	  courts	  with	  the	  task	  of	  applying	  the	  EU	  standard	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  following	  the	  guiding	  elements	  provided	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.”427	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CONCLUSION	  
Summary	  This	  thesis	  has	  been	  concerned	  with	  assessing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  ECJ	  has	  aided	  the	  Union’s	  integrationist	  project	  with	  regards	  to	  law.	  Specifically,	  it	  has	  been	  tasked	  with	  examining	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Court’s	  evolving	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  has	  served	  as	  a	  positive,	  integrative	  force	  in	  the	  ongoing	  construction	  of	  the	  EU.	  It	  has	  leveraged	  a	  neo-­‐functionalist	  paradigm	  as	  a	  means	  of	  explaining	  not	  only	  how	  the	  Court’s	  rights-­‐based	  adjudication	  enhances	  European	  integration,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  examining	  to	  what	  
degree	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  it	  does	  so.	  	  “Constitutionalism	  captures,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  what	  is	  special	  about	  the	  process	  of	  European	  integration.”428	  As	  such,	  chapter	  one	  argued	  that	  neo-­‐functionalism	  provides	  a	  theoretical	  explanation	  for	  how	  and	  why	  constitutionalization	  and	  regional	  integration	  converge.	  It	  discussed	  how	  functional	  spillovers	  results	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  Community	  law	  into	  novel	  and	  diverse	  policy	  domains,	  providing	  the	  Court	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  adjudicate	  within	  the	  human	  rights	  domain.	  It	  also	  discussed	  how	  political	  spillover	  transforms	  political	  attitudes	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  supranational,	  thereby	  creating	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  Community-­‐level	  of	  norms,	  as	  embodied	  by	  legal	  doctrine.	  	  In	  this	  connection,	  chapter	  two	  strove	  to	  illustrate	  how	  neo-­‐functionalist	  spillover	  requires	  to	  the	  ECJ	  to	  create	  and	  to	  coordinate	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  human	  rights.	  Because	  norms	  codify	  collective	  discipline	  and	  reflect	  a	  Community’s	  shared	  social	  purpose,	  normative	  construction	  and	  diffusion	  works	  symbiotically	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  is	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constitutionalization.	  Chapter	  two	  also	  discussed	  the	  factors	  influencing	  normative	  construction	  of	  human	  rights	  	  (i.e.	  historical	  and	  cultural	  traditions,	  the	  ‘fundamental	  boundary’),	  and	  it	  highlighted	  the	  inherent	  difficulty	  the	  Court	  faces	  in	  translating	  such	  considerations	  into	  a	  transnational,	  legal	  context.	  The	  chapter	  then	  proceeded	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  Court	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  this	  reality	  by	  highlighting	  the	  various	  considerations	  (i.e.	  jurisdiction,	  economic	  competencies)	  and	  substantive	  sources	  (i.e.	  the	  Charter’s	  provisions,	  ECHR,	  the	  Constitutional	  traditions	  of	  the	  Member	  States)	  animating	  the	  Court’s	  legal	  reasoning.	  	  Collectively,	  these	  two	  chapters	  conveyed	  how	  neo-­‐functionalist	  logic	  created	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  transnational,	  legal	  incorporation	  of	  human	  rights	  at	  the	  institutional	  and	  normative	  level.	  However,	  what	  remained	  to	  be	  seen	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  integrative	  impulse	  translated	  into	  substantive,	  jurisprudential	  policy	  outcomes	  that	  effectively	  expanded	  the	  role	  of	  supranational	  human	  rights	  adjudication	  within	  national	  legal	  orders,	  thereby	  further	  facilitating	  integration.	  Chapters	  three	  and	  four	  concluded	  that	  the	  constitutionalization	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  buttresses	  the	  momentum	  of	  integration,	  insofar	  as	  there	  has	  been	  an	  expansion	  of	  supranational	  governance	  within	  this	  legal	  domain.	  By	  this,	  I	  mean	  that	  remedial	  rights	  protections	  have	  expanded	  their	  operational	  role	  within	  the	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  law	  over	  the	  decades.	  By	  extension,	  the	  Court’s	  ability	  to	  partake	  in	  right-­‐oriented	  judicial	  review	  has	  expanded,	  thereby	  creating	  more	  opportunities	  for	  normative	  harmonization	  to	  unfold.	  	  This	  empirical	  finding	  coheres	  with	  the	  analytical	  expectations	  of	  functional	  spillover.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  finds	  that	  functional	  spillover	  fails	  to	  translate	  into	  political	  spillover	  at	  the	  substantive,	  jurisprudential	  level.	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  contends	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that	  political	  actors	  will	  “shift	  their	  national	  loyalties,	  expectations,	  and	  political	  activities	  to	  a	  new	  and	  larger	  center,”429	  thereby	  resulting	  in	  the	  supranational	  normative	  construct	  transcending	  the	  national.	  Such	  an	  effect	  was	  observed	  only	  when	  the	  Court	  adjudicated	  on	  member	  state	  legislation	  implementing	  a	  EU	  directive.	  When	  the	  Court	  was	  to	  assess	  Member	  States’	  derogation	  claims	  in	  relation	  to	  human	  rights,	  their	  judgments	  failed	  to	  institutionalize	  the	  supranational	  protection	  of	  that	  right.	  As	  discussed,	  the	  Court	  preferred	  to	  award	  the	  national	  courts	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  deference	  in	  determining	  the	  remedial	  relationship	  between	  the	  national	  law,	  the	  EU	  law,	  and	  the	  contested	  rights	  violation.	  This	  effectively	  mitigated	  normative	  diffusion,	  and	  by	  extension,	  supranational	  integration	  because	  Member	  State	  were	  free	  to	  establish	  their	  distinct	  standards	  of	  rights	  protection.	  As	  a	  whole,	  these	  case	  studies	  illustrate	  that	  the	  constitutionalization	  of	  rights	  does	  not	  always	  maintain	  the	  ability	  to	  serve	  as	  “an	  integrative	  device	  that	  tends	  to	  displace,	  by	  means	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  supremacy,	  the	  disparities	  between	  Member	  States.”430	  This	  empirical	  finding	  within	  the	  ECJ’s	  freedom	  of	  expression	  case	  law	  is	  a	  product	  of	  judicial	  restraint.	  As	  such,	  these	  judgments’	  outcomes	  illustrate	  how	  entrenched	  sociopolitical	  self-­‐interest	  and	  institutions	  can	  work	  symbiotically	  to	  consciously	  mitigate	  the	  integrative	  effects	  arising	  from	  constitutionalization.	  This	  conclusion	  directly	  implicates	  our	  understanding	  of	  neo-­‐functionalist	  legal	  logic	  in	  relation	  to	  right	  adjudication.	  Though	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law,	  the	  Treaty’s	  amendments,	  and	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter	  has	  created	  more	  possibilities’	  for	  normative	  construction	  and	  diffusion	  of	  right	  to	  occur	  throughout	  diverse	  policy	  domains	  (functional	  spillover),	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	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such	  opportunities	  does	  not	  guarantee	  the	  immediate,	  transnational	  institutionalization	  of	  such	  rights	  within	  national	  legal	  orders	  (political	  spillover).	  Thus,	  in	  the	  legal	  context	  of	  human	  rights,	  functional	  and	  political	  spillover	  does	  not	  always	  work	  synergistically,	  “and	  through	  positive	  feedback	  loops	  that	  would…push	  steadily	  for	  deeper	  integration.”431	  In	  this	  connection,	  it	  seems	  that	  inter-­‐govermentalist	  logic	  provides	  insight	  into	  why	  the	  Court	  takes	  such	  a	  restrained	  approach	  to	  constitutionalization	  within	  the	  legal	  domain	  of	  rights.	  In	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  neo-­‐functionalism,	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  also	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  Member	  State	  preferences.	  However,	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  differs	  from	  neo-­‐functionalism	  in	  that	  it	  maintains	  a	  more	  “static	  notion	  of	  the	  political	  interests”432	  animating	  integration,	  and	  it	  “castigates	  neo-­‐functionalism	  for	  failing	  to	  appreciate	  the	  enduring	  importance	  of	  nationalism.”433In	  the	  context	  of	  rights	  adjudication,	  both	  the	  Court	  and	  Member	  States’	  judiciaries	  have	  maintained	  this	  ‘static’	  notion	  of	  ensuring	  the	  autonomy	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  guarantees	  at	  the	  national	  level	  throughout	  the	  decades,	  though	  for	  different	  reasons.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.6,	  whereas	  the	  Court	  strives	  to	  maintain	  its	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	  supremacy	  of	  Community	  law,	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  interested	  in	  preserving	  their	  hegemony	  over	  their	  enshrined	  constitutional	  traditions.	  These	  distinct	  political	  aims	  motivate	  the	  Court	  to	  take	  a	  more	  deferential	  approach	  to	  rights	  adjudication,	  and	  it	  explains	  why	  the	  Court	  has	  chosen	  to	  continually	  construct	  its	  rights	  jurisprudence	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  provide	  domestic	  courts	  with	  a	  flexible	  standard	  of	  accommodation	  for	  remedial	  protection.	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Paradoxically,	  this	  empirical	  finding	  coheres	  with	  notions	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism.	  This	  is	  because	  neo-­‐functionalism	  emphasizes	  utilitarian	  self-­‐interests,	  and	  it	  argues	  that	  political	  actors	  turn	  “to	  supranational	  means	  when	  this	  course	  appears	  profitable	  to	  
them.”434As	  such,	  “integration	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  occur	  within	  a	  domain	  shielded	  from	  the	  interplay	  of	  direct	  political	  interests.”435	  Given	  that	  human	  rights	  guarantees	  are	  inherently	  political	  within	  a	  transnational	  context,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  this	  thesis	  has	  observed	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  judicial	  restraint	  and	  the	  curtailing	  of	  the	  integrative	  effects	  arising	  from	  constitutionalization.	  Thus,	  the	  integrative	  logic	  of	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  seems	  to	  intersect	  with	  that	  of	  neo-­‐functionalism	  only	  in	  policy	  domains	  maintaining	  firmly	  entrenched,	  political	  preferences,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  human	  rights.	  	   	  
Implications	  for	  Future	  Research	  	  	  As	  a	  whole,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  EU’s	  gradual	  constitutionalization	  of	  rights	  has	  produced	  integrative	  effects	  at	  the	  institutional	  level,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  so	  following	  the	  legal	  ratification	  of	  the	  Charter.	  As	  a	  normative	  and	  legal	  concept,	  rights	  have	  come	  to	  occupy	  an	  important	  place	  within	  the	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  of	  Community	  law,	  and	  they	  are	  now	  more	  elastically	  deployed	  as	  additional	  standards	  of	  legality,	  making	  Member	  States’	  legal	  orders	  more	  susceptible	  to	  supranational	  harmonization	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  rights.	  However,	  the	  Court	  has	  carefully	  counterbalanced	  the	  Charter’s	  integrative	  effect	  by	  deferring	  the	  remedial	  scope	  of	  its	  application	  to	  Member	  States’	  themselves.	  By	  doing	  so,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  crafted	  an	  unpredictable	  standard	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  human	  rights	  protections.	  Yet,	  such	  a	  standard	  for	  remedial	  protection	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  simultaneously	  flexible,	  one	  that	  can	  be	  molded	  and	  adapted	  to	  fit	  the	  particularities	  of	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each	  case.	  Such	  an	  approach	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  of	  merit	  considering	  the	  Union’s	  continually	  evolving	  competencies,	  and	  given	  the	  pluralism	  of	  constitutional	  traditions	  and	  political	  interests	  alike.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  EU’s	  progressive	  development	  of	  competences,	  future	  research	  should	  track	  how	  the	  Court	  continues	  to	  apply	  and	  to	  interpret	  Article	  51(1)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  regarding	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  application.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  notion	  of	  “implementation	  of	  EU	  law,”436	  is	  an	  open-­‐textured	  formula,	  especially	  so	  for	  “situations	  that	  are	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  implementing	  measures	  but	  present	  a	  substantial	  element	  of	  connection	  with	  EU	  law.”437	  In	  this	  connection,	  future	  research	  should	  also	  continue	  to	  track	  the	  Court’s	  approach	  to	  the	  national	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	  its	  relationship	  to	  producing	  substantive,	  legal	  change	  within	  national	  legal	  orders,	  and	  how	  this	  affects	  the	  normative	  uniformity	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  standard	  for	  fundamental	  rights.	  By	  doing	  so,	  future	  research	  will	  be	  able	  to	  more	  readily	  assess	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Charter	  serves	  as	  a	  centripetal	  force	  within	  the	  EU’s	  autonomous,	  transnational	  legal	  system.	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